Download or read book Essays on Modeling Product Returns and Durable Goods Secondary Markets written by Jeffrey D. Shulman and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on the Marketing Strategies of a Durable Goods Manufacturer written by Ngan Ngoc Chau and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When purchasing durable goods, consumers not only pay for current but also future consumption; consequently, forward looking behavior is an important consideration in durable goods markets. For example, anticipating that prices will go down in the future, consumers may delay the purchase today; such behavior has a significant impact on the firm's marketing strategies. This dissertation investigates the impact of durability on two marketing strategies: new product introductions and supply chain design. The first part of this dissertation (Chapter 3) examines a durable goods manufacturer's new product introduction strategy under different market environments where network effects and product compatibility are important. More specifically, this part explores the incentives of a firm to use either a replacement strategy or a skipping strategy--in the former, the firm commercializes the existing technology, while in the latter, it does not; in either case, an improved technology will be available in the future and the firm will introduce a new product at that time. Using a two-period analytical model with network effects, the analysis shows how the level of improvement in the new product, along with the type of compatibility between the products, interacts with network strength to determine the manufacturer's optimal strategy. Under gradual new product improvement, there is a strict preference for replacement. In contrast, under rapid new product improvement, that preference only holds in markets with relatively high levels of the network strength; at lower levels of the network strength, skipping is preferred; interestingly, for moderate values of the network strength, the level of product improvement affects the manufacturer's optimal choice differently under varying types of compatibility. The second part of this dissertation (Chapters 4 and 5) focuses on the supply chain design decisions of a durable goods manufacturer who is a sole supplier of an essential proprietary component for making the end product. Three different supply chain structures are considered. In the first, the manufacturer operates as a "component supplier" and sells the component to a downstream firm who then makes the end product. In the second structure, the manufacturer produces the end product using its component but does not make that component available to any other firms; here, the manufacturer operates as a "sole entrant". Finally, the manufacturer can operate as a "dual distributor" who not only makes the end product using its own component, but sells the component to a downstream firm who then competes against the manufacturer in the end product market. The extant literature on the optimal choice among the above supply chain structures has focused mainly on static settings in a framework of price competition. By contrast, researchers predominantly use quantity competition to examine durable goods markets in dynamic (i.e., multiple time period) settings. Moreover, the literature notes diversity in optimal firm behavior under the two types of (i.e., price and quantity) competition. Therefore, to transition from supply chain design in a static setting to a more dynamic one where consumers are forward-looking, this part utilizes Chapter 4 to analyze the manufacturer's choice using quantity competition in a static setting. This analysis (in Chapter 4) identifies precisely the shift in the manufacturer's choice of supply chain structure when moving from price competition to a quantity competition framework. With that analysis as a benchmark, the next chapter focuses on the manufacturer's choice in a dynamic setting. More specifically, Chapter 5 investigates the impact of durability on the optimality of the supply chain structures identified above. Using a two period setting, the analysis explores how the manufacturer's preference for different supply chain structures is modified. The findings reveal that, e.g., when durability is taken into account, the manufacturer's preference for the sole entrant role goes up, while the preference for the component supplier role goes down. Further, under certain conditions, the manufacturer may opt to be a dual distributor in the first period and then choose to become only a component supplier in the second period. The underlying rationale for such shifts in preference is directly linked to durability, which creates future competition and substantially reduces the manufacturer's profitability in the long run. Interestingly, this negative impact varies across different supply chain structures. Overall, this dissertation contributes to the current literature on durable goods and enhances our understanding of the impact of durability on the optimality of distinct marketing strategies, and provides insights that are valuable to both academics and managers.

Download or read book Two Essays on the Marketing of Durable Goods written by Raghunath Singh Rao and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Strategic Considerations for Product Development written by James Winslow Sawhill and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed of three essays focused on strategic considerations for product development. In chapter I, I address the question of whether consumers equally weigh capital and operating costs when purchasing durable goods. This trade off is important to manufacturers as they determine how much of their product design and production costs should be dedicated to keeping operating costs low. I test this empirically using data from the automobile industry. Chapter II is also an empirical study which explores whether consumers are willing to pay for socially responsible products. The answer to this question is important for firms to address in their product development process as they decide whether they will gain more market share by producing a socially responsible product with somewhat higher costs or a low cost product which does not incorporate socially responsible practices. In this case, I use data on retail sales in coffee industry using fair trade practices as an exemplar of social responsibility. Chapter III addresses the question of how durable or reliable manufacturers of durable goods should make their products. Consumers will likely want to pay more for a more durable product, yet increased durability depresses replacement demand. I attempt to gain insight into this trade off by developing an analytical model of the interplay between consumers and a monopolist manufacturer of durable goods. The remainder of the abstract provides a more detailed summary of each of these chapters in turn. Chapter I explores whether consumers behave as if they are optimally trading off capital and operating costs when purchasing a durable good. I study this question using data on gas prices and automobile sales over the 20 year period, 1971-1990. This question is important for three reasons. First, it is interesting from a theoretical basis if consumers make this trade off optimally. Many theoretical models in marketing and economics make the fundamental assumption that consumers equally weigh current and future events when making decisions today. Yet there is some evidence, mostly from laboratory experiments, that consumers underweight future events. I attempt to explore this question in a market setting where the stakes are considerably higher. This research adds evidence to the debate about how much weight consumers place on future events when making choices today. Second, it is interesting to firms making product design decisions. If consumers underweight future events, then when making purchase decisions, consumers will view operating costs as less important than the upfront capital cost of the product. Finally, the answer to this question informs public policy. Many have argued that there is a need for the US to reduce gasoline demand per capita. Lower gasoline consumption would reduce environmental pressures, potentially dampen inflation, and allow more foreign policy flexibility in dealing with antagonistic regimes in oil-exporting states. While these rationale for reducing gasoline consumption have a normative flavor, and reasonable people may disagree as to the validity and motivations of this goal, it will nonetheless be useful to know the relative effectiveness of different policy levers in curbing gasoline consumption. For example, if consumers underweight fuel costs during the vehicle purchase decision, then a gas tax will be relatively less effective than a tax on gas guzzling vehicles. To study this question I develop a choice model of the automobile industry. I identify the weight the consumer places on capital v. operating costs by determining how much of the variation in automobile market share can be explained by variation in each of these two factors holding other product attributes constant. We use data from the period 1971-1990, a period over which gas prices and thereby operating costs experienced considerable variation. In order to model operating costs which are not known at the time of purchase, I account for the expectations of consumers about car usage and gas prices. I assume that consumers are aware that they will respond to changes in the gasoline prices with changes in their driving patterns. Consumers also know that gasoline prices are not stable, and need to form expectations about future gasoline prices at the time of the automobile purchase. To take account of this effect, I estimate an ARIMA model of US gasoline prices from 1960-1995, that is used as the by consumers in their expectations formation process. Taking car usage and gas price expectations together enables an estimate of future gasoline costs of operating the car in the future. I also account for consumer heterogeneity in miles driven, sensitivity to automobile price, and sensitivity to operating costs. Finally, I recognize that prices are not exogenously determined and attempt to model prices as market outcomes. Based on the results of the model developed, I find no evidence to support behavioral theories that consumers systematically underweight the cost of future events in real market settings. However, I find significant evidence that large portions of the population are not making the trade-off optimally. Some consumers underweight future operating costs (SUV drivers) while others appear to overweight them (hybrid drivers). Conservatively, at least 30% of the population is either drastically underweighting or overweighting operating costs when purchasing a new car. Chapter II addresses the question of whether consumers are willing to pay for corporate social responsibility(CSR). This question is important in an environment where CSR is ubiquitous, yet it is unclear that these programs actually pay off for the firms that sponsor them. For example, consider Target's program to donate 1% of all retail sales to United Way local charities. Do consumers really want their money spent this way? Are consumers happily paying 1% higher prices or are they switching to a competitor which does not donate a portion of revenues to charity? Who is making the donation in the end, Target's shareholders or customers? From a social planner's perspective, the point is largely moot, yet to the shareholders of Target and many other firms practicing CSR, the question is crucially important. I endeavor to study this question within the context of the coffee industry, an important and sizeable commodity market. In particular, I explore the impact of Fair-Trade (FT) certification on the retail coffee market. FT is a social and ethical movement that supports the ethical production of coffee and other products largely in third world countries. Coffee can be FT certified by adhering to FT standards. Once certified, FT coffee is distinguished from non-FT by distinctive labeling visible to the consumer who is deciding which coffee product to select from the supermarket shelf. The analytical strategy for this paper is to first estimate the price premium commanded by FT coffee over non-FT coffees through ordinary least squares (OLS) and Fixed Effects hedonic price regressions. However, these tools do not allow us to disentangle the portion of the price premium which is due to supply considerations (i.e., FT certification costs) from the portion which is due to consumers' willingness to pay for FT coffee because they want to support socially responsible coffee production. To parse out willingness to pay from the overall price premium, I specify a brand choice model similar to the model used in chapter I. Using hedonic price regressions I establish that FT coffee carries a price premium of $1.74 per 12-16 oz. It seems likely that at least a portion of this premium is due to increased consumer willingness to pay for FT coffee. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that the price premium is a result of the added costs associated with that FT practices. The choice model specified in this paper should enable the allocation of the cause of the price premium we have now established for FT coffee to demand v. supply considerations. I hope to estimate this model in future research. Chapter III addresses the problem of how durable or long lasting manufacturers should they make their products. On the one hand a more durable product will be more desirable to consumers, since it will provide benefits over a longer period. Thus, a longer-lived product will command a higher price. However, it seems likely that unit production costs will increase as a product is made more durable due to the increased cost of more reliable materials and more exacting quality standards. In addition, a product which is more durable will be replaced less frequently. Ceteris paribus, less frequent replacement is less desirable to manufacturers, as the periodicity of the revenue stream increases. Manufacturers can trade off the benefits of durability with the costs to determine the optimal reliability or life for the goods they produce. In some sense, this problem is a classic trade-off between quality and cost. What distinguishes the durable goods reliability problem is that increasing quality depresses replacement demand. A common anecdote is that light bulbs could easily be manufactured to last longer, but are not in order to increase replacement sales. This question is important for manufacturers to understand from several perspectives. First, a manufacturer of a product with technology that is fairly static (e.g., light bulbs), needs to consider replacement demand in developing product designs. When technology is not static (e.g., computers), it is important to understand how the rate of technology advance will stimulate replacement demand. Should the products be designed to be more or less durable in the face of technological advance? An additional complication arises when the rate of technological advance may only be partially observable to the consumer (e.g. golf clubs). Finally, manufacturers need to consider "buying back" used durable goods from the.

Download or read book Essays on Durable Goods Markets written by Rahul Kumar Guha and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 366 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Coordinating Channels for Durable Goods written by Preyas S. Desai and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A large literature in economics and marketing studies the problem of manufacturer's designing contracts that give a retailer appropriate incentives to make decisions that are optimal from the manufacturer's point of view (see, for example, Spengler 1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Lal 1990, Rao and Srinivasan 1995, Desai 1997, among others). An important result from this literature is that the manufacturer can coordinate retail price decisions by choosing a two-part tariff in which the wholesale price equals the manufacturer's marginal cost and the fixed fee extracts all the rents from the retailer. In other words, the manufacturer sells the firm to the retailer for the fixed fee and, thus, eliminates the double-marginalization problem. Although this result is well established for non-durables, researchers have not analyzed the coordination issue for durable goods manufacturers who have the added complexity of competition from used goods in secondary markets. In this paper, we show how the coordination problem for a durable goods manufacturer is fundamentally different from the traditional coordination problem of a non-durables manufacturer. In particular, the durable goods manufacturer has to solve not only the coordination problem but also the time-consistency problem (see, for example, Coase 1972, Bulow 1982, Purohit 1995). Our objectives in this paper are to investigate whether or not the insights from the channel coordination literature, that has developed principally with non-durable goods in mind, are also applicable to durable goods. In order to do this, we develop a dynamic, two-period model in which a manufacturer sells its products to a retailer who sells the product to consumers. Products sold in the first period become used goods in the second period and compete with sales of new units. Starting from consumer utilities, we derive inverse demand functions for new and used goods and consider a number of different contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer. We start with a simple contract in which the manufacturer offers a wholesale price for a period at the beginning of that period. As one would expect, this contract does not solve either the channel coordination problem or the time-consistency problem. We then consider a number of two-part tariff contracts. Given the well-established results from the existing channel coordination literature, we begin with a contract in which the manufacturer offers per-period two-part tariffs in which all wholesale prices are set at marginal cost. We find that not only does this contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double marginalization problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. We then allow the wholesale prices to be different from marginal costs. We show that using this more general two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer can achieve channel coordination. That is, the total channel profit is the same as the profit of an integrated seller. However, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the marginal cost. Next, we consider a contract in which the manufacturer uses a single fixed fee, announced at the beginning of the first period. The per-period wholesale prices are still at the marginal cost level in this contract. This contract is identical to "selling the firm to the retailer" at the price of the fixed fee. Here we find that the contract can achieve channel coordination. However, the contract is not an equilibrium solution. In particular, the manufacturer increases wholesale prices to above marginal cost levels. Although some of the contracts above solve the double marginalization problem, none of them mitigates the time consistency problem. In order to solve both these problems, the contract must yield total channel profit equal to an integrated renter's profit. Because the renter does not have a problem with time consistency, an integrated renter earns the highest profits in a durable goods channel. We derive a contract that solves both of these problems. In this contract, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and two per-period wholesale prices, both of which turn out to be strictly above the marginal cost. Interestingly, with this contract, the manufacturer makes more money by selling through the retailer rather than selling directly to consumers. We contribute to the coordination literature by examining coordination issues in a dynamic, durable goods context and identifying a new coordination problem - unlike the traditional coordination models, a durable goods manufacturer may have to provide the retailer incentives to sell less rather than to sell more. Clearly, the traditional "selling the firm to the retailer," approach does not solve this new problem. We also contribute to the durable goods literature by showing how a durable goods manufacturer can sell its product and solve its time consistency problem. Effectively, this allows the manufacturer to earn the same profits as it would get if it could commit to prices or if it could rent its product. When committing to individual consumers or renting can only be achieved through additional costs, our solution is the optimal strategy for a durable goods manufacturer.

Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2009-05 with total page 582 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Optimal Hierarchical Structure and Durable Goods Supply Chain Management written by Xiaobo Zheng and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 166 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The first essay explores how the economics of information processing affects the design of managerial hierarchy when queuing phenomena and task complexity are considered. The cost of information processing consists of the cost of time delay and the cost of capacity to process information and make decisions. We assume that time delay follows a queuing process and that there are complexity-related inefficiencies when processing data from n data sources. Some new results emerge: hierarchical organizations exhibit diseconomies of scope for small n, and economies of scope for large n. The capacity devoted to processors increases with tier, although their capacity utilization falls. Under specific conditions, when a firm expands n, the size of upper management does not change. In the second essay, we investigate how demand volatility affects durable goods producers' production and pricing decisions by using a model of an infinite-horizon sequential game between a monopolistic producer and strategic consumers. We formulate the problem of a monopolist durable goods producer as a discrete-time Markov Decision Process and prove certain structural properties of the sales and production policy. These structural properties facilitate an efficient computational algorithm, which we use in running numerical experiments to explicate the producer's strategy and to conduct equilibrium comparative statics analysis. We show that a simple myopic policy is optimal when each period's demand is independent and identically distributed. When demand is correlated across periods, the producer's optimal production and sales policy is not myopic and depends on various market conditions. In the last essay, I investigate a durable goods producer's capacity and wholesale price choices and a retailer's selling and leasing strategy under demand uncertainty. My result indicates that with strategic consumers timing their purchase of a product, the producer is worse off with decentralization through wholesale-price contracts in the presence of constant replacement sales, and he prefers using a retailer that leases than one that sells. I also show that more positive inter-period correlation of economic conditions increases the producer's expected profit but reduces the retailer's expected profit. Whereas, higher economic volatility reduces the producer's expected profit but increases the retailer's expected profit"--Pages iv-v.

Download or read book Essays in Industrial Organization written by Wanjia Zhu (Ph.D.) and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies economic agents' behavior and market outcomes in the presence of competition or self-competition. The first chapter examines how leasing affects the profitability and market power of durable goods oligopolists. By leasing some new products in addition to selling, oligopolists can earn profits from attracting consumers with high preferences for leasing, alleviating self-competition by controlling the secondary markets, and mitigating the Coase effect they suffer due to the lack of commitment. However, leased products depreciate faster than sold products, which reduces the value of off-lease products to oligopolists. To understand the various interrelated effects of leasing, I develop a dynamic equilibrium model of durable goods oligopoly with leasing, selling, and secondary markets. I calibrate the model to aggregate data from the US heavy-duty truck industry and obtain a good fit. In counterfactuals, I quantify different effects of leasing and assess how quality depreciation and market structure affect these effects. Results show that eliminating leasing decreases truck manufacturers' profits by 83.2% and markups by 31.6%. Manufacturers benefit more from leasing when leased trucks depreciate slower and when there is more competition. The second chapter (joint with Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, and Christopher Sullivan) investigates firms' post-merger product repositioning. We compile information on conglomerate firms' additions and removals of products for a sample of 61 mergers and acquisitions across a wide variety of consumer packaged goods markets. We find that mergers lead to a net reduction in the number of products offered by the merging firms, and the products that are dropped tend to be particularly dissimilar to the firms' existing products. These results are consistent with theories of the firm that emphasize core competencies linked to particular segments of the product market. The third chapter is about the effect of entry on an incumbent's location choice. Using detailed trip data from the New York City, this chapter studies the effect of the entry of a new taxi service, boro taxis, on the spatial distribution of the incumbent yellow taxis. Boro taxis provide the same service as yellow taxis except that they are not allowed to pick up in certain areas. I find that the number of yellow taxi trips increases by 19.7% in areas where boro taxis are prohibited from picking up and increases by 6.2% in other areas. These results indicate that yellow taxis migrate to areas with no boro taxis in order to avoid competition, and that there is an increase in demand following the entry of boro taxis. Furthermore, the increase in demand for taxis is positively correlated with the number of boro taxi trips.

Download or read book Essays on Unconventional Pricing Strategies and Impacts of Economic Regulation on Stock Return Asymmetry written by Daniel F. Lima and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 129 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains two essays in industrial organization and one related to the corporate finance literature. In Chapter 1, I investigate how consumers' feedback might affect investments in innovation and quality assurance (QA). I also focus on how innovation impacts intertemporal price discrimination. In the model, a monopolist releases a new technology embedded in a durable good. Then, I investigate the determinants of the introduction of a new generation in the second period. In the proposed framework consumers' feedback can reduce the firm's QA/R & D expenses. However, consumers usually provide feedback through complaints, causing reputation damage. I derive conditions under which the lower "quality" version of the good (first generation) will have a higher price than the improved version (second generation). Planned obsolescence causes the price schedule to be steeper than predicted by the previous literature on durable goods. The model predicts and explains Apple's experience with several products, in particular the iPhone family. In Chapter 2, Aren Megerdichian and I examine a firm's decision to raise price overtly (by increasing the dollar amount of a good) versus the adoption of hidden price change (by decreasing the contents in a good's package). We provide an oligopoly model explaining the hidden price change phenomenon, as well as a comprehensive set of empirical analyses, including demand estimation to assess the impact of hidden price increases on expenditure share and profitability. We focus on the ready-to-eat cereal industry. During July 2007, General Mills decreased the cereal content for 20 out of 23 of their products in our sample of scanner data. We find that some General Mills products gained expenditure share after the hidden price change relative to what the demand system predicts, indicating that a sufficient proportion of consumers did not notice the hidden price change. We also find that some products lost share relative to what the demand system predicts. A key finding is that consumers tend to notice hidden price changes on smaller-sized boxes of cereal, leading them to substitute to larger-sized boxes of cereal. The final chapter is a joint work with Regio Martins. Our conjecture is that regulated firms may be subject to some regulatory practices that can potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical features of return data and investigate whether there are any meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies.

Download or read book Four Essays Upon Durable Goods written by Kenneth Lee Wertz and published by . This book was released on 1970 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Product Durability economics and Related Aspects written by Thomas E. Smith and published by . This book was released on 1976 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Product Life Cycle of Durable Goods written by Joachim Kaldasch and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A dynamic model of the product lifecycle of (nearly) homogeneous durables in polypoly markets is established. It describes the concurrent evolution of the unit sales and price of durable goods. The theory is based on the idea that the sales dynamics is determined by a meeting process of demanded with supplied product units. Taking advantage from the Bass model for first purchase and a logistic model for repurchase the entire product lifecycle of a durable can be established. For the case of a fast growing supply the model suggests that the mean price of the good decreases according to a logistic law. Both, the established unit sales and price evolution are in agreement with the empirical data studied in this paper.The presented approach discusses further the interference of the diffusion process with the supply dynamics. The model predicts the occurrence of lost sales in the initial stages of the lifecycle due to supply constraints. They are the origin for a retarded market penetration. The theory suggests that the imitation rate B indicating social contagion in the Bass model has its maximum magnitude for the case of a large amount of available units at introduction and a fast output increase. The empirical data of the investigated samples are in qualitative agreement with this prediction.

Download or read book Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science written by Fouad El Ouardighi and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-09-16 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: With this book, distinguished and notable contributors wish to honor Professor Charles S. Tapiero’s scientific achievements. Although it covers only a few of the directions Professor Tapiero has taken in his work, it presents important modern developments in theory and in diverse applications, as studied by his colleagues and followers, further advancing the topics Tapiero has been investigating. The book is divided into three parts featuring original contributions covering the following areas: general modeling and analysis; applications to marketing, economy and finance; and applications to operations and manufacturing. Professor Tapiero is among the most active researchers in control theory; in the late sixties, he started to enthusiastically promote optimal control theory along with differential games, successfully applying it to diverse problems ranging from classical operations research models to finance, risk and insurance, marketing, transportation and operations management, conflict management and game theory, engineering, regional and urban sciences, environmental economics, and organizational behavior. Over the years, Professor Tapiero has produced over 300 papers and communications and 14 books, which have had a major impact on modern theoretical and applied research. Notable among his numerous pioneering scientific contributions are the use of graph theory in the behavioral sciences, the modeling of advertising as a random walk, the resolution of stochastic zero-sum differential games, the modeling of quality control as a stochastic competitive game, and the development of impulsive control methods in management. Charles Tapiero’s creativity applies both in formulating original issues, modeling complex phenomena and solving complex mathematical problems.

Download or read book Essays on Economic Integration Migration and Secondary Markets written by Max St. Brown and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 2, North Korean Internal Migration, analyzes the determinants of interprovincial migration within North Korea. The analysis stands out from similar analyses of other countries due to North Korea's strict restrictions on labor mobility. Despite these restrictions, it is found that economic variables play a statistically significant role in accounting for variations in interprovincial migration rates. All else equal, there are more migrations towards provinces with strong industry growth and provinces that contain a special economic zone.

Download or read book Applications of Operational Research and Mathematical Models in Management written by Miltiadis Chalikias and published by MDPI. This book was released on 2020-11-17 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book, Applications of Operational Research and Mathematical Models in Management, includes all the papers published in the Mathematics Special Issue with the same title. All the published papers are of high quality and were subjected to rigorous peer review. Mathematics is included in the Science Citation Index (Web of Science), and its current Impact Factor is 1.747. The papers in this book deal with on R&D performance models, methods for ranking the perspectives and indicators of a balance scorecard, robust optimization model applications, integrated production and distribution problem solving, demand functions, supply chain games, probabilistic optimization and profit research, coordinated techniques for order preference, robustness approaches in bank capital optimization, and hybrid methods for tourism demand forecasting. All the papers included contribute to the development of research.

Download or read book Essays in Dynamic General Equilibrium Theory written by Alessandro Citanna and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2006-01-11 with total page 278 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the area of dynamic economics, David Cass’s work has spawned a number of important lines of research, including the study of dynamic general equilibrium theory, the concept of sunspot equilibria, and general equilibrium theory when markets are incomplete. Based on these contributions, this volume contains new developments in the field, written by Cass's students and co-authors.