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Book Essays on the Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information

Download or read book Essays on the Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information written by Darin Lee and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information

Download or read book The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information written by Ulrich Schwalbe and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.

Book Essays on the economics of asymmetric information

Download or read book Essays on the economics of asymmetric information written by Russell Wade Cooper and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 163 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays on Asymmetric Information Economics

Download or read book Essays on Asymmetric Information Economics written by Wioletta Dziuda and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays on the international economics with asymmetric information

Download or read book Essays on the international economics with asymmetric information written by Hisashi Sawaki and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays on Asymmetric Information and Markets

Download or read book Essays on Asymmetric Information and Markets written by Paula Cristina Ramada and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 162 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays on the Effects of Asymmetric Information

Download or read book Essays on the Effects of Asymmetric Information written by Mario Ramirez Basora and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It can be easily argued that most, if not all, real economic settings are asymmetric in nature. Particularly, it is often the case that one or several agents possess more or better information than the rest when agreeing upon an economic transaction. Although the information economics revolution of the 1970s laid out the majority of the theoretical foundations, the effects of asymmetric information are subtle and have not been studied in some very interesting contexts, which motivate this thesis. In the first essay, which is based on joint work with Antonio Bento and Benjamin Ho, we study the problem of an uninformed regulator who wishes to use a voluntary price instrument under varying degrees of uncertainty, specifically in the context of a carbon offset market. In this scenario, a regulator offers private land owners a contract that compensates them for producing carbon offsets while minimizing adverse selection and welfare losses. The model shows that monitoring should decrease as the uncertainty of offset quality decreases, but should increase as uncertainty over agricultural productivity increases. Also, in response to those who argue that the problem of additionality is so large that carbon offsets should not be allowed in carbon regulation, the model quantifies the amount of additionality and finds that even in the case of a regulator with no information, welfare is improved by allowing offset contracts. Finally, the model offers guidance for calculating the optimal offset price as a function of the regulator's information. The second essay consists of a cardinal tournament used by a representative firm to choose its next CEO. Candidates are managers of different types: they are heterogeneous over levels of ability and risk aversion. The managers have private information about their ability. In this context, a two-dimensional solution set of levels of ability and risk aversion corresponding to each possible mean of cash flow realization is identified. Using two different specifications (CARA preferences with normally distributed cash flows, and CRRA preferences with log-normally distributed cash flows), the trade-off between managerial ability and risk aversion is found to be characterized by a concave function. Furthermore, for better levels of technology, the relative importance of risk aversion with respect to ability increases, while for worse levels of technology, the reverse holds. Finally, in the third essay, using a model based on the optimal consumption and investment models from the operations research literature, I study how the CEO characteristics studied in Chapter 2 impact dividend policy and the longrun evolution of the firm. Specifically, when assuming CRRA preferences and a concave trade-off between ability and risk aversion, I find that the optimal dividend policy of the CEO is non-monotonic with respect to risk aversion. In other words, CEOs with a combination of both high (or low) ability and risk aversion, will pay out lower dividend yields than CEOs with a more balanced combination of ability and risk aversion. Furthermore, firm survival is a function of the dividend yield and is also non-monotonic: while the probability of firm survival converges to either zero or one as risk aversion (and, by extension, ability) converges to either zero or infinity, there exists a range for which lower investment counteracts a potentially higher dividend yield, and the resulting change in the probability of survival is ambiguous.

Book Three Essays in Financial Economics Under Asymmetric Information

Download or read book Three Essays in Financial Economics Under Asymmetric Information written by Günter Strobl and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 142 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Markets  Games  and Organizations

Download or read book Markets Games and Organizations written by Tatsuro Ichiishi and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2003 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The book is a collection of contributed papers in honor of Roy Radner. Reflecting Radner's broad range of research interests, the papers cover quite diverse areas, ranging over general equilibrium analysis of the market mechanism, economies undergoing transition, satisficing behavior, markets with asymmetric information, organizational resource allocation and information processing, incentives and implementation, stable sets and the core, stochastic sequential bargaining games, perfect equilibria in a macro growth model, repeated games, and evolutionary games.

Book Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information

Download or read book Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information written by Stefan Maus and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory

Download or read book Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory written by Robert J. Aumann and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 1999 with total page 306 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Since the publication of "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics. This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cutting-edge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, "Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games" and of the oft-cited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, "The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member". This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice. The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences.

Book Essays in Asymmetric Information

Download or read book Essays in Asymmetric Information written by Gregorio Impavido and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays on Economic Theory in Asymmetric Information

Download or read book Essays on Economic Theory in Asymmetric Information written by Naoki Kojima and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 173 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis deals with three different subject matters from the aspect of asymmetric information, especially adverse selection : relationship banking in the framework of competition amongst banks ; initial public offering ( conflicts of interests between the issuer, the underwriter and investors ; mechanism of optimal pricing by a monopolistic seller in the presence of budget constraints on the part of buyers and proposition of new approach to this bi-dimensional asymmetric information problem.

Book The Core of a Production Economy with Asymmetric Information

Download or read book The Core of a Production Economy with Asymmetric Information written by Isabelle Lefebvre and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Essays in the Economics of Asymmetric Information

Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Asymmetric Information written by Fredrik Andersson and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 136 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Assets  Beliefs  and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics

Download or read book Assets Beliefs and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics written by Charalambos D. Aliprantis and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-11-11 with total page 733 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.