Download or read book Essays on Competition in Electricity Markets written by Ricardo Javier Bustos Salvagno and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter two examines the Chilean experience on auctions for long-term supply contracts in electricity markets from 2006 to 2011. Using a divisible-good auction model, I provide a theoretical framework that explains bidding behavior in terms of expected spot prices and contracting positions. The model is extended to include potential strategic behavior on contracting decisions. Empirical estimations confirm the main determinants of bidding behavior and show heterogeneity in the marginal cost of over-contracting depending on size and incumbency.

Download or read book Competition and Regulation in Electricity Markets written by Sebastian Eyre and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Featuring an original introduction by the editors, these carefully-selected essays explore the main issues surrounding competition and regulation in electricity markets. The industry is experiencing irresistible forces of change, driven by energy policy objectives; a reassessment of market regulation in the face of high-energy prices; and the response to consumer pressure to agree on what constitutes a fair price for energy. This volume identifies the key articles that underpin the debate across the industries supply chain (generation, supply and networks) from a regulatory perspective (including market power and incentive regulation). The collection then considers the overall impact of liberalisation and future developments.

Download or read book Essays on Regulation Liberalization and Privatization in Energy Markets written by Carlos Suárez and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 174 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The general motivation of this research is to explore the effects of the coexistence of public and private companies on the allocative efficiency of the supply of electricity. In particular, this thesis investigates from an empirical perspective to what extent the distinction between private and public companies is relevant to understand the competition in the wholesale electricity generation markets. I apply several econometric techniques and theory advances in industrial organization branch on data of the firms of the Colombian market. The case of the Colombian electricity market is suitable to study this issues for four reasons: i) It is an oligopoly in which private and public companies compete under the same rules. ii) The most important firms in the Colombian electricity sector are mature organizations, with a conventional business vision. In fact, many of these companies belong to transnational capital that carry out activities in several continents. iii) The market setting have a conventional design similar to other liberalized electricity markets. It operates as a multi-unit uniform-price auction. iv) There is available information with daily and even hourly resolution of the generation market variables. I consider that these are key elements for justifying the external validity of the results. This thesis presents three essays that aim to answer three questions related to the interaction between competition in electricity markets and their ownership structure. Chapter 1 addresses the question: Do the switch from public to private management have impacts in the bidding strategy of specific generation assets? Chapter 2 explores the question: Do public and private generation companies respond the same to the incentives to relax competition? Chapter 3 focuses on the question: Do private companies have a greater propensity to establish coordination relationships in comparison to public firms? In the first chapter of this thesis I evaluate the impact of privatization on the bidding of electricity units participating in a liberalized wholesale electricity market. The results of this evaluation contribute to better understand whether privatization is the right decision in an environment of imperfect competition. In this essay I adopt a policy evaluation approach to estimate the impact of changes from public to private management on the bidding prices of electricity generation units. I use information of bidding prices of the Colombian wholesale electricity market and exploit the changes of management of generation units documented in the period 2006 - 2018. The methodologies and results presented in this thesis contributes to the literature of mixed oligopoly because they place special emphasis on the behavioral differences between private and public companies and studies a field experience in which they compete in the same relevant market. The empirical evidence resultant from the policy evaluation method is aligned with the theoretical predictions of comparative statics arising from the behavioral differences of mixed oligopoly models. The second chapter of this dissertation proposes a methodology in order to find differences between the reactions of private and public firms when they face incentives to exercises unilateral market power. Several common events in the electricity industry such as transmission restrictions, the concentration of generation property within specific areas, the non-storage capacity of electricity and the low elasticity of demand, provide opportunities to exert market power. That is why this issue has been widely studied and discussed theoretically and empirically. The novel element of this essay in relation to this strand of the literature is accounting for the distinction between private and public companies regarding competitive behavior. Chapter 3 investigates from an empirical perspective the role of disclosure information in the stability of informal coordination agreements. Particularly, this chapter focuses in the economic effects of the announcement and the put into effect of a non-transparency policy implemented in the Colombian wholesale electricity market in 2009. We propose an identification strategy for isolating the effect of a coordinating relation from the confusion factors related with unilateral market power. The characteristics of the reform of the transparency policy allow to link the simple announcement of the policy change with the collapse of a coordinated strategy of private firms in a repeated interaction context. We use several empirical tools to assess the impact of the simple announcement of a modification in the transparency conditions on the average bidding price of private firms. We present an empirical analysis of the average bidding price data over August 2008 - July 2009. Overall, the evidence presented in the three essays of this dissertation indicates that the distinction between public and private companies may be a relevant aspect for explaining the functioning of competition in liberalized industries." -- TDX.

Download or read book Energy in a Competitive Market written by Colin Robinson and published by University of Pennsylvania Press. This book was released on 2003 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Covering a wide and fascinating selection of topics incorporating the whole spectrum of energy economics, this book examines the belief that markets are the key to the effective allocation of resources, a notion which arguably applies as much to energy as it does to any other commodity. In particular it focuses on several pertinent issues including: competition and regulation in gas and electricity; comparative efficiency analysis in electricity regulation; UK coal in competitive markets; vertical integration in the oil industry; cluster developments in the UK continental shelf; modelling underlying energy demand trends; and emissions targets, environmental Kuznets curves and incentive mechanisms.

Download or read book Competition Contracts and Electricity Markets written by Jean-Michel Glachant and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2011 with total page 335 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term contracts and the efficiency of electricity markets. These include the impact of long-term contracts and vertical integration on effective competition, generation investment in risky markets, and the challenges for competition policy principles. On the one hand, long-term contracts may contribute to lasting generation capability by allowing for a more efficient allocation of risk. On the other hand, they can create conditions for imperfect competition and thus impair short-term efficiency. The contributors – prominent academics and policy experts with inter-disciplinary perspectives – develop fresh theoretical and practical insights on this important concern for current electricity markets. This highly accessible book will strongly appeal to both academic and professional audiences including scholars of industrial, organizational and public sector economics, and competition and antitrust law. It will also be of value to regulatory and antitrust authorities, governmental policymakers, and consultants in electricity law and economics.

Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Electricity Markets written by and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Electricity Markets written by Linda Rud and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 287 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Competitive Electricity Markets The Power of Choice written by Joseph L. Welch, PE and published by Lulu.com. This book was released on 2009 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Critique of the US Electricity Industry. Analysis of derailed industry deregulation initiatives. Sketches a new, competitively structured Energy Policy Template.

Download or read book Competitive Electricity Markets written by Fereidoon Sioshansi and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2011-10-10 with total page 625 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: After 2 decades, policymakers and regulators agree that electricity market reform, liberalization and privatization remains partly art. Moreover, the international experience suggests that in nearly all cases, initial market reform leads to unintended consequences or introduces new risks, which must be addressed in subsequent “reform of the reforms. Competitive Electricity Markets describes the evolution of the market reform process including a number of challenging issues such as infrastructure investment, resource adequacy, capacity and demand participation, market power, distributed generation, renewable energy and global climate change. Sequel to Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective in the same series published in 2006 Contributions from renowned scholars and practitioners on significant electricity market design and implementation issues Covers timely topics on the evolution of electricity market liberalization worldwide

Download or read book Six Empirical Essays on Competition and Regulation in Energy Markets written by Sven Heim and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on the Competitive Effects of Disaster in Electrical Power Markets written by Cheyney Michael Thomas O'Fallon and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 181 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Competition in the generation and marketing of electricity entails the use of a strategy space with many dimensions. Often requiring outlays in the hundreds of millions and occasionally billions of dollars to build, power plants are infrastructure investments with huge potential for economic impact. A variety of generating technologies currently compete to be the lowest cost provider and each of these options includes a set of externalities associated with producing power. Therefore, some competitive efforts, often manifested as lobbying, are directed towards preventing internalization of third party costs. Under standard operating conditions and mild deviations, electricity producers and marketers work hard to ensure a reliable and unremarkable (from the consumer perspective) supply of power. Natural disasters can offer windows into the strategic choices that define the structure of competition in electricity generation and subsequent market outcomes. The recent drought in the United States and the Tohoku earthquake in Japan are the two disasters discussed in the pages that follow.

Download or read book Designing Competitive Electricity Markets written by Hung-po Chao and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-01 with total page 213 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The authors are prominent economists, operation researchers, and engineers who have been instrumental in the development of the conceptual framework for electric power restructuring both in the United States and in other countries. Rather than espousing a particular market design for the industry's future, each author focuses on an important issue or set of issues and tries to frame the questions for designing electricity markets using an international perspective. The book focuses on the economic and technical questions important in understanding the industry's long-term development rather than providing immediate answers for the current political debates on industry competition.

Download or read book Essays in Electricity Economics written by Brittany L. Tarufelli and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Goods markets are designed and regulated at a sub-global level. Although it’s typical to assume one set of market clearing rules across regulated and unregulated regions, trade occurs across a patchwork of sub-global market designs. Not accounting for this heterogeneity in market design can lead to unanticipated outcomes from sub-global regulations, as correcting for one market failure–such as a negative externality from carbon emissions–can lead to another market failure from the market design itself when trade occurs across differing market designs. The anatomy of this second-best problem is considered in the context of U.S. electricity markets, as market clearing mechanisms vary by region, and they imperfectly overlap with state-level climate policies such as carbon prices and renewables subsidies. In Chapter I, I present a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on electricity market design and its interaction with regional climate policies. In the wholesale electricity sector, market design drives both the extent of the forward contract market and the competitiveness of the spot market, which can induce strategic behavior and affect both market and regional climate policy outcomes. Assessing climate policy outcomes under only the assumption of a centralized market design, as is customary in the literature, belies the complexity of electricity market design, which varies regionally. As there is currently an agenda to link regional electricity markets, there is also a need to study how strategic behavior across differing market designs affects emissions when regional climate policies are imposed. In Chapter II, I develop a two-stage model of oligopolistic electricity production to determine if strategic behavior in forward contract and spot markets across differing electricity market designs increases or decreases emissions leakage from regional climate policies. I find that under uncertainty from demand and renewable resource shocks, centralized market designs generally reduce market power through arbitraging away price risk between forward and spot markets. However, under an asymmetric carbon cap and trade program, resulting emissions leakage is decreased by bilateral markets, which act as a structural backstop to emissions leakage. Emissions leakage increases when bilateral markets trade with, or are integrated with centralized markets, potentially reducing the efficacy of regional climate policies. In Chapter III, I study the interaction between sub-global climate policy and sub-global design of goods markets using an example of market expansion from wholesale electricity markets–the Western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) in California. Using a difference-in-differences and triple-differences framework with matching to account for self-selection, I investigate how the EIM affects emissions leakage from California’s carbon cap and trade program. I find that the EIM caused a modest increase in emissions leakage into participating regions outside California, despite the relatively small trading volumes. The results have implications for ongoing efforts to expand competitive wholesale electricity markets across regions with differing climate policies. The results of this dissertation are informative for sub-global climate policy when trade in goods markets occurs across regions with different market clearing rules. Specifically, reduced transactions costs in trade between regulated and unregulated regions may tend to exacerbate emissions leakage. These results are informative in the context of continuing changes in wholesale electricity markets, including potential market expansions and continued integration of regional electricity markets across the U.S. and the European Union.

Download or read book Energy in a Competitive Market written by Lester C. Hunt and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This fine collection of original essays is in recognition of Colin Robinson, who has been at the forefront of thinking in energy economics for over 30 years. Energy in a Competitive Market brings together both prominent academics and practitioners to hono

Download or read book Essays on Electricity and Matching Markets written by Ömer Karaduman and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis contains two chapters on the Electricity Markets and a chapter on Matching Markets. In the first chapter, I study how an energy storage affects the wholesale electricity market. The transition to a low-carbon electricity system is likely to require grid-scale energy storage to smooth the variability and intermittency of renewable energy. I investigate whether private incentives for operating and investing in grid-scale energy storage are optimal and the need for policies that complement investments in renewables with encouraging energy storage. In a wholesale electricity market, energy storage systems generate profit by arbitraging inter-temporal electricity price differences. In addition, storage induces non-pecuniary externalities due to production efficiency and carbon emissions. I build a new dynamic equilibrium framework to quantify the effects of grid-scale energy storage and apply it to study the South Australian Electricity Market. This equilibrium framework computes a supply function equilibrium using estimated best responses from conventional sources to observed variation in the residual demand volatility. Accounting for storage’s effect on equilibrium prices is quantitatively important: previous methods that ignore this channel overestimate the profitability of operating a storage unit. The first set of results shows that although entering the electricity market is not profitable for privately operated storage, such entry would increase consumer surplus and total welfare and reduce emissions. A storage operator that minimizes the cost of acquiring electricity could further improve consumer surplus by twice as much. Importantly, a competitive storage market cannot achieve this outcome because other power plants distort prices. These results argue for a capacity market to compensate for a private firm for investing in storage. The second set of results shows that at moderate levels of renewable power, introducing grid-scale storage to the system reduces renewable generators’ revenue by decreasing average prices. For high levels of renewable generation capacity, storage increases the return to renewable production and decreases CO2 emissions by preventing curtailment during low-demand periods. In the second chapter, I study how a large scale wind power investment affects the wholesale electricity market. Renewable subsidies have been an influential device for wind power investment in many parts of the world. These policies help to lower emissions by offsetting high-emitting electricity generation with clean energy. For zero-emission targets, this transition towards renewable power should be accompanied by thermal generators’ retirement to set clean the energy mix in the power sector. In this paper, I build a framework to quantify the offset and revenue impact of large-scale wind power investment in a wholesale electricity market and apply it to study the South Australian Electricity Market. This equilibrium framework computes a supply function equilibrium using estimated best responses from conventional sources to observed variation in the residual demand volatility. I first show that reduced-form methods are biased as the scale of the additional capacity increases. My results highlight that with different investment sizes, the substitution patterns and negative revenue impact for wind power differ considerably. As the penetration level of wind power increases, the electricity becomes cheaper. The offset and negative shock shifts from low-cost inflexible generators to high-cost flexible generators, while the revenue impact is the highest on existing renewable generation. I also show quite a bit heterogeneity in price impact among different potential wind power projects. These results have some policy implications on renewable targets’ long-run effects and the project selection given the subsidy scheme. In the third chapter, joint with Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo and Clayton Featherstone, I study the market failure in kidney exchange. We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could increase transplants by 30 to 63 percent. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient; most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals only partly internalize their patientsâǍŹ benefits from exchange, and current platforms suboptimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we calibrate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires either a mandate or a combination of new mechanisms and reimbursement reforms.

Download or read book Essays in Market Power Mitigation and Supply Function Equilibrium written by Thiagarajah Natchie Subramaniam and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 81 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Market power mitigation has been an integral part of wholesale electricity markets since deregulation. In wholesale electricity markets, different regions in the US take different approaches to regulating market power. While the exercise of market power has received considerable attention in the literature, the issue of market power mitigation has attracted scant attention. In the first chapter, I examine the market power mitigation rules used in New York ISO (Independent System Operator) and California ISO (CAISO) with respect to day-ahead and real-time energy markets. I test whether markups associated with New York in-city generators would be lower with an alternative approach to mitigation, the CAISO approach. Results indicate the difference in markups between these two mitigation rules is driven by the shape of residual demand curves for suppliers. Analysis of residual demand curves faced by New York in-city suppliers show similar markups under both mitigation rules when no one supplier is necessary to meet the demand (i.e., when no supplier is pivotal). However, when some supplier is crucial for the market to clear, the mitigation rule adopted by the NYISO consistently leads to higher markups than would the CAISO rule. This result suggest that market power episodes in New York is confined to periods where some supplier is pivotal. As a result, I find that applying the CAISOs' mitigation rules to the New York market could lower wholesale electricity prices by 18%. The second chapter of my dissertation focuses on supply function equilibrium. In power markets, suppliers submit offer curves in auctions, indicating their willingness to supply at different price levels. Although firms are allowed to submit different offer curves for different time periods, surprisingly many firms stick to a single offer curve for the entire day. This essentially means that firms are submitting a single offer curve for multiple demand realizations. A suitable framework to analyze such oligopolistic competition between power market suppliers is supply function equilibrium models. Using detailed bidding data, I develop equilibrium in supply functions by restricting supplier offers to a class of supply functions. By collating equilibrium supply functions corresponding to different realizations of demand, I obtain a single optimal supply function for the entire day. Then I compare the resulting supply function with actual day-ahead offers in New York. In addition to supply function equilibrium, I also develop a conservative bidding approach in which each firm assumes that rivals bid at marginal costs. Results show that the supply functions derived from equilibrium bidding model in this paper is not consistent with actual bidding in New York. This result is mainly driven by the class of supply functions used in this study to generate the equilibrium. Further, actual offers do not resemble offers generated by the conservative bidding algorithm.

Download or read book Making Competition Work in Electricity written by Sally Hunt and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2002-10-01 with total page 467 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An expert's perspective on how competition can make this industry work. There has never been a coherent plan to restructure the electricity industry in the USâ??until now. Power expert Sally Hunt gets down to the critical lessons learned from the California power crisis and other deregulated markets, in which competition has been introduced properly and successfully. Hunt presents sensible solutions to power market reform that have been cultivated over her twenty years of professional work in the industry. Sally Hunt (New York, NY) spent twenty years at National Economic Research Associates, where she was head of NERA's U.S. energy practice and a member of the board. Coauthor of Competition and Choice in Electricity with Graham Shuttleworth (0471957828), she has served as Corporate Economist at Con Edison, Deputy Director of the New York City Energy Office, and Assistant Administrator of the New York City Environmental Protection Administration. Over the years, financial professionals around the world have looked to the Wiley Finance series and its wide array of bestselling books for the knowledge, insights, and techniques that are essential to success in financial markets. As the pace of change in financial markets and instruments quickens, Wiley Finance continues to respond. With critically acclaimed books by leading thinkers on value investing, risk management,asset allocation, and many other critical subjects, the Wiley Finance series provides the financial community with information they want. Written to provide professionals and individuals with the most current thinking from the best minds in the industry, it is no wonder that the Wiley Finance series is the first and last stop for financial professionals looking to increase their financial expertise.