Download or read book Essays in Price Discrimination and Regulation written by Sarah Nazpai Schwartz Moshary and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 1 studies price discrimination in advertising sales to Political Action Committees (PACs) in the 2012 Presidential Election. These groups have grown rapidly - expenditures neared $500 million in the 2012 presidential election - and their effect on elections depends on regulation and its interaction with imperfect competition. While the government tightly proscribes station behavior vis-a-vis official campaigns, it does not protect Political Actions Committees (PACs). Television stations potentially wield considerable power to shape access to the electorate. Using novel data on prices paid for individual ad spots from the 2012 presidential election, I find PACs pay a 40% markup above campaign rates, and that there are differences in prices paid by Republican and Democratic groups for indistinguishable purchases. I then develop and estimate a model of political demand for ad spots, exploiting misalignments of state borders and media markets to address potential price endogeneity. Findings indicate that pricing to PACs reflects buyer willingness-to-pay for viewer demographics. Chapter 2 investigates spillover effects of regulation protecting campaign advertising purchases, a most favored nation clause. This regulation guarantees campaigns the lowest rate received by any advertiser, incentivizing stations to sell less airtime to commercial advertisers to buoy campaign prices. Using spot-level data on presidential campaign advertising purchases from 2012, I find that campaign ad prices drop following the institution of rate regulation (sixty days preceding election day). I then develop a model of station price discrimination, and estimate the effect of regulation on campaign and commercial prices relative to a counterfactual without regulation. Chapter 3, co-authored with Gaston Illanes, studies the effects of potential entry on market outcomes in the context of Washington state's 2012 privatization of liquor sales. Theory indicates that entry, and even the threat of entry, plays a key role in discipling market outcomes. We exploit the post-reform licensure requirement that stores have 10,000 square feet of retail space to estimate the impact of an additional store on price competition. We compare prices and product variety in markets with stores just above versus just below the square footage cutoff.
Download or read book Essays on Price Discrimination and Minimum Quality Standard written by Ho-saeng Yi and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 234 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Price Discrimination written by Jie Shuai and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Antitrust and Regulation written by Franklin M. Fisher and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1985 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection of original essays by economists and lawyers addresses important aspects of antitrust and regulation, such as the U.S. government's merger guidelines, antitrust in regulated industries, the connection between profitability and market share, and the question of what constitutes anticompetitive behavior. The book combines economic and legal analysis to inform policymaking with theory as well as the lessons of experience in the petroleum, electric power, computer, retail food, and telecommunications industries. Antitrust and Regulationopens with John McGowan's previously unpublished background paper, "Mergers for Power or Progress," for the merger guidelines taskforce which recommended the rules adopted by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in 1982. This is followed by "Competition and Antitrust in the Petroleum Industry: An Application of the Merger Guidelines," by George A. Hay and Robert J. Reynolds; "Anticompetitive Mergers: Prevention and Cure," by William J. Kolasky, Jr., Philip A. Proger, and Roy T Englert, Jr.; "Industrial Markets: Another Look at the SIC Approach," by James W McKie; "Profitability and Market Share," by Morris A. Adelman and Bruce E. Stangle; "Non-Price Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Firms Toward the Producers of Complementary Products," by J. A. Ordover, A. O. Sykes, and R. D. Willig; "Market Conduct: When is it Anticompetitive?" by Robin C. Landis and Ronald S. Rolfe; "Can Exclusive Franchises Be Bad?" by F. M. Fisher; "Mixing Regulatory and Antitrust Policies in the Electric Power Industry: The Price Squeeze and Retail Market Competition," by Paul L. Joskow; "Preferences of Policy Makers for Alternative Allocations of the Broadcast Spectrum," by Forrest Nelson and Roger Noll; "The Financial Interest and Syndication Rules in Network Television: Regulatory Fantasy and Reality," by F. M. Fisher; and "Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: More on Departures of Price from Marginal Cost," by Almarin Phillips and Gary L. Roberts. Franklin M. Fisher is Professor of Economics at MIT. He is a coauthor with John McGowan and Joen Greenwood of Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and U.S. v IBM, an MIT Press paperback.
Download or read book Essays on Competitive Spatial Price Discrimination written by Barnali Gupta and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays on Price Discrimination written by Qihong Liu and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 91 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Price Discrimination in Search Markets HCarl Christian Groh written by Carl-Christian Groh and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Vertical Markets with Consumer Search written by Edona Reshidi and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three essays that study issues arising in vertical markets with consumer search. The first essay analyses wholesale price discrimination, the second essay examines vertical bargaining and obfuscation and the third essay evaluates the effect of regulated recommended retail prices. In the first essay we show that manufacturers have an incentive to offer different retailers different contracts. The mechanism relies on consumers having heterogeneous search costs. Expecting price dispersion in the retail market, consumers are induced to search. Low-cost retailers sell to a disproportionately larger share of low search cost consumers, while high-cost retailers also lower margins given their smaller customer base. In this way, by discriminating, manufacturers can create a more competitive retail market and increase their profits. We find that consumers can be better off under wholesale price discrimination. The second essay models manufacturer practices that impede consumer search. Examples include vertical informational restraints such as Minimum Advertised Prices (MAPs) and bans on online sales. We find that once the bargaining power rests with the manufacturer, the equilibrium involves no obfuscation. The final consumers, however, are worse off compared to settings when the retailers have all the bargaining power. We show that policies that impose caps on obfuscation may backfire since they induce higher wholesale and retail prices. Finally, the third essay studies the effect of regulation that requires some sales to take place at Recommended Retail Prices (RRPs). We argue that this regulation enables manufacturers to commit to their unobserved contracts and discriminate their retailers. Given the regulation, manufacturers are not free to deviate and sell to all retailers at lower wholesale prices that generate more profits. We show that without this regulation on RRPs only uniform pricing can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome and that consumers would be better off.
Download or read book Essays on Empirical Analysis of Price Discrimination written by Congnan Zhan and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 103 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Price Discrimination and Price Dispersion written by Yeonjei Jung and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book An Essay on Price Discrimination written by Paul Robert Milgrom and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Empirical Essays on Price Discrimination and Market Segmentation written by Romana Khan and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The focus of the second essay is on the contribution to retailer profitability from two price discrimination mechanisms: quantity discounts based on package size (second degree price discrimination), and micromarketing or store-level pricing (third degree price discrimination). The analysis shows that the ability to engage in second degree price discrimination contributes more to retailer profitability than third degree price discrimination.
Download or read book Essays on Price Discrimination written by Donald Ngwe and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This understanding is central in forming prescriptions for managers as well as measuring welfare implications, both of which I leave for future work.
Download or read book Three Essays on Market Structure written by Qingxin He and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 157 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Price discrimination and regulation written by and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Information Design and Regulation written by Daehong Min and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation focuses on information design problem and regulation. In the first chapter, I study how a ban on price discrimination affects firms' investment decisions and social welfare in an intermediate good market. When price discrimination is allowed, an upstream firm can extract all profits of downstream firms by using discriminatory pricing. Thus downstream firms will not invest knowing that all benefits from the investment will be captured by the upstream firm. If instead price discrimination is banned, the upstream firm is forced to yield some benefits from investment to a more efficient downstream firm. I show that this can result in a strict improvement of social welfare. Researchers may be tempted to manipulate the reporting of experimental data. This is likely to affect which experiments are conducted, how the reported results are interpreted and welfare. The second chapter addresses this question in a setting where a sender has limited ability to commit to the choice of information structure, or experiment, and a receiver observes both the chosen experiment and the reported results. This gives rise to a novel mode of communication: a mixture of cheap talk (no commitment or full manipulation) and Bayesian persuasion (full commitment or no manipulation). I show that there is a clear Pareto-ranking among three different modes of communication: both the sender and the receiver are strictly better off as the communication environment changes from cheap talk through communication with partial commitment to Bayesian persuasion. This strict welfare ranking holds for any level of conflict of interests between the sender and the receiver. In the last chapter I study a principal-agent problem in which the principal is an information user and the agent is an information provider. The agent can conduct an experiment that reveals information about the unknown true state. The agent has private information about which experiments are feasible, his type. While the principal can observe both the experiment conducted by the agent and the experimental results, she cannot observe the type of the agent. First I note that there are some cases in which the principal can achieve the first-best outcome despite the information asymmetry. When the first-best outcome is not achievable, there are two kinds of optimal decision mechanisms: (1) one which assigns the best experiment to each type with the distortion in the ex post optimal decisions and (2) the other which achieves the ex post optimal decisions by not assigning the best experiments. I provide sufficient conditions that determine which decision rule is optimal.
Download or read book Regulation of Price Competition written by Marketing Laws Survey (U.S.) and published by . This book was released on 1942 with total page 216 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
