Download or read book The Theory of Contract Law written by Peter Benson and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2001-02-05 with total page 365 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essays addressing a variety of issues in the theory and practice of contract law.
Download or read book Essays on Contract Theory written by Jeongsun Yun and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contract Theory in Historical Context written by Deborah Baumgold and published by BRILL. This book was released on 2010 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: These essays carefully show that classic social-contract theory was an ancien regime genre. Far more than is commonly realized, the local horizon was built into Hobbes s and Locke s theories and the genre drew on the absolutism of Bodin and Grotius.
Download or read book Essays on Contract Theory written by Carlos Manuel Willington and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Contract written by P. S. Atiyah and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1988 with total page 363 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: P.S. Atiyah is one of the leading contract theorists of the common law world. These previously published essays, all revised or rewritten for this edition, constitute a comprehensive account of Atiyah's thoughts on the theory and foundation of contractual liability over the last twenty years, and include the author's replies to criticisms previously made of his work.
Download or read book Essays in Contract Theory written by Fabrizia Lapecorella and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Changing Concepts of Contract written by David Campbell and published by Springer. This book was released on 2017-02-28 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Changing Concepts of Contract is a prestigious collection of essays that re-examines the remarkable contributions of Ian Macneil to the study of contract law and contracting behaviour. Ian Macneil, who taught at Cornell University, the University of Virginia and, latterly, at Northwestern University, was the principal architect of relational contract theory, an approach that sought to direct attention to the context in which contracts are made. In this collection, nine leading UK contract law scholars re-consider Macneil's work and examine his theories in light of new social and technological circumstances. In doing so, they reveal relational contract theory to be a pertinent and insightful framework for the study and practice of the subject, one that presents a powerful challenge to the limits of orthodox contract law scholarship. In tandem with his academic life, Ian Macneil was also the 46th Chief of the Clan Macneil. Included in this volume is a Preface by his son Rory Macneil, the 47th Chief, who reflects on the influences on his father's thinking of those experiences outside academia. The collection also includes a Foreword by Stewart Macaulay, Malcolm Pitman Sharp Hilldale Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and an Introduction by Jay M Feinman, Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law.
Download or read book Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision written by Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-02-19 with total page 211 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Download or read book Three Essays on Contract Theory and Applications written by Sunjoo Hwang and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 286 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines a general theory of information based on informal contracting. The measurement problem--the disparity of true and measured performances--is at the core of many failures in incentive systems. Informal contracting can be a potential solution since, unlike in formal contracting, it can utilize a lot of qualitative and informative signals. However, informal contracting must be self-enforced. Given this trade-off between informativeness and self-enforcement, I show that a new source of statistical information is economically valuable in informal con- tracting if and only if it is sufficiently informative that it refines the existing pass/fail criterion. I also find that a new information is more likely valuable, as the stock of existing information is large. This information theory has implications on the measurement problem, a puzzle of relative performance evaluation and human resources management. I also provide a methodological contribution. For tractable analysis, the first-order approach (FOA) should be employed. Existing FOA-justifying conditions (e.g. the Mirrlees-Rogerson condition) are so strong that the information ranking condition can be applied only to a small set of information structures. Instead, I find a weak FOA- justifying condition, which holds in many prominent examples (with multi- variate normal or some of univariate exponential family distributions). The second essay analyzes the effectiveness of managerial punishments in mitigating moral hazard problem of government bailouts. Government bailouts of systemically important financial or industrial firms are necessary ex-post but cause moral hazard ex-ante. A seemingly perfect solution to this time-inconsistency problem is saving a firm while punishing its manager. I show that this idea does not necessarily work if ownership and management are separated. In this case, the shareholder(s) of the firm has to motivate the manager by using incentive contracts. Managerial punishments (such as Obama's $500,000 bonus cap) could distort the incentive-contracting program. The shareholder's ability to motivate the manager could then be reduced and thereby moral hazard could be exacerbated depending on corporate governance structures and punishment measures, which means the likelihood of future bailouts increases. As an alternative, I discuss the effectiveness of shareholder punishments. The third essay analyzes how education affect workers' career-concerns. A person's life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In order to address how a person chooses an education-career path, I examine an integrated model of education and career-concerns. In the first part, I analyze the welfare effect of education. In Spence's job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In my integrated model, by contrast, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates the work incentive generated by career-concerns. In this regard, I suggest scholarship programs aimed at building human capital rather than sorting students. The second part provides a new perspective on education: education is job-risk hedging device (as well as human capital enhancing or sorting device). I show that highly risk-averse people take high education in order to hedge job-risk and pursue safe but medium-return work path. In contrast, lowly risk-averse people take low education, bear job-risk, and pursue high-risk high-return work path. This explains why some people finish college early and begin start-ups, whereas others take master's or Ph.D. degrees and find safe but stable jobs.
Download or read book Essays in Contract Theory written by Fei-Lung Tzang and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book New Essays on Contract Theory written by Kai Nielsen and published by Guelph, Ont. : [Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy]. This book was released on 1977 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Contract Theory written by Stefan Terstiege and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contract as Assumption written by Brian Coote and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 217 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It has many times been said that contracts involve assumptions of obligation or liability, but what that means, and what it is that is assumed, have not often been discussed. It is to further such discussion that some of the author's previously published writings around this subject have been brought together in this book. His basic premises are that contractual obligation and liability in this context are two sides to the same coin and that an assumption of one is an assumption of both. Parties are bound not because liability has been imposed upon them by law as a result of their having entere.
Download or read book Essays on Contract Theory Applied to International Finance written by Philippe Auffret and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Pricing and Contract Theory written by Masoud Talebian and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 370 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Contract Theory written by Alice Peng-Ju Su and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 87 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is primarily on the contractual design to account for various source of information asymmetry in a principal-agent(s) relationship. In the first chapter, I study the optimal provision of team incentives with the feasibility for the agents to coordinate private actions through repeated interaction with imperfect public monitoring. As the agents' imperfect monitoring of private actions is inferred from the stochastically correlated measurements, correlation of measurement noise, besides its risk sharing role in the conventional multiple-agent moral hazard problem, is crucial to the accuracy of each agent's inference on the other's private action. The principal's choice of performance pay to provide incentive via inducing competition or coordination among the agents thus exhibits the tradeoff between risk sharing and mutual inference between the agents. I characterize the optimal form of performance pay with respect to the correlation of measurement noise and find that it is not monotonic as suggested by the literature. In the second chapter, I study the optimal incentive provision in a principal-agent relationship with costly information acquisition by the agent. When it is feasible for the principal to induce or to deter perfect information acquisition, adverse selection or moral hazard arises in response to the principal's decision, as if she is able to design a contract not only to cope with an existing incentive problem, but also to implement the existence of an incentive problem. The optimal contract to implement adverse selection by inducing information acquisition, comparing to the second best menu, exhibits a larger rent difference between an agent in an efficient state and whom in an inefficient state. The optimal contract to implement moral hazard by deterring information acquisition, comparing to the second best debt contract, prescribes a lower debt and an equity share of output residual. With imperfect information acquisition or private knowledge of information acquiring cost, the contract offered to an uninformed agent is qualitatively robust, and that to the informed exhibits countervailing incentives. I relax the assumption of complete contracting and study truthful information revelation in an incomplete contracting environment in the third chapter. Truthful revelation of asymmetric information through shared ownership (partnership) is incorporated into the Property Right Theory of the firms. Shared ownership is optimal as an information transmission device, when it is incentive compatible within the relationship as well as when the relationship breaks, at the expense of the ex-ante incentive to invest in the relationship-specific asset as the hold-up concern is not efficiently mitigated. Higher (lower) level of integration is optimal with a lower marginal value of asset if the information rent effect is stronger (weaker) than the hold-up effect.
Download or read book Three Essays in Contract Theory written by Bernard Caillaud and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 432 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
