Download or read book Essays in Non cooperative Game Theory Evolutionary Learning and Signalling Games written by Mogens Jensen and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Evolutionary Game Theory and Its Applications written by Shota Fujishima and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 95 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on evolutionary game theory and its applications. The first essay considers mechanism design in the evolutionary game-theoretic framework. The second essay studies equilibrium selection of coordination games by using an evolutionary game-theoretic concept. The third essay formulates a multi-regional economic growth model as an evolutionary game and characterizes the stability of its equilibria under an evolutionary dynamic. The summaries of each essay are provided below. In the first essay, I consider an implementation problem in a class of congestion games with players that have heterogeneous costs of taking actions. One application is to traffic congestion with drivers having heterogeneous time costs. The planner would like to design a price scheme under which the economy converges to an epsilon-optimum from any initial state when he does not have full knowledge of the cost functions, and he can observe only the aggregate strategy distribution. Although the planner would like to internalize the externalities, the informational constraints compel him to estimate their values. Using the optimality and equilibrium conditions, I construct a practical estimation procedure that yields the true values of externalities in the long-run. Moreover, I show that our scheme makes the epsilon-optimum globally stable under the best response dynamic if the externalities among players taking the same action are sufficiently large relative to those among players taking different actions. In the second essay, I study the long-run outcomes of noisy asynchronous repeated games with players that are heterogeneous in in terms of their patience. The players repeatedly play a 2-by-2 coordination game with random pair-wise matching. The games are noisy because the players may make mistakes when choosing their actions and are asynchronous because only one player can move in each period. I characterize the long-run outcomes of Markov perfect equilibrium that are robust to the mistakes and show that if there is a sufficiently patient player, the efficient state can be the unique robust outcome even if it is risk-dominated. Because I need heterogeneity for the result, I argue that it enables the most patient player in effect to be the leader. In the third essay, I consider a microfounded urban growth model with two regions and a mass of mobile workers to study interactions among growth, agglomeration, and urban congestion. Unlike previous research in the urban growth literature, I formulate the model as a one-shot game and take an evolutionary game-theoretic approach for stability analysis. My approach enables us to analyze the stability of nonstationary equilibria in which populations of each region are not constant over time. I show that if both the expenditure share for housing and inter-regional transport cost are small, a stable stationary equilibrium does not exist. Moreover, in such a case, I show that there can exist a stable nonstationary equilibrium in which mobile workers agglomerate in one region at first but some of them migrate to the other region later. I argue that such a nonstationary location pattern is related to return migration.
Download or read book Three Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jack Robles and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Epistemology and Evolutionary Game Theory written by Elias Tsakas and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Srinivas Arigapudi and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter studies the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule. The second chapter studies a model of stochastic evolution under the probit choice rule. In the small noise double limit, where first the noise level in agents' decisions is taken to zero, and then the population size to infinity, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. We use resultsfrom optimal control theory to solve the exit cost problem. This is used to determine the most likely exit paths from the initial basin of attraction and also to assess the expected time until the evolutionary process leaves the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium in a class of three-strategy coordination games. The third chapter (joint work with Yuval Heller and Igal Milchtaich) studies the population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each action k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the action whose mean payoff was highest during the testing phase. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma.By contrast, when k > 1 we show that, if the gains from defection are not too large, there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case k = 1 commonly studied in the literature.
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ratul Lahkar and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jonas Björnerstedt and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 167 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essay on Nonlinear evolutionary game dynamics written by Marius Ionut Ochea and published by Rozenberg Publishers. This book was released on 2010 with total page 217 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jorgen W. Weibull and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 265 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Joerg Oechssler and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Yao-Chye Chiang and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Complexity of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1997-08-18 with total page 247 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that landmark book. It collects seven essays, originally published in a broad range of journals, and adds an extensive new introduction to the collection, along with new prefaces to each essay and a useful new appendix of additional resources. Written in Axelrod's acclaimed, accessible style, this collection serves as an introductory text on complexity theory and computer modeling in the social sciences and as an overview of the current state of the art in the field. The articles move beyond the basic paradigm of the Prisoner's Dilemma to study a rich set of issues, including how to cope with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how new political actors and regions of shared culture can develop. They use the shared methodology of agent-based modeling, a powerful technique that specifies the rules of interaction between individuals and uses computer simulation to discover emergent properties of the social system. The Complexity of Cooperation is essential reading for all social scientists who are interested in issues of cooperation and complexity.
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ge Jiang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Rational Decisions written by Ken Binmore and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2008-12-29 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian decision theory--and when does it need to be modified? Using a minimum of mathematics, Rational Decisions clearly explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds. The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress. In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies. Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making.
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Basic Books. This book was released on 2009-04-29 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Download or read book Satisficing Theory and Non cooperative Games written by Matthew S. Nokleby and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Satisficing game theory is an alternative to traditional non-cooperative game theory which offers increased flexibility in modeling players[alpha] social interactions. However, satisficing players with conflicting attitudes may implement dysfunctional behaviors, leading to poor performance. In this thesis, we present two attempts to [beta]bridge the gap[gamma] between satisficing and non-cooperative game theory. First, we present an evolutionary method by which players adapt their attitudes to increase raw payoff, allowing players to overcome dysfunction. We extend the Nash equilibrium concept to satisficing games, showing that the evolutionary method presented leads the players toward an equilibrium in their attitudes. Second, we introduce the conditional utility functions of satisficing theory into an otherwise traditional non-cooperative framework. While the conditional structure allows increased social flexibility in the players[alpha] behaviors, players maximize individual utility in the traditional sense, allowing us to apply the Nash equilibrium. We find that, by adjusting players[alpha] attitudes, we may alter the Nash equilibria that result.
