Download or read book PhD series written by Mie la Cour Sonne and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Two sided Markets and Optimal Contracting written by Mie la Cour Sonne and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essaya in Two sided Markets and Optimal Contracting written by Mie la Cour Sonne and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Uniform Pricing and Vertical Contracts in Two sided Markets written by Andre Boik and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Optimal Contracts with Overconfidence written by Justin R. Downs and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies the effect of overconfidence on markets and organizations with asymmetric information. In the first chapter, I introduce overconfidence into a standard information gathering contracting model. A principal (she) hires an agent (he) to gather information about a project's cost before he implements the project, and the agent overestimates the probability of having a low implementation cost. The agent's overconfidence makes him more willing to sign the contract, but less willing to gather information, and increases in overconfidence may increase or decrease the principal's profit. In the second chapter, I study a labor market where firms hire overconfident workers who have private information about their productivity. I derive the optimal contracts for both a monopsonistic market, where one firm makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to the workers, as well as a competitive market, where many firms compete for the services of workers. Overconfidence causes the optimal contract to be distorted away from the efficient outcome in both markets, but a monopsonistic firm internalizes these distortions while a competitive firm does not. The main result is that monopsonistic markets can be more efficient than competitive markets. In the third chapter, I provide a review of several mathematical definitions of overconfidence used in the contract theory literature and apply them all to a generalized version of the information gathering model from Chapter 1. The effects overconfidence has on the agent's willingness to participate, to gather information, and on the principal's profit are all sensitive to the mathematical definition of overconfidence used in the model.
Download or read book Three Essays on the Economics of Two sided Markets written by Tim Brühn and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Dynamic Contract Theory written by Rui Zhao and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Contracts written by Zenan Wu and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of two essays on contract theory. I investigate contracts under different economics contexts. In the first chapter, I consider a two-period model in which the success of the firm depends on the effort of a first-period manager (the incumbent) and the ability of a second-period manager. At the end of the first period, the board receives a noisy signal of the incumbent manager's ability and decides whether to retain or replace the incumbent manager. I show that the information technology the board has to assess the incumbent manager's ability is an important determinant of the optimal contract and replacement policy. The contract must balance providing incentives for the incumbent manager to exert effort and ensuring that the second-period manager is of high ability. I show that severance pay in the contract serves as a costly commitment device to induce effort. Unlike existing models, I identify conditions on the information structure under which both entrenchment and anti-entrenchment emerge in the optimal contract. In the second chapter, I use a dynamic model of life insurance with one-sided commitment and bequest-driven lapsation, as in Daily, Hendel and Lizzeri (2008) and Fang and Kung (2010), but with policyholders who may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motive, to analyze how the life settlement market--the secondary market for life insurance--may affect consumer welfare in equilibrium. I show that life settlement may increase consumer welfare in equilibrium when (i) policyholders are sufficiently overconfident; and (ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption (IES) of policyholders is greater than one.
Download or read book Essays on Two Sided Matching with Contracts written by Daniel Aaron Ripperger-Suhler and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine contracting problems in two-sided matching models. The first chapter studies use of syndication contracts in the venture capital matching market, and the resulting impact on portfolio company outcomes. A novel empirical model is developed to account for endogeneity issues due to matching between venture capitalists (VCs) and companies as well as the simultaneous causality bias coming from contract choice. The estimates show that unobserved company heterogeneity can lead to biased company outcome estimates, which can change over time due to changes in preferences over unobserved company characteristics. The second chapter, joint with Kaniska Dam and Konstantinos Serfes, explores the effect of incentives on choice of organizational structure, and the implications for the output distribution in two-sided matching model. A novel condition guaranteeing positive assortative matching (PAM) is derived for two-sided matching models with non-smooth bargaining frontiers. In the model, the choice between integrating and remaining separate results in a non-differentiable bargaining frontier and produces equilibria in which some matched pairs integrate, and others do not integrate. These equilibria produce drastically different output distributions and provide researchers with predictions that can be tested empirically. The final chapter considers a principal-agent model in which the agent can choose and exclusive contract with a single principal, or a non-exclusive contract with two principals at the cost of additional effort. The two-sided matching model shows that the endogenous outside option absent in a standard principal-agent model is necessary in order to generate certain equilibrium contract patterns. Finally, the model shows that changes in the costliness of additional effort by the agents has a non-monotonic impact of agent utility.
Download or read book Essays on Two sided Markets with Externalities written by Alper Nakkas and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 119 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Contracting Problems written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 121 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis contains three chapters regarding applications of contracting problems to different topics. The first chapter studies the optimal joint design of disability insurance and unemployment insurance in an environment with moral hazard, when health status is private information, and cyclical fluctuations. I show how disability benefits and unemployment benefits vary with aggregate economic conditions in an optimal contract. I then consider a calibrated version of the full model and study the quantitative implications of both the current system and the optimal system. In the optimal system, disability benefits are designed such that the system punishes workers who stay unemployed for a long time. Finally, I consider the welfare impact of changing from the current system to the optimal one when both systems provide the same ex-ante utility to the worker. The cost savings incurred from handling the incentive problems are substantial, ranging from 45 percent to 101 percent for different workers, and the unemployment rate could be reduced by roughly 50 percent. The second chapter is about non-stationary two-sided learning in continuous time. This paper studies the multi-period contracting problem when actions of an agent are unobservable and both parties disagree on the agent's ability. The question being asked is how the actions would be affected when the amount of disagreement is another motivating factor. I derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility of contracts. I then use results from stochastic analysis to transform the problem into one that can be solved numerically using Monte Carlo simulations. My results exhibit an interesting pattern: effort is no longer front-loaded as in the related work of Prat and Jovanovic (2013), and responses to incentives are significant when the terminal date approaches. The third chapter discusses anti-dumping duties and money burning. I show that with delegated decisions and private information, optimal trade agreements could consist of tariff caps as well as burning money before high tariff sanctions are used.
Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2009-09 with total page 532 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Optimal Contracting written by Zhiguo He and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 154 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Download or read book Essays in Optimal Contracting Under Asymmetric Information written by Aaron Miruri Thegeya and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Optimal Contracting Under Asymmetric Information written by Aaron Miruri Thegeya and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 438 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Consumer Credit Markets written by Mark William Jenkins and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2009 with total page 135 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies the organization of consumer credit markets using a rich and novel dataset from a large subprime auto lender. Its primary goal is to develop empirical methods for analyzing markets with asymmetric information and to use these methods to better understand the behavior of subprime borrowers and lenders. The first chapter quantifies the importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in the subprime auto loan market and shows how different loan contract terms serve to mitigate these distinct information problems. The second chapter examines the impact of centralized credit scoring on lending outcomes, including the distribution of performance across dealerships within the firm. The third chapter studies borrower repayment behavior and quantifies the impact of ex post moral hazard on interest rates and the costs of default. Collectively, the three chapters provide a better understanding of the functioning of markets for subprime credit in the U.S. They also provide unique empirical evidence on the importance of asymmetric information and the value of screening, monitoring, and contract design in consumer credit markets in general.
