Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Two Sided Markets written by David S. Evans and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume collects a series of essays that I have written over the last decade on businesses that create value by providing products that enable two or more different types of customers to get together, find each other, and exchange value. Part I presents background pieces on the economics of multi-sided platforms and industries in which these platforms are common. Part II examines the antitrust economics of two-sided markets including defining the difficult problem of defining the boundaries of competition. Part III comprises several papers that apply two-sided market analysis to web-based businesses. Part IV does the same for payment cards which is the industry that attracted much of the early two-sided analysis - in part because this framework was helpful for understanding the hotly debated issue of interchange fees. Part V collects several article and book chapters on software platforms. These platforms have become especially important in the last several years because they are now the basis for revolutionary developments with mobile devices (e.g. the iPhone and Android), social networking (Facebook in particular), and payments (PayPalX). The essays are published as originally written (usually, in fact, whatever version could be made freely available). The book itself consists of a series of urls (website addresses) that enable the reader to download these papers.

Download or read book Three Essays on the Economics of Two sided Markets written by Tim Brühn and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Platform Economics written by David S. Evans and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 459 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume collects a series of essays that I have written over the last decade on multi-sided platform businesses that create value by providing products that enable two or more different types of customers to get together, find each other, and exchange value. Part I presents background pieces on the economics of multi-sided platforms and industries in which these platforms are common. Part II examines the antitrust economics of two-sided markets including the difficult problem of defining the boundaries of competition. Part III comprises several papers that apply two-sided market analysis to web-based businesses. Part IV does the same for payment cards which is the industry that attracted much of the early two-sided analysis -- in part because this framework was helpful for understanding the hotly debated issue of interchange fees. Part V collects several article and book chapters on software platforms. These platforms have become especially important in the last several years because they are now the basis for revolutionary developments with mobile devices (e.g. the iPhone and Android), social networking (Facebook in particular), and payments (PayPalX).

Download or read book Essays on Platforms and Two sided Markets written by Mark Joseph Tremblay and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 95 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Market Structure written by Feng Ruan and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 87 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Two sided markets and their relevance for competition policy written by Jitendra Jain and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2009-05-11 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - Topic: European Union, grade: Good, Ruhr-University of Bochum, course: MA (ECUE), language: English, abstract: Two-sided markets consist of two or more exclusive groups, present simultaneously on a single platform. They both need each other. In order to succeed the platform provider must ensure active participation of both groups. In the beginning these bazaars face chicken-and-egg problem, which should be solved, sometimes even by providing free chicken. These markets include some of the most important industries in new economy such as mobile telephony companies, free TV services, OS suppliers, software providers, gaming companies, credit card companies, auction sites etc. Ebay and amazon are good examples of two-sided markets. In such two-sided markets buyers and sellers first trade with the intermediary/ies so as to gain access to the functionalities of a platform and then trade with each other under oligopolistic conditions. In chapter 1 of this paper an attempt has been made to describe finer nuances of two-sided markets. Thereafter I proceed to discuss the various dynamics of two-sided markets in chapter 2. Two-sided firms differ from traditional industries and they follow totally different business economics. Marginal cost does not help them in deciding optimal price. Pricing policies and other business strategies must be formulated in such a way that it should ensure active interaction of both groups. Pricing strategy should get both sides on board and should also solve chicken-and-egg problem. Chapter 3 describes the pricing policy adopted by two-sided markets. Chapter 4 deals with relevance of two-sided markets for competition policy. Competition Authorities do not need different set of rules to regulate these industries. However Competition Authorities must consider various economic principles that influence pricing and investment decisions in two-sided markets. Chapter 5 concludes with various observations and suggestions.

Download or read book Essays in Two sided Markets and Optimal Contracting written by Mie la Cour Sonne and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Path Dependence in Two sided Markets written by Tobias Georg Meyer and published by Tobias Georg Meyer. This book was released on 2012 with total page 371 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on the Analysis and Implications of Two sided Matching Markets written by James W. Boudreau and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Market Design and Experimental Economics written by Eric Samuel Mayefsky and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.

Download or read book Market Definition in Two Sided Markets written by Lapo Filistrucchi and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Drawing from the economics of two-sided markets, we provide suggestions for the definition of the relevant market in cases involving two-sided platforms, such as media outlets, online intermediaries, payment cards companies and auction houses. We also discuss when a one-sided approach may be harmless and when instead it can potentially lead to a wrong decision. We then show that the current practice of market definition in two-sided markets is only in part consistent with the above suggestions. Divergence between our suggestions and practice is due to the failure to fully incorporate the lessons from the economic theory of two-sided markets, to the desire to be consistent with previous practice and to the higher data requirements and the higher complexity of empirical analysis in cases involving two-sided platforms. In particular, competition authorities have failed to recognize the crucial difference between two-sided transaction and non-transaction markets and have been misled by the traditional argument that where there is no price, there is no market.

Download or read book Essays on Two sided Markets with Externalities written by Alper Nakkas and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 119 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Networks written by Mircea Ioan Marcu and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent developments in the economics of networks have shown the potential fallacies of using one-sided logic in two-sided markets. In the third study I develop a two-sided market model to analyze the pricing and quality decisions of a profit maximizing managed care organization (MCO) in the presence of indirect network externalities between doctors and patients. The managed care organization faces trade-offs when choosing the quality of service, insurance premiums, and physician reimbursements. These trade-offs depend on patient health risk and physician cost distributions, the elasticity of supply of physicians with respect to reimbursements, the marginal cost of service quality, and the marginal utility derived by patients from access to a broader network of physicians and the quality of health services. In the case of iso-elastic distributions of patient health risk and physician cost of treatment, an increase in the cost of providing quality decreases the quality provided by the MCO, which leads to fewer policyholders, lower physician reimbursements, and fewer doctors in the preferred network. The insurance premium also decreases. An increase in the health risk of the population results in lower quality, lower reimbursements, and fewer physicians in the MCO's network. The insurance premium also decreases, but the decrease is smaller than the decrease in individuals' utility due to lower quality and fewer physicians, which leads to fewer policyholders.

Download or read book The Antitrust Paradox written by Robert Bork and published by . This book was released on 2021-02-22 with total page 536 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

Download or read book Matchmakers written by David S. Evans and published by Harvard Business Review Press. This book was released on 2016-05-03 with total page 271 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A different kind of matchmaker. Many of the most dynamic public companies, from Alibaba to Facebook to Visa, and the most valuable start-ups, such as Airbnb and Uber, are matchmakers that connect one group of customers with another group of customers. Economists call matchmakers multisided platforms because they provide physical or virtual platforms for multiple groups to get together. Dating sites connect people with potential matches, for example, and ride-sharing apps do the same for drivers and riders. Although matchmakers have been around for millennia, they’re becoming more and more popular—and profitable—due to dramatic advances in technology, and a lot of companies that have managed to crack the code of this business model have become today’s power brokers. Don’t let the flashy successes fool you, though. Starting a matchmaker is one of the toughest business challenges, and almost everyone who tries to build one, fails. In Matchmakers, David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, two economists who were among the first to analyze multisided platforms and discover their principles, and who’ve consulted for some of the most successful platform businesses in the world, explain how matchmakers work best in practice, why they do what they do, and how entrepreneurs can improve their chances for success. Whether you’re an entrepreneur, an investor, a consumer, or an executive, your future will involve more and more multisided platforms, and Matchmakers—rich with stories from platform winners and losers—is the one book you’ll need in order to navigate this appealing but confusing world.

Download or read book The Economics of Platforms written by Paul Belleflamme and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2021-11-11 with total page 275 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Digital platforms controlled by Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Netflix, Tencent and Uber have transformed not only the ways we do business, but also the very nature of people's everyday lives. It is of vital importance that we understand the economic principles governing how these platforms operate. This book explains the driving forces behind any platform business with a focus on network effects. The authors use short case studies and real-world applications to explain key concepts such as how platforms manage network effects and which price and non-price strategies they choose. This self-contained text is the first to offer a systematic and formalized account of what platforms are and how they operate, concisely incorporating path-breaking insights in economics over the last twenty years.

Download or read book Essays in Industrial Organization and Environmental Economics written by Katalin Springel and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies both theoretically and empirically how the allocation of subsidies might matter for economic outcomes in a two-sided market framework. The first chapter establishes a non-neutrality result with respect to subsidy allocation in the price theory of two-sided markets with membership externalities building on the works of Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Armstrong (2006). There are many examples of two-sided (or more generally, multi-sided) markets in which two (or more) groups of agents interact via intermediaries or “platforms.” The distinguishing feature of these markets is the presence of cross-group externalities: the benefit enjoyed by a member on one side depends on the number of members on the other side of the market. Examples of two-sided markets include: video game platforms, news media, credit cards, and electric vehicles. A basic feature of two-sided markets established by Rochet and Tirole (2006) is the non-neutrality of price structure, that is, how usage fees or membership prices are allocated between the two sides of the market have an impact on economic outcomes like buyer demand. In this work, I consider whether this non-neutrality in the price allocation carries over to the case of subsidies (or taxes) in two-sided markets. Specifically, I develop a stylistic two-sided market model to show that subsidies to the different sides of the market are non-neutral, in the sense that one dollar spent on subsidies given to one side of the market has a different economic impact as the same amount spent on subsidies given to end-users on the other side of the market. This result is driven by a key feature of two-sided markets: the positive network externalities between the two sides of the market. The non-neutrality of the allocation of subsidies has important implications for such quickly growing industries like the electric vehicle market in which currently most governments are subsidizing both sides of the market. Therefore, if we really want to learn where to give subsidies to achieve the policy goal of increased electric vehicle sales the findings of this chapter show that we need to empirically estimate the impact of price subsidies to buyers versus direct subsidies to charging stations using a two-sided market framework. The second chapter, building on the non-neutrality result of the first chapter, provides an empirical analysis of the impact of electric vehicle incentives on electric vehicle adoption that highlights the importance of accounting for the network externalities present in this market. I model the electric vehicle sector as a two-sided market with network externalities to determine which side of the market is more efficient to subsidize depending on key vehicle demand and charging station supply primitives. I use new, large-scale vehicle registry data from Norway to empirically estimate the impact that different subsidies have on electric vehicle adoption when network externalities are present. I present descriptive evidence to show that electric vehicle purchases are positively related to both consumer price and charging station subsidies. I then estimate a structural model of consumer vehicle choice and charging station entry, which incorporates flexible substitution patterns and allows me to analyze out-of-sample predictions of electric vehicle sales. In particular, the counterfactuals compare the impact of direct purchasing price subsidies to the impact of charging station subsidies. I find that between 2010 and 2015 every 100 million Norwegian kroner (around 12.39 million USD) spent on station subsidies alone resulted in 835 additional electric vehicle purchases compared to a counterfactual in which there are no subsidies on either side of the market. The same amount spent on price subsidies led to only an additional 387 electric vehicles being sold compared to a simulated scenario where there were no electric vehicle incentives. However, the relation inverts with increased spending, as the impact of station subsidies on electric vehicle purchases tapers off faster.