Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets written by Alexander Westkamp and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets written by Benjamín Tello Bravo and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets with Correlated Preferences written by Onur Burak Celik and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays about Matching Markets written by Jan Christoph Schlegel and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Thèse. HEC. 2017
Download or read book Essays on the Analysis and Implications of Two sided Matching Markets written by James W. Boudreau and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on dynamic matching markets written by Morimitsu Kurino and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design written by Siqi Pan and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 112 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation focuses on the design and implementation of matching markets where transfers are not available, such as college admissions, school choice, and certain labor markets. The results contribute to the literature from both a theoretical and a behavioral perspective, and may have policy implications for the design of some real-life matching markets. Chapter 1, “Exploding Offers and Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” studies the unraveling problem prevalent in many two-sided matching markets that occurs when transactions become inefficiently early. In a two-period decentralized model, I examine whether the use of exploding offers can affect agents' early moving incentives. The results show that when the culture of the market allows firms to make exploding offers, unraveling is more likely to occur, leading to a less socially desirable matching outcome. A market with an excess supply of labor is less vulnerable to the presence of exploding offers; yet the conclusion is ambiguous for a market with a greater degree of uncertainty in early stages, which depends on the specific information structure. While a policy banning exploding offers tends to be supported by high quality firms and workers, it can be opposed by those of lower quality. This explains the prevalence of exploding offers in practice. Chapter 2, “Constrained School Choice and Information Acquisition,” investigates a common practice of many school choice programs in the field, where the length of students' submitted preference lists are constrained. In an environment where students have incomplete information about others’ preferences, I theoretically study the effect of such a constraint under both a Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) and a Boston mechanism (BOS). The result shows that ex-ante stability can only be ensured under an unconstrained DA, but not under a constrained DA, an unconstrained BOS, or a constrained BOS. In a lab experiment, I find that the constraint also affects students’ information acquisition behavior. Specifically, when faced with a constraint, students tend to acquire less wasteful information and distribute more efforts to acquire relevant information under DA; such an effect is not significant under BOS. Overall, the constraint has a negative effect on efficiency and stability under both mechanisms. Chapter 3, “Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms,” is jointly written with Huanxing Yang. We investigate targeted advertising in two-sided markets. Each of the two competing platforms has single-homing consumers on one side and multi-homing advertising firms on the other. We focus on how asymmetry in platforms’ targeting abilities translates into asymmetric equilibrium outcomes, and how changes in targeting ability affect the price and volume of ads, consumer welfare, and advertising firms' profits. We also compare social incentives and equilibrium incentives in investing in targeting ability. Chapter 4, “The Instability of Matching with Overconfident Agents: Laboratory and Field Investigations,” focuses on centralized college admissions markets where students are evaluated and allocated based on their performance on a standardized exam. A single exam’s measurement error causes the exam-based priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences: a student who underperforms in one exam may lose her placement at a preferred college to someone with a lower aptitude. The previous literature proposes a solution of combining a Boston algorithm with pre-exam preference submission. Under the assumption that students have perfect knowledge of their relative aptitudes before taking the exam, the suggested mechanism intends to trigger a self-sorting process, with students of higher (lower) aptitudes targeting more (less) preferred colleges. However, in a laboratory experiment, I find that such a self-sorting process is skewed by overconfidence, which leads to a welfare loss larger than the purported benefits. Moreover, the mechanism introduces unfairness by rewarding overconfidence and punishing underconfidence, thus serving as a gender penalty for women. I also analyze field data from Chinese high schools; the results suggest similar conclusions as in the lab.
Download or read book Models of Matching Markets written by Sangram Vilasrao Kadam and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The structure, length, and characteristics of matching markets affect the outcomes for their participants. This dissertation attempts to fill the lacuna in our understanding about matching markets on three dimensions through three essays. The first essay highlights the role of constraints at the interviewing stage of matching markets where participants have to make choices even before they discover their own preferences entirely. Two results stand out from this setting. When preferences are ex-ante aligned, relaxing the interviewing constraints for one side of the market improves the welfare for everyone on the other side. Moreover, such interventions can lead to a decrease in the number of matched agents. The second essay elucidates the importance of rematching opportunities when relationships last over multiple periods. It identifies sufficient conditions for existence of a stable matching which accommodates the form of preferences we expect to see in multi-period environments. Preferences with inter-temporal complementarities, desire for variety and a status-quo bias are included in this setting. The third essay furthers our understanding while connecting two of the sufficient conditions in a specialized matching with contracts setting. It provides a novel linkage by providing a constructive way of arriving at a preference condition starting from another and thus proving that the later implies the former.
Download or read book Essays on Matching and Market Design written by Fuhito Kojima and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The third essay investigates matching and price competition. A recent antitrust case against the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) sparked discussion about the effect of a centralized matching on wages. Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin (2006) investigate a matching market with price competition where each firm hires one worker and show that firm profits are higher and worker wages are lower in the equilibrium with the centralized matching mechanism than in any competitive equilibrium. We demonstrate these conclusions may not hold once firms can hire more than one worker and different firms hire different numbers of workers, as in most real-life matching markets including the NRMP.
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Matching Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies dynamic matching and bargaining games with two-sided private information bargaining. There is a market in which a large number of heterogeneous buyers and sellers search for trading partners to trade with. Traders in the market are randomly matched pairwise. Once a buyer and a seller meet, they bargain following the random-proposer protocol: either the buyer or the seller (randomly chosen) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party. The traders leave once they successfully trade, and the market is continuously replenished with new-born buyers and sellers who voluntarily choose to enter. We study the steady state with positive entry. There are (except the asymmetric information) two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. Chapter 2 addresses existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It provides a simple necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium. The equilibrium is unique if the discount rate is small relative to the search costs. This chapter also analyzes how the composition of frictions affects the patterns of equilibria. It shows that if the discount rate is small relative to the search costs, in equilibrium every meeting results in trade. If the discount rate is relatively large, some meetings do not result in trade. Chapter 3 shows that private information typically deters entry. Because of search externalities, this entry-deterring effect may be socially desirable or undesirable. We provide and interpret a simple condition under which private information improves welfare. Chapter 4 studies the convergence properties of equilibria as frictions vanish. It not only shows that, as frictions vanish, the equilibrium price range collapses to the Walrasian price and the equilibrium welfare converges to the Walrasian welfare level, but also provides the rate of convergence. Under random-proposer bargaining, welfare converges at the fastest possible rate among a.
Download or read book Market Design written by Christoph Schwaiger and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Market Design and Experimental Economics written by Eric Samuel Mayefsky and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.
Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets Course Allocation Team Formation and P2P Lending Markets written by Hoda Atef Yekta and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation we analyze matching markets using two broad methodologies. In the first two of three essays, we use integer programming to design new practical markets, solving difficult organizational problems in which items like a seat in a classroom course or membership on a project team are allocated to agents who express their preferences to a centralized planner. In the third essay, we employ empirical modeling to study the signals sent among three types of agents in a peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market: borrowers, lenders, and a (rating-service) platform. The first two essays use extensive simulations, while the third uses statistical analysis on a large empirical dataset: four years of loan application and payment history from a prominent online P2P lending platform. Our findings in the first essay show that large but manageable course allocation problems can be solved with various multi-stage optimization algorithms, providing much better outcomes than existing benchmarks from the literature on metrics of efficiency, fairness, and incentive-compatibility. We demonstrate robustness of our techniques by simulating over a variety of market parameters, including varying degrees of manipulation over a range of common to private value utility functions. These results show promising new practical designs that can satisfy more organizational objectives than previous methods. In the second essay, we find that the much harder (interpersonal) quadratic-interaction optimization in an agent-based team formation game requires advanced computational technique. In the pursuit of a balance between the competing objectives efficiency and group stability, we explore the cutting-edge of computational operations research. In contrast to existing draft-based systems that favor distributed, intuitive heuristics, we solve the extremely difficult centralized optimization problems directly, with positive results using a new technique for bi-level optimization in this context, based on a customized column generation framework. Again, the results produce a promising new optimization framework for a practical problem, and our results compare favorably with existing methods. Finally, the results of the third essay show just how complex behavior in real-world matching markets can be through the empirical analysis of a real market. We verify a few intuitive results, but also find some counterintuitive interactions, in which a monotonically increasing signal from the market platform results in a non-monotonic return on investment (ROI), for example. Overall, we find risk-seeking behavior among peer investors that does not tend to pay off, and some strange disconnects in which, for example, investors favor Debt Consolidation loans despite inferior ROI, and have a prejudice against Business loans despite no significant evidence of poor performance.
Download or read book Essays on Matching Processes and Effects of Institutional Changes written by Michael Stops and published by wbv Media GmbH & Company KG. This book was released on 2016-05-18 with total page 201 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Die Fragen, wie der Arbeitsmarkt funktioniert und welchen Einfluss die Politik ausüben kann, sind Dauerbrenner in der gesellschaftlichen und politischen Debatte. Das hierzu nötige Wissen speist sich aus der Arbeitsmarktforschung, die häufig Impulse aus dem Alltagsgeschäft der Arbeitsmarktpolitik bekommt. Umgekehrt laden Fortschritte in der Methodenentwicklung und der Datenerschließung die Arbeitsmarktpolitik dazu ein, neue Fragen aufzuwerfen, die bisher nicht beantwortet werden konnten. Michael Stops greift solche Entwicklungen auf und fokussiert drei Themenbereiche: - Berufliche Mobilität und Effizienz des Arbeitsmarktausgleichs - Die Entwicklung der Effizienz des Arbeitsmarktausgleichs vor, während und nach den Jahren der deutschen Arbeitsmarktreformen 2003-2005 auf beruflichen Teilarbeitsmärkten - Die Wirkung des flächendeckenden Mindestlohns in Großbritannien auf die Beschäftigung 1999-2012
Download or read book Who Gets What and why written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. This book was released on 2015 with total page 275 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Download or read book Essays in Game Theory written by Nimrod Megiddo and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
