Download or read book Essays on Earnings Management Incentives written by Tim Dominik Hensel and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Incentive Contracts Earnings Management Expectation Management and Related Issues written by Jie Gao and published by Open Dissertation Press. This book was released on 2017-01-28 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, "Essays on Incentive Contracts, Earnings Management, Expectation Management and Related Issues" by Jie, Gao, 高洁, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. DOI: 10.5353/th_b4327865 Subjects: Corporate profits Disclosure of information Compensation management
Download or read book Essays on the Relation Between Managers Incentives and Financial Accounting Information written by Yanfeng Xue and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (Cont.) around thresholds do convey information about a firm's future performance, firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry between the management and investors are more likely to use this signaling mechanism, and the capital market recognizes the information content of the earnings management activities and rationally incorporates it in setting prices.
Download or read book Essays on Incentive Contracts Earnings Management Expectation Management and Related Issues written by Jie Gao (Ph. D.) and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 129 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays on Earnings Management and Executive Compensation written by Heather Katherine Guthrie and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In chapter 2, I explore the possibility that current shareholders encourage CEOs to manage earnings around equity issuances, as artificially inflated stock prices allow shareholders to obtain external financing at lower cost. My main result establishes that CEOs in well-governed firms are more likely to have large positive discretionary accruals around equity issuances than CEOs in poorly-governed firms. The finding suggests that governance is a double-edged sword: good governance may limit misreporting when it hurts current shareholders, but it may exacerbate misreporting when current shareholders stand to benefit.
Download or read book Cfos Incentives and Earnings Management Ethics Impact on Their Financial Decisions written by Dennis Nangabo and published by Grin Publishing. This book was released on 2016-09-28 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essay from the year 2015 in the subject Art - Arts Management, language: English, abstract: Despite the regulatory reforms targeted at limiting aggressive earnings management and financial reporting continues to be a major concern of the regulators, standards setters and the industry practitioners. To bring the practice to light and offer mitigative solutions, the paper carries out an experiment to investigate the impact of two independent variables on the discretionary CFO's expense control. Incentive conflict, one of the independent variable is manipulated at two different levels (past and present). EM-Ethics (earnings management ethics) is the other CFOs independent variable (low vs. high). And it is measured as the CFOs assessment of the ethicalness of the primary earnings management motivations. We discover that the EM-Ethics and incentive conflict interact to determine the discretionary accruals for the CFOs such that (a) when the incentive conflict is absent, the CFOs with high (low) EM-Ethics do tend to resist (give in) the corporate incentive through booking higher (lower) expense accrual. (b) when the incentive conflict is absent, the CFOs with (high) low EM-Ethics do tend to resist (give into) the incentive through booking (lower) higher expense accruals. The practical and theoretical implications of the research findings are discussed.
Download or read book Essays on Real Earnings Management written by Wenxia Ge and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Accounting based Earnings Management and Real Activities Manipulation written by Wei Yu and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the first essay, I examine the association between auditor industry specialization and earnings management choices. Prior research suggests that industry specialist auditors constrain accounting-based earnings management. But such actions may cause client companies to seek alternative means to manage earnings. Specifically, companies that hire industry specialist auditors may alter operating decisions to meet earnings targets, referred to as real activities manipulation. This essay investigates whether clients of industry specialist auditors that have an incentive to manage earnings are constrained from managing earnings through accruals manipulation and, therefore, are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation. Further, I examine whether operating performance declines for firms suspected of real activities manipulation. My findings indicate that clients of industry specialist auditors with incentives to manage earnings have lower absolute value of accruals relative to firms with incentives to manage earnings that do not hire industry specialist auditors. These clients of industry specialist auditors are also more likely to engage in real activities manipulation, suggesting this is a possible unintended consequence of hiring an industry specialist auditor. I also document evidence that firms suspected of real activities manipulation have lower future operating performance relative to firms not suspected of real activities manipulation.
Download or read book Tournament Incentives Vs Equity Incentives of CFOs written by Feng Han and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 83 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation consists of two essays on CFOs' promotion-based tournament incentives and performance-based equity incentives. The first essay examines the joint implications of CFOs' tournament incentives and equity incentives for firms' risk-taking. With the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO as the proxy for the CFO's tournament incentives, I find that the relationship between a firm's risk taking and the CFO's tournament incentives is non-monotonic. In particular, I show that below a certain level, increase in pay gap is associated with increase in firm risk taking (e.g., higher leverage, lower cash holding balance and higher R&D intensity). However, after reaching a certain level, the CEO-CFO pay gap negatively impacts risk-taking, as increase in pay gap is associated with lower leverage, higher cash holding balance and lower R&D intensity. With the CFO's pay-performance sensitivity as the proxy for the CFO's equity incentives, I find that the CFO's equity incentives negatively impact firm's R&D intensity, but have no significant impact on broader financial decisions such as capital structure and cash policy. Collectively, my findings indicate that CFO incentives play an important role in firm's risk-taking behaviors, and the effect of the CFO's tournament incentives is more pronounced. The second essay studies the impact of tournament incentives and equity incentives for CFOs on firms' earnings management, including accrual-based earnings management (e.g., total accruals, abnormal accruals) and real activities manipulation (e.g., abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal production costs). Measuring the CFO's tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO, I show that the CFO's tournament incentives positively influence total accruals and abnormal accruals. Meanwhile, the CFO's equity incentives, measured as the CFO's pay-performance sensitivity, are found positively related to real activities manipulation proxies and total accruals. My findings show a consistent pattern before and after the passage of SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), but the incentives' effects on earnings management have become less significant in the post-SOX period. Overall, the CFOs' tournament and equity incentives both play an important role in earnings management, but their relative importance lies in different earnings management techniques.
Download or read book Essays on Real Earnings Management written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essays on Real Earnings Management.
Download or read book Three Essays on Real Earnings Management written by Zhaohui Xu and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays on Earnings Management Using Real Business Operations written by Lingxiang Li and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Voluntary Disclosure Quality Earnings Management and Executive Compensation written by Florian Eugster and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Two Essays on Corporate Governance are Local Directors Better Monitors and Directors Incentives and Earnings Management written by Hong Wan and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: ABSTRACT: Previous literature have documented that the independent directors play a crucial goal in corporate governance but the research on the firm value and board independence remains inconclusive. In my dissertation, I examine the impact of independent directors' geographic proximity to corporate headquarters on the effectiveness of corporate boards and the motivations of board directors. Using a large sample of directors trading, I show that independent directors who live close to headquarters ("local director") earn higher abnormal returns on their trades than other directors, and that this advantage is stronger in small firms. Further, I find an inverse relationship between the number of local independent directors on the board and firm value. Companies with fewer local independent directors also have higher ROA ratios, lower abnormal CEO compensations, and higher CEO incentive compensations. Collectively, the findings suggest that local independent directors are more informed but less effective monitors. I also provided evidence that firms with a higher proportion of directors' incentive compensation are more likely to manage earnings. Directors are more likely to exercise options in the year following the firms' earnings management being in the top tercile of the sample. The results are robust after controlling for self-selection bias. Taken together, the evidence suggests that director incentive pay is more likely to align directors' interest with the CEO's, rather than to induce the directors to act in the best interest of the shareholders.
Download or read book Essays on Earnings Management written by Wenjiao Cao and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Earnings Management from the Bottom Up written by Felix Oberholzer-Gee and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Performance-based pay is an important instrument to align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm's reported earnings. The previous literature has focused primarily on Chief Executive Officers, but managers further down in the firm hierarchy-division managers and Chief Financial Officers-- are likely to have similar incentives, and perhaps even greater opportunity to influence reported earnings in a manner that maximizes these managers' personal income. Moreover, previous research focuses on equity incentives and largely ignores other elements of incentive pay. We contribute to this literature by analyzing all forms of incentive pay for several types of managerial positions and include additional measures of earnings manipulation--end-of-year excess sales and class action litigation-in addition to the standard measure of discretionary accounting accruals. We find that the association between high-powered incentives and earnings manipulation varies by both type of incentive pay and position. Our findings have important policy implications and suggest that compensation committees should review pay policies of other managerial positions in addition to CEOs. Importantly, if the committees wanted to weaken incentive pay to get more truthful reporting, diluting the CFO's bonus and stock options would be one place to start.
Download or read book Essays in Earnings Management written by Kamran Malikov and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
