Download or read book Essays in Three Design Issues in Experimental Auctions written by Ji Yong Lee and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this thesis is to investigate three design issues in experimental auctions: 1) the effects of allowing negative bids for a privately valued good, 2) the effects of introducing additional alternatives (substitutes) for the auctioned good in an endowment auction, and 3) respondent behavior in acquiring information. The thesis consists of three papers examining those issues. The first paper examines participants bidding behavior when negative bids are allowed for privately valued goods in an experimental auction. We focus on two questions: i) whether subjects with negative values tend to bid strategically - either overbidding or underbidding in an effort to enhancing earnings, and ii) the performance of random nth and 5th price auctions. We find that: a) WTP bids are demand revealing, b) subjects tend to underbid WTA values, c) controlling for risk attitude partially explains the bias in WTA bids, and d) negative values from random nth auctions tend to be below those from 5th price auctions. In the second paper we 1) investigate the effect of the availability of varying numbers of alternatives (substitutes) for a privately valued good on participants bidding behavior, and 2) identify whether the availability of additional alternatives: a) impacts the value of product information, and b) impacts the effect of new information on product valuations. We find that: a) allowing additional alternatives in a private value auction does not significantly decrease subjects bids, and b) the presence of additional alternatives in the auction decreases both the value and effect of product information. The third paper examines the effect of acquired information on auction participants bidding behavior. We focus on three questions: i) how subjects choose/value different types of information, ii) whether the value of acquired information about a product influences the subsequent valuation of the product itself, and iii) whether the effects of acquired information differ from those of exogenously provided information. We find that: a) subjects behaviors of acquiring different types of information about the product are influenced by their heterogeneous characteristics (i.e. prior beliefs, risk attitudes, prior knowledge, etc.), b) subjects place more weight on acquired information than on provided information in their decision-making process, and c) individual subjects have different values of information which caused different impacts on product valuation.

Download or read book Three Essays on Market Design Experiments Using Computational Learning Agents written by Deddy Priatmodjo Koesrindartoto and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 346 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Three papers in this dissertation are entirely self-contained. The papers are linked both through the methodologies used and through the issues addressed. Each of the paper seeks to understand the complexity effects of market design issues by using agent-based computational economic approach. The first essay addresses the question of which auction pricing rule should Treasury use that yields the highest revenue, especially whether the Treasury should use a discriminatory-price rule or a uniform-price one. Computational experiments are carefully designed based on four treatment factors: (1) the buyers' learning representation; (2) the number of buyers participating in the auction; (3) the total security demand capacity of buyers relative to the Treasury offered security supply (4) volatility of security prices in the secondary market. Key findings in this study show that Treasury revenue varies systematically with changes of treatments factor. The second essay tries to answer the question of what is the best bidding rule for multi-unit sealed-bid double auctions. Extending the earlier theoretical work which suggested that submitting supply offers in the form of price-quantity supply functions P(Q) will benefit the seller under one-sided auction with uncertain demand. However, this study results show that under double-sided multi-unit auction in which seller face a similar uncertain demand, submitting P(Q) supply offers not necessarily benefited sellers. Moreover, strategic interaction effects among players using P(Q) rules can lower sellers profit and overall market efficiency. Such insights are critical, especially to market designers who are concerned about the detailed aspects of market design implementation. The third essay addresses the experimental testing of the recently proposed wholesale power market design by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) is a complex market that requires market participants to simultaneously bid into real-time, day-ahead, ancillary, and transmission rights markets. The study main goals are to gain understanding the nature of this complex market design, at the same time to test whether WPMP design results in efficient, fair, robust market operations overtime, especially under conditions in which participants' strive to gain market power through strategic pricing, capacity withholding, and any other imaginable strategies.

Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Bargaining written by Yumiko Baba and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design written by Luke Hu and published by . This book was released on 2014-01-28 with total page 89 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Auctions written by Ilaria Cingottini and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 85 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Multi object Auctions written by Veronika Grimm and published by . This book was released on 2003-01-01 with total page 101 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Heritage Currency Auctions CSNS Signature Auction Catalog 406 written by Ivy Press and published by Heritage Capital Corporation. This book was released on 2006-03 with total page 468 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Heritage Currency Auctions Central States 2005 Omara Catalog 374 written by Ivy Press and published by Heritage Capital Corporation. This book was released on 2005-03 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays in Intertemporal Choice written by John Keith Horowitz and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Market Design and Auction Theory written by Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on market design and auction theory. In Chapter 1, I introduce new multidimensional auction mechanisms. In many auctions, because of externalities, each bidder has a different maximum willingness to pay in order to beat each specific competitor, which causes the following new problem. When there are three bidders, two bidders might compete against each other unnecessarily and have worse payoffs than if they had lost to the third bidder, i.e., the two bidders have "group winner regret, " which can also lead to inefficiency. While no one-dimensional-bid mechanism is efficient, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) may require losers to pay. This paper introduces a novel mechanism, the "multidimensional second-price" (MSP) auction (and its open ascending version), and characterizes it. MSP is free of a loser's payment, pairwise stable, and has good incentive properties, including no group winner regret. Moreover, the winner cannot win at any different price by any misreport, and a loser cannot be better off winning by any misreport. MSP is strategyproof for a bidder without externalities imposed by others, and it reduces to the second-price auction when there are no externalities. Simulations suggest that MSP outperforms the second-price auction in terms of both revenue and efficiency. In Chapter 2, I study properties of VCG when externalities exist, and introduce shill bidding strategies that weakly dominate truthful bidding. When externalities exist, VCG is efficient, incentive compatible, and individually rational. However, as occurs in package auctions without externalities, VCG outcomes may not be in the core. Moreover, VCG is not pairwise stable. Due to externalities, several additional problems occur. VCG may require losing bidders to pay, which might be undesirable. Also, it might be budget infeasible, and the auctioneer might need to pay the winner a subsidy. The subsidy problem can occur even when all bids are positive. Furthermore, unlike package auctions without externalities, there exists a shill bidding strategy that weakly dominates truthful bidding. In addition, when this shill bidding is used, there is no Nash equilibrium. Each bidder is better off using an infinite number of shills, which eventually makes VCG undefined. In Chapter 3, I study properties of VCG in the advertising auction setting. Even though VCG is incentive compatible (IC) in the advertising auction setting, the actual implementation of VCG in practice is not VCG per se. The main reason is that the price needs to be determined when the billing event happens at the same time as the estimation of click-through rate (CTR) or position discount (PD) is occurring. After all, advertising auctions charge the estimate of externalities. However, even in this "estimated" VCG (eVCG), CTR miscalibration does not ruin IC. Even when PD miscalibration exists, IC still holds with "perfect competition." Regarding efficiency and revenue, both CTR and PD miscalibrations matter. Interestingly, however, the revenue of the auctioneer does not necessarily decrease by underbidding.

Download or read book Essays on Time Preference and Combinatorial Auctions written by Kan Takeuchi and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 404 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Experimental Auctions written by Jayson L. Lusk and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2007-11-08 with total page 316 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.

Download or read book HCAA F U N Signature Catalog 396 written by Ivy Press and published by Heritage Capital Corporation. This book was released on 2005-12 with total page 586 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on mechanism design problems: a collective decision problem, a theoretical auction problem, and an applied auction problem. Chapter 1 contains an introduction. In Chapter 2 I consider a problem where a group has to take a collective decision. I study how the decision mechanism should be designed when the information relevant for the decision is dispersed among the group members and when the group members' preferences over decisions might be in conflict. Observed mechanisms differ in whether the most extreme positions are disregarded or not. I find that the designer should never disregard the most extreme positions, but that he should limit the amount by which single group members can affect the decision. In Chapter 3 I analyze a seller's problem to design an optimal first-price auction. Normally the design problem reduces to the problem of determining the lowest admissible bid. I show that the structure of the optimal first-price auction may be non-standard when the seller cannot commit to sell to the highest bidder after observing the bids, and when he is able to fix the auction rules already at a time at which he is still uncertain about his own use value. In this case the seller might allow high and low bids, but forbid intermediate ones. In the last chapter I am interested in the problem of a procurer to organize his procurement process. I compare two procurement systems resembling stylized facts from American and Japanese procurement. In the first system the procurer exerts as much competitive pressure on his incumbent supplier as possible, while in the second system he protects his incumbent supplier by looking only for possible replacements after bilateral negotiations with him break down. I show that either system may induce higher relationship-specific investments and I describe under which conditions which of the two systems is preferable from the procurer's point of view.

Download or read book The Making of Experimental Economics written by Andrej Svorenčík and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-11-05 with total page 251 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is the transcript of a witness seminar on the history of experimental economics, in which eleven high-profile experimental economists participated, including Nobel Laureates Vernon Smith, Reinhard Selten and Alvin Roth. The witness seminar was constructed along four different topics: skills, community, laboratory, and funding. The transcript is preceded by an introduction explaining the method of the witness seminar and its specific set-up and resuming its results. The participants' contribution and their lively discussion provide a wealth of insights into the emergence of experimental economics as a field of research. This book was awarded with best book prize of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET) in 2018.

Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-19 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.

Download or read book Handbook of Experimental Economics Results written by Charles R. Plott and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2008-08-21 with total page 1175 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appears blurred and may produce uncertain results. The contributors to this volume have provided brief notes describing specific experimental results.