Download or read book Essays on Late Bidding in Internet Auctions written by Ying Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 65 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Empirical studies have documented that buyers in internet auctions tend to bid immediately before the scheduled closing time. This practice of late bidding is often called sniping. My dissertation investigates this phenomenon from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The first chapter of my dissertation studies a second-price independent private value auction with two risk-neutral buyers who can submit a single bid either early or late. Early bids are received by the auctioneer with probability one, but late bids are received with a probability less than one. I prove that there can exist a symmetric cutoff equilibrium in which high-value buyers always bid early and low-value buyers bid late as long as their opponent has not bid early. A sufficient condition is then identified for the existence of the cutoff equilibrium with late bidding. Finally, I illustrate the equilibrium with examples from the beta distribution on values. The second chapter of my dissertation empirically investigates the impact of late bidding on the final price of internet auctions. Using a dataset collected from eBay, I estimate the time after which late bidding has a differential impact on the final price. The time is estimated as a structural break in the data using a method proposed by Bai (1997). The break point occurs approximately three minutes before the close of the auction. The empirical findings indicate that buyers who won auctions by bidding in the last three minutes were typically more experienced than other winners and that they won the auctions for used items at lower prices. The third chapter of my dissertation extends the first chapter by introducing an uncertainty on the number of buyers through a Poisson arrival process. In addition, I investigate the impact of late bidding on the seller's expected revenue and provide numerical comparative statics for the equilibrium.

Download or read book Online Auctions written by Yu Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, which consists of three essays, studies online auctions both theoretically and empirically. The first essay studies a special online auction format used by eBay, "Buy-It- Now" (BIN) auctions, in which bidders are allowed to buy the item at a fixed BIN price set by the seller and end the auction immediately. I construct a two-stage model in which the BIN price is only available to one group of bidders. I find that bidders cutoff is lower in this model, which means, bidders are more likely to accept the BIN option, compared with the models assuming all bidders are offered the BIN. The results explain the high frequency of bidders accepting BIN price, and may also help explain the popularity of temporary BIN auctions in online auction sites, such as eBay, where BIN option is only offered to early bidders. In the second essay, I study how bidders' risk attitude and time preference affect their behavior in Buy-It-Now auctions. I consider two cases, when both bidders enter the auction at the same time (homogenous bidders) thus BIN option is offered to both of them, and when two bidders enter the auction at two different stages (heterogenous bidders) thus the BIN option is only offered to the early bidder. Bidders' optimal strategies are derived explicitly in both cases. In particular, given bidders' risk attitude and time preference, the cutoff valuation, such that a bidder will accept BIN if his valuation is higher than the cutoff valuation and reject it otherwise, is calculated. I find that the cutoff valuation in the case of heterogenous bidders is lower than that in the case of homogenous bidders. The third essay focuses on the empirical modeling of the price processes of online auctions. I generalize the monotone series estimator to model the pooled price processes. Then I apply the model and the estimator to eBay auction data of a palm PDA. The results are shown to capture closely the overall pattern of observed price dynamics. In particular, early bidding, mid-auction draught, and sniping are well approximated by the estimated price curve.

Download or read book Essays on Multi item Auctions written by Rao Fu and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, I explore bidders' behavior in multiple auctions which are conducted sequentially or simultaneously. The first and the second chapters examine buyers' bidding behaviors in an environment of multiple simultaneous auctions and show that the wildly-used assumption of proxy bidding is inappropriate in the multiple auction setting. The first chapter proposes two models which try to describe online auction platforms. One model has a fixed ending time and the other does not. I show that incremental bidding strategy can arise out of equilibrium and weakly dominate the proxy bidding strategy. Late bidding is also discussed. I use the data I collect from eBay to test these theoretical predictions in the second chapter. The estimation results basically support the theory part. Incremental bidders who switch among different auctions are more likely to win and have higher payoffs than proxy bidders. The third essay studies the procurement auctions in the Texas school milk market. I define score functions to map the bids from multiple dimensions to one dimension and analyze the factors that may affect the bids of school milk suppliers. After considering the impacts of these factors including backlogs and cost synergies, I can still find some evidences for existence of collusion among the bidders.

Download or read book Empirical Inference for Online Auctions written by Guojie Wang and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 69 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay adopts the survival analysis to empirically analyze a new auction format, pay-per-bid auction, in which a fee occurs to the bidder when a new bid is submitted. This auction mechanism attracted many theoretical studies and empirical testing in recent years. However, analyzing the pay-per-bid auction under the survival framework provides a novel path to reflect this new auction format as well as involved bidder and seller behaviors. By considering the arrival of bids as a necessary condition for a pay-per-bid auction to survive, survival analysis tools such as Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimate and Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models are applied to the data set collected from a leading pay-per-bid auction site Swoopo. Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) model is also discussed. Some equilibrium behaviors are confirmed but also some equilibrium deviated behaviors are detected. The second essay models the last-minute bidding behaviors in eBay's hard close auction design using non-parametric analysis. For comparison purpose, the auctions in Amazon with soft close auction design are combined to carry out analysis. The data is selected from eBay and Amazon and a large difference in bid timing is found between auction sites. Density estimation of bid timing confirms the existence of such difference. Mixed additive model is applied to explore the nonparametric relationship between bid timing and parameters of bidding environment. And generalized response model with logistic link function is used to model the probability of a late bidding occurs conditioned on interested covariates. The third essay proposes, from a non-parametric Bayesian aspect, using Dirichlet Processes (DP) with normal mixtures to estimate underlying valuations in second-price ascending auctions under the independent-private-values paradigm. I illustrate how a second-price ascending auction is similar in mechanism to its sealed counterpart and consequently bidders' valuations can be extracted if bidders are identifiable. Compared to classical methods, to provide more flexible and reliable inferences, DP density estimation is strongly motivated and represents an advance. As a non-parametric Bayesian method, DP can accommodate non-nomality through normal mixtures and develop Bayesian inference on model parameters. Due to the complex nature of posteriors, MCMC simulation is used to approximate posteriors as well as density predictions. To test the validity of this method, a Monte Carlo experiment is conducted with similar sample size to our eBay data. In the last section, I reanalyze a data set from eBay auctions and apply our method to estimate the valuations.

Download or read book Some Evidence on Late Bidding in Ebay Auctions written by Ladislav Wintr and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end-time. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002). There is no indication that late bidding could lead to collusive gains for bidders. Late bidding is a strategic response to the presence of bidders placing multiple bids. Experts protecting their private information are typically the last to bid, while collectors are often the first. As bidders gain familiarity with eBay rules, they tend to bid slightly earlier.

Download or read book Bid to Win on Ebay written by Patrick C. Cook and published by Pagefree Publishing. This book was released on 2004 with total page 300 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bid to Win on eBay takes an in-depth look at strategies for bidding in eBay online auctions. Competitive bidding tactics are explored that help the reader competitively position in eBay auctions. Strategic bidding enhances the enjoyment of buying on eBay and helps the reader remain aware and alert leading to a safer and more enjoyable experience with eBay auctions.

Download or read book Early Late and Multiple Bidding in Internet Auctions written by Radovan Vadovic and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In Internet auctions bidders frequently bid in one of three ways: either only early, or late, or they revise their early bids. This paper rationalizes all three bidding patterns within a single equilibrium. We consider a model of a dynamic auction in which bidders can search for outside prices during the auction. We find that in the equilibrium bidders with the low search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with high search costs bid early or multiple times and search only if they were previously outbid. An important feature of the equilibrium is that early bidding allows bidders to search in a coordinated manner. This means that everyone searches except the bidder with the highest early bid. We also compare the static and dynamic auction and conclude that dynamic auction is always more efficient but not always more profitable.

Download or read book Good Bids Come to Those Who Wait written by Bryan Lim and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract This paper proposes an intuitive rationale for late bidding in online venues. The expected surplus from bidding on subsequent auctions for equivalent items creates an option value to losing the current auction. This option is dynamic due to the stochastic arrival of new auctions and early bids on later-closing auctions. We demonstrate that late bidding can be optimal given the decentralized and heterogeneous nature of online auctions, in which the option value is exogenous to an individual bidder's actions. Late bidding precludes the bidder from being locked into a suboptimal bid as her opportunity set evolves.

Download or read book Late Bidding in Open Auctions with Two Buyers written by Colin Campbell and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In open internet auctions with deadlines, some bids made near the deadline are randomly lost. Roth and coauthors have demonstrated via full-information examples that multiple bidders bidding late can nevertheless be equilibrium behavior, as the cost to one bidder of a lost bid can be outweighed by the gain when others' bids are lost. We extend to a standard symmetric two-bidder environment with continuously distributed random private values. For strategies in which every type of bidder either bids immediately, or waits to bid late when the other bidder has done so, all equilibria are symmetric. In any equilibrium in which some types bid late, those that bid late are an interval that includes the lowest type. Equilibria in which at least some types bid late exist when the probability of a lost bid is small, and when buyer values are probabilistically high.

Download or read book Three Essays in Empirical Auctions written by Sudip Gupta and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Internet Auctions written by Abdel-Hameed Hamdy Nawar and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Auction Markets written by Ali Hortaçsu and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 390 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bidding Behaviour in Multi Unit Auctions written by Rebecca Catherine Elskamp and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals.

Download or read book Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions written by Axel Ockenfels and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Auction Inference with Non equilibrium Beliefs written by Lidia Kosenkova and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the dissertation I study bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with risk-neutral bidders. Instead of assuming that bids and beliefs correspond to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), I only assume that they are consistent with k-steps of iterated elimination of dominated strategies (krationalizability). The focus of my dissertation is to provide econometric tests for whether k is finite and to identify the largest value of k that is consistent with the data. This is important because rejecting any finite k would immediately rule out BNE and (full) rationalizability and it allows to quantify deviations from (fully) rationalizable behavior and improve counterfactual predictions. My framework includes cognitive hierarchy or level-k models as special cases but, unlike those models, I make no assumptions about how beliefs are selected. My approach relies only on inequalities between functionals of conditional distributions that are implied by krationalizability. As an empirical illustrationI apply my tests to USFS timber auction data. The results show that values of k as low as 2 can be rejected in some auctions. Counterfactual exercises allow me to quantify the loss in expected payoff derived from the presence of incorrect beliefs.

Download or read book Four Essays on Auction Mechanisms written by Tim Grebe and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 115 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays in Modeling the First Bid in Retail Secondary Market Online Auctions written by Babak Zafari and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: