Download or read book Essays on executive compensation and managerial entrenchment written by Swarnodeep HomRoy and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment written by Gary Gorton and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a firm's owner can transfer some control to a manager, thereby entrenching her. Recognizing these characteristics, we solve for the vesting dates; wage, equity and options components; and control rights of an optimal contract. Managerial entrenchment makes the promise of deferred compensation credible. Deferring compensation by delaying vesting reduces a manager's ability to free-ride on a replacement's effort

Download or read book Executive Pay Hidden Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment written by Camelia M. Kuhnen and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a managerial optimal framework for top executive compensation, where top management sets their own compensation subject to limited entrenchment, instead of the conventional setting where such compensation is set by a board that maximizes firm value. Top management would like to pay themselves as much as possible, but are constrained by the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to avoid a replacement. Shareholders can remove a manager, but only at a cost, and will therefore only do so if the anticipated future value of the manager (given by anticipated future performance net of future compensation) falls short of that of a replacement by this replacement cost. In this setting, observable compensation (salary) and hidden compensation (perks, pet projects, pensions, etc.) serve different roles for management and have different costs, and both are used in equilibrium. We examine the relationship between observable and hidden compensation and other variables in a dynamic model, and derive a number of unique predictions regarding these two types of pay. We then test these implications and find results that generally support the predictions of our model.

Download or read book Essays on Top Management and Corporate Behavior written by Hui-Ting Wu and published by Rozenberg Publishers. This book was released on 2010 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment written by Gary B. Gorton and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a firm's owner can transfer some control to a manager, thereby entrenching her. Recognizing these characteristics, we solve for the vesting dates; wage, equity and options components; and control rights of an optimal contract. Managerial entrenchment makes the promise of deferred compensation credible. Deferring compensation by delaying vesting reduces a manager's ability to free-ride on a replacement's effort.

Download or read book Executive Compensation written by Friedrich Kley and published by Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The empirical analyses of data from large German public companies that are presented in this book show that the introduction of long-term orientated remuneration components for corporate executives increases their willingness to invest in riskier investment portfolios, at least in the short term. The study furthermore demonstrates that a payment model which emphasises equity-based remuneration elements is not sufficient to increase executives' long-term orientation. The results of the study's final analysis show that payment of executives in large German public companies has become more consistent across the board in recent years.

Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation written by Ko-Chia Yu and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Vaibhav Sharma and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation and its potential importance in aligning shareholder and management interests has been an extensively researched area within corporate finance. This thesis studys executive compensation while addressing several unresolved issues in the literature. Essay one examines CEO compensation following spin-offs. The second essay studys changes in CEO salaries and their relation to firm performance. Essay three examines managerial decision horizons for target and acquirer firms in mergers and acquisitions.

Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation and Managerial Incentives written by and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation and Firm Scope written by Yuri Khoroshilov and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Research Handbook on Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.

Download or read book Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Management Entrenchment written by Gary Gorton and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation written by Timothy C. Carpenter and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 77 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation examines the effects resultant from compensation committees' decisions on the structure and magnitude of executive compensation packages. Executive compensation has long been a contentious topic, both in the U.S. and abroad. Specifically, equity-based pay (eg. options and stock grants) has been increasing in popularity and met with mixed reactions. This form of remuneration aims to properly align the goals of executives with those of their shareholders; however, the use of equity based-pay tends to result in larger pay packages. Thus, the potential reasons for its recent popularity range from a forthright belief in its optimality to more Machiavellian motives. Moreover, incentive compensation has a number of secondary effects which must be accounted for, including effects on executive retention and accounting quality among many others. This line of research aims to improve our understanding of executive pay so compensation committees can better serve their shareholders by crafting more appropriate pay packages and better understanding the potential benefits and consequences therefrom. In Chapter One, I analyze the effect of cumulative wealth and unvested equity compensation on voluntary CEO turnover. I find that wealthier CEOs are less likely to retire or resign. This suggests that the CEO vetting process is able to sort out those individuals who would substitute high wealth for additional leisure. Consistent with Balsam and Miharjo (2007), CEOs with more unvested equity are significantly less likely to leave their position. However, I find that unvested equity is less effective as a retention device if the CEO has high existing wealth. In contrast to prior results, my results show no significant relation between existing CEO wealth and incentive compensation. In Chapter Two, I analyze the structure of compensation packages awarded in the United Kingdom compared to their U.S. counterparts. I consider the asymmetric relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in the U.S. and test for similar relations in the U.K. My findings confirm that asymmetry exists in the U.S. in that pay is more strongly associated with upside risk than downside risk. In contrast, U.K. CEO pay is more symmetrically associated with risk. Therefore, while U.S. CEOs face greater risk as a result of compensation with more equity-based pay, their pay to performance is asymmetrical. This suggests an additional component that risk-based arguments must consider before concluding that higher pay in the U.S. is structural and, thus, rational. Finally, in Chapter Three, I examine the effect of executive wealth on accounting quality. Results indicate that firms with wealthier CEOs are significantly more likely to restate earnings. To some extent this effect may be mitigated by compensation committees through the use of unvested compensation components, but this reduction is minimal. Firms with wealthier CEOs also exhibit greater levels of earnings management. Consistent with SEC auditors being aware of this, firms with wealthier CEOs are more likely to face an enforcement action, suggesting that these firms are both targeted and, ultimately, found in violation of accounting requirements. Chief Financial Officers' wealth shows a similar (and even stronger) relationship, increasing the likelihood of an earnings restatement as well as the magnitude of earnings management, but SEC enforcement actions do not reflect this relationship. My results suggest that SEC auditors may be able to improve governance by targeting firms that employ wealthy CFOs, and particularly those with recent large gains.

Download or read book Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance written by Rasha Ashraf and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first essay analyzes mutual funds' proxy voting records on shareholder proposals. The results indicate that mutual funds support shareholder proposals and vote against management for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders' wealth and rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched management, and when funds have longer investment horizon. Mutual funds mostly take management sides on executive compensation related proposals, when they have higher ownership concentration, and when they belong to bigger fund families. The results further indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a monitoring role. Moreover, mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove of managements' policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting shareholder proposals. The second essay investigates institutional investors' trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts and insurance companies as passive institutions. We find active institutions increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher wealth implications. However, active institutions overreact to stock mergers at the announcement, which they appear to correct at the resolution quarter of the merger. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and trade on the basis of merger wealth effect at the resolution quarter. The third essay examines relation between executive compensation structure with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. According to "managerial entrenchment hypothesis," higher managerial power from adoption of takeover defense mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for executives. "Efficient contracting hypothesis" argue that higher anti-takeover provisions would contribute in achieving efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the future due to the low possibility of hostile takeover. The results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis with regard to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. With regard to changes in anti-takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial power influence the future pay structure.

Download or read book Firm Diversification and Ceo Compensation written by Nancy L. Rose and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2017-12-25 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Firm Diversification and Ceo Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment? Proponents of managerial entrenchment explanations argue that diversification frequently is undertaken by self-serving managers to increase the value of their compensation packages, even when diversification reduces the value of the firm. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Finance written by Keyang Yang (PhD) and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, I examine two main topics in corporate finance: executive compensation and corporate investment. First, in the chapter titled "Import Penetration and Executive Compensation", we investigate the impact of import penetration on executive compensation. We find that import penetration reduces executives' total compensation, stock grants, and opportunistic grant timing, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms. Furthermore, we show that import penetration increases option grants and option duration, thus incentivizing more innovation and risk-taking. Second, I study the relationship between entrenchment and corporate investment. In the chapter titled "Entrenchment, Managerial Shirking, and Investment", I find that entrenchment reduces capital expenditures, R&D, and productivity, weakens a firm's competitiveness in the product market, and diminishes firm value. These findings are consistent with the shirking hypothesis that entrenchment enables managers to evade the responsibilities of overseeing investment projects.

Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance written by Swarnodeep Homroy and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: