Download or read book Essays on ownership structure corporate governance and corporate finance written by Kurt A. Desender and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Changes in Corporate Governance written by Sukesh Patro and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: These results indicate that insiders are using insider trading as a substitute to cash compensation, and keeping the total direct compensation level less volatile than previous research relied on. This effect is robust to exogenous shock to insider trading return, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The result suggests the importance to take into account of insider trading profit in context of executive compensation.
Download or read book Essays on Voting Power Corporate Governance and Capital Structure written by Yinghong Chen and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 204 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays on Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in the Banking Industry written by Allister Keane and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 147 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Thèse. HEC. 2020.
Download or read book Essays on Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Governance written by Konstantin Kosenko and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 159 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Ownership and Governance of Companies written by Jonathan Michie and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2021-06-29 with total page 277 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Apartheid South Africa was often thought to run in the interests of the business elite. Yet 27 years after apartheid, those business interests remain largely entrenched. Why? Did the South African business community play a role in engineering this outcome – perhaps recognising the apartheid era was over, and jumping ship in time? Conversely, the mission of the ANC was widely perceived to be to shift wealth and power into the hands of the whole community. Yet despite ‘black empowerment’ measures, corporate ownership remains largely in white hands – and certainly in the hands of an elite few, even though no longer restricted to whites. This picture is replicated across the global south, where corporate ownership tends to be concentrated in the hands of an elite, rather than being more democratically spread. Why have alternative corporate forms not been pursued more vigorously, with ownership in the hands of customers, employees, and local communities? In the case of South Africa, where the majority of customers and employees are black, this could have delivered on the ANC’s mission to replace the apartheid era with a democratic one – in terms of wealth, incomes and power, as well as in terms of voting and civic rights. This edited volume explores all these questions and looks at ways to align corporate forms with economic and social goals. The chapters in this book were originally published as special issues of International Review of Applied Economics.
Download or read book Comparative Corporate Governance written by Klaus J. Hopt and published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. This book was released on 2015-02-06 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance has become an important issue in all industrial economies. This text has grown out of a conference entitled Comparative Corporate Governance, An International Conference, United States - Japan - Western Europe which considered the subject.
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance written by Shuai Wang and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 96 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent literature provide widespread and robust evidence on the impact of corporate governance. Ownership structure and management characteristics are among the center of the debate. Empirical studies report conflicting evidence regarding the information environment of public family-controlled firms. We use staggered exogenous shocks to the information environment to test whether family control influences corporate disclosure. After an exogenous decrease in the information environment, we find that family firms provide greater, more informative, and more rapidly produced disclosures than their nonfamily peer firms. Family control increases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure by 190% relative to nonfamily firms after a negative information shock. These disclosure increases occur across founder-, descendant-, and externally- led family firms, suggesting families possess strong incentives to protect the firm's information environment. Beyond ownership structure, I examine the relation of CEO overconfidence on compensation incentive. My findings suggest that the cost-reduction hypothesis applies when firms offer higher incentive to overconfident CEOs to exploit their positively biased views of firm performance; risk-reduction hypothesis dominates when CEOs are extremely overconfident, where firms offer reduced compensation convexity to lower CEO's excessive risk-taking incentive. Extremely overconfident CEOs receive less convex compensation than moderately overconfident CEOs and this relation amplifies with history of value-destroying acquisition and better corporate governance.
Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Control written by Susan Christine Sassalos and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Finance and Governance written by Johan Molin and published by Stockholm School of Economics Efi Economic Research Institut. This book was released on 1996 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Governance written by Jared Ian Wilson and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 332 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance examines the mechanisms through which managers and directors are incentivized to act in the best interests of shareholders. The three essays of this dissertation focus on internal and external control mechanisms in the CEO and director labor markets and their effectiveness in aligning the interests of mangers, directors and shareholders. The first essay examines the influence of industry shocks and peer firms on board monitoring decisions. Recent evidence documents that industry factors influence CEO turnover decisions, despite agency theory's proposition that boards should filter out industry shocks when evaluating CEO performance. Consistent with industry dynamics affecting board monitoring decisions, I document that industries exhibit CEO turnover waves. During these periods of abnormally high turnover, executives face a heightened threat of discipline as boards increase turnover-performance sensitivity. This increased scrutiny inside waves represents a meaningful managerial incentive that curbs value-destroying behavior of CEOs. Overall, this essay documents the existence of CEO turnover waves, which motivate boards to monitor management differently and have real effects on CEO behavior and shareholder wealth. The second essay examines the shareholder wealth effects associated with a required venue for shareholder litigation. In response to the increased threat of shareholder litigation filed in multiple states, firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to a single venue of the board's choice. It is unclear whether these provisions impose increased costs on shareholders' ability to discipline managers and directors or provide benefits to shareholders by eliminating multi-forum and duplicative lawsuits. I use the Delaware Chancery Court's announcement upholding the adoption of these provisions as a natural experiment to evaluate their wealth implications. Overall, this essay suggests that exclusive forum provisions create value for shareholders by specifying a required venue for corporate litigation. The final essay, with David Becher and Ralph Walkling, examines the stability and composition of acquirer boards around mergers and the director characteristics associated with selection for the post-merger board. Our results indicate that the post-merger board changes substantially and variation is significantly different from both non-merger years and non-merging firms. Adjustments reflect firms upgrading skills associated with executive and merger experience and bargaining between targets and acquirers, rather than agency motives. Conversely, director selection at non-merging firms is driven by general skills and diversity. Our analyses provide insight into the dynamic nature of board structure and characteristics valued in the director labor market.
Download or read book Two Essays on Corporate Governance written by Minhua Yang and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore the changes in corporate governance around the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 2002. In the first essay, I examine the relation between board structure and compensation as a bargaining game between the board and the CEO. Bargaining game theories describe an endogenous process of determining the structure of director and CEO compensation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered the equilibrium of power between the board and CEO by changing the monitoring role of the board. SOX essentially provides a natural experiment to test how a shock to the bargaining game alters the balance of power between directors and the CEO. Using the ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation to proxy for bargaining power, I find a significant increase following the passage of SOX, consistent with directors gaining bargaining advantage. Moreover, firms with strong shareholder rights exhibit even greater evidence of power shifting to the directors. Overall, the results suggest that directors gain more power relative to the CEO in determining compensation plans and strong shareholder rights help firms to align directors' incentives with those of shareholders. In the second essay, I examine the relation between CEO compensation structure and acquirer returns. In the literature, researchers find that executive compensation structures influence corporate acquisition decisions. Equity-based executive compensation should reduce the non-value-maximizing behavior of acquiring managers. A series of corporate reforms such as SOX and the FASB expensing rule affected the structure of CEO equity-based compensation. I find a significant increase in CEO restricted stock compensation and a significant decrease in CEO option-based compensation following these reforms. I also find that CEOs with strong managerial power are more likely to receive more restricted stock in their compensation package after the 2002 reforms. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between the restricted stock compensation of acquiring firm CEOs and abnormal stock returns after 2002. This provides empirical support on the effectiveness of the shift away from options towards restricted stock in executive compensation packages. Restricted stock is associated with better merger decisions.
Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance Equity Capital Structure and Corporate Diversification written by Markus Schmid and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 130 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Governance written by Ms. Nadya Malenko and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation provides a theoretical analysis of several corporate governance mechanisms in the presence of information asymmetries and agency conflicts between shareholders, managers, and directors. The first essay of the dissertation analyzes decision-making in corporate boards and studies how board characteristics and the design of board meetings affect board decisions. Two other essays are on shareholder activism. The second essay focuses on voting for non-binding shareholder proposals and examines its effectiveness in conveying shareholder views to the management. The third essay considers another common form of shareholder activism, private negotiations with the management, and studies the activist's choice between private negotiations and public confrontation. The first essay, "Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards, " develops a theory of communication and collective decision-making in a board of directors whose members have private information about the issue under discussion. The key element of the model is that the quality of board communication is endogenous, because it depends on the time and effort directors are willing to put into communicating their information to others. Directors may have biases regarding the decision and may be reluctant to disagree with the prevailing opinion in the boardroom. I show that when effective communication is personally costly for directors, both stronger preferences for conformity and stronger biases may improve the board's decisions because directors will have stronger incentives to convince others of their position. These results have implications for the design of board policies, including the use of open vs. secret ballot voting, the establishment and composition of committees, and the frequency of executive sessions of outside directors. The second essay, "Non-Binding Voting for Shareholder Proposals, " which is co-authored with Doron Levit and is forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, considers another setting where information relevant for the firm's decisions is dispersed among many agents, namely, the firm's large shareholders. Our main question is whether voting for non-binding shareholder proposals fulfills its intended role of conveying shareholders' expectations to the management. We show that when the interests of the manager and shareholders are not aligned, non-binding voting generally fails to convey shareholder views to the manager. This distinguishes voting for non-binding proposals from standard voting for binding proposals, where some information is always conveyed. In practice, the effectiveness of shareholder proposals may be affected by external governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control in the form of activist investors. Our analysis demonstrates that the presence of an activist investor can enhance the advisory role of non-binding voting only if there is substantial conflict of interest between the activist and shareholders. Although shareholder proposals have become increasingly common in recent years, submitting a proposal to a shareholder vote is often viewed by activist investors as a tactic of last resort. According to survey evidence, activists generally try to achieve their objectives through private negotiations with the management and use confrontational tactics only if these negotiations are not successful. The third essay, "Behind-the-Scene Negotiations in Shareholder Activism, " examines under which circumstances negotiations between the activist and the management fail. I study these negotiations in a bargaining framework where the manager is privately informed about his private benefits. The model provides implications for the likelihood of proposal withdrawals and announcement effects of proposal submissions. It demonstrates, in particular, that the announcement of an activist's intervention may have a negative price effect even if the intervention is known to be beneficial to the company.
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets written by Sudarat Bo Ananchotikul and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays on Equity Carve out written by Zhilan Feng and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
