Download or read book Essays in Dynamic Cooperation Bargaining and Contribution Games written by Parth Singh Parihar and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In many economic and political settings, agents with non-aligned interests must work together to enact mutually beneficial change. My dissertation consists of three chapters that analyze problems that combine features of bargaining and contribution games. In particular, I examine how institutional rules, the size of teams, and the attitudes of agents affect dynamic cooperation.In Chapter 1, I analyze a repeated bargaining environment where the previously negotiated agreement becomes the present status quo. Agreements' efficiency decays in the absence of revision, giving both parties an incentive to re-negotiate. I study how limited foresight-- or the inability of agents to account for the full dynamic linkage from one agreement to the next-- affects behavior. I show that limited foresight is a key driver of gridlock. Moreover, I demonstrate that while limited foresight and inter-temporal discounting both overweight imminent outcomes, these have the opposite effects on equilibrium. I solve the model in the case of legislative bargaining and relate its findings to observed phenomena in policy-making.In Chapter 2, Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros, and I study sequential contributions to public goods. We consider a model where agents with different valuations for the good are selected at random to contribute in each period. Agents face classical free-riding incentives in preferring to offload the cost of contributing to other players. We show that if the project is sufficiently large, the unique equilibrium of the model displays endogenous contribution cycles, in which agents of different types alternate making gradual contributions towards completion of the project.Finally, in Chapter 3, I explore a setting that combines features of both bargaining and contribution games. Two players cooperate to complete a joint project, wherein each of several periods, one agent-- the project leader-- is responsible for advancing the project at personal cost. Project leaders are choose not only the extent of progress they enact but also the direction in which the project moves, over which their preferences diverge with their counterparts. I show that increasing the incumbency of an efficient project leader decreases her productivity while the opposite is true for an inefficient contributor.
Download or read book Essay in Cooperative Games written by Gianfranco Gambarelli and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-06-05 with total page 241 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essays on Cooperative Games collates selected contributions on Cooperative Games. The papers cover both theoretical aspects (Coalition Formation, Values, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games). A contribution on Minimax Theorem (by Ken Binmore) and a brief history of early Game Theory (by Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen) are also enclosed.
Download or read book Bargaining and Cooperation written by Duozhe Li and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bargaining and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Dynamic Game written by Jess J. Benhabib and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Cooperative Game Theory with Applications to Hold up in Co ownership Bargaining and Multi person Utility written by Manel Baucells Alibés and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 234 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Bargaining and Repeated Games written by Alexander Wolitzky and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The thesis consists of four essays on bargaining and repeated games. The first essay studies whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in repeated games with long-run players. Given any prior over behavioral types, a modified prior is constructed with the same total weight on behavioral types and a larger support under which almost all efficient, feasible, and individually rational payoffs are attainable in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus, whether reputation effects emerge in repeated games with contracts depends on details of the prior distribution over behavioral types other than its support. The second essay studies reputational bargaining under the assumption of first-order knowledge of rationality. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself is determined, as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much. It is shown that this maxmin share of the surplus is large relative to the player's initial reputation, and that the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement. The third essay studies the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained in sequential equilibrium in repeated games with network monitoring. The foundational result is that the maximum level of cooperation can be sustained in grim trigger strategies. Comparative statics on the maximum level of cooperation are shown to be highly tractable. For the case of fixed monitoring networks, a new notion of network centrality is introduced, which characterizes which players have greater capacities for cooperation and which networks can support more cooperation. The fourth essay studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time period has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. Optimal equilibrium pricing and profits are characterized. For durable goods, a lower bound on optimal profit for any discount factor is provided. The bound converges to the optimal static monopoly profit as the discount factor converges to one, in contrast to the Coase conjecture.
Download or read book Cooperation Game Theoretic Approaches written by Sergiu Hart and published by Springer. This book was released on 1997-04-17 with total page 352 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, helt at SUNY, Stony Brook, New York, July 18-29, 1994
Download or read book Dynamic Shapley Value and Dynamic Nash Bargaining written by David W. K. Yeung and published by Nova Science Publishers. This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is an important and innovative addition to textbooks in game theory. It provides a detailed discourse on the extension of two of the worlds most prominent cooperative game solutions the seminal Shapley value in games with transferrable payoffs and the classic Nash bargaining scheme in games with non-transferrable payoffs to a dynamic framework. The extension of these two classic cooperative solution concepts into a dynamic setting is not just of theoretical interest, but also allows many real-life cooperation situations like global environmental management, nuclear disarmament, disease control, trade disputes and political unions to be analyzed in an effective way. This book provides: (i) A compendium of dynamic optimization techniques used in its analysis; (ii) a detailed disquisition on cooperative dynamic consistency; (iii) the extension of the Shapley Value to a dynamic framework; (iv) the establishment of a dynamic Nash bargaining paradigm; and (v) the incorporation of stochastic elements into the analyses. Interesting solvable examples are provided to illustrate the practicality and applicability of the dynamic Shapley value and dynamic Nash bargaining scheme in dynamic cooperation.
Download or read book Essays in Cooperation and Repeated Games written by Daniel Vincent Barron and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation explores cooperation when formal contracts and legal institutions are imperfect. The first chapter (co-authored with Isaiah Andrews) considers how a principal allocates business among a group of agents to motivate them in the context of a repeated game with imperfect private monitoring. If players are impatient, the optimal relational contract dynamically allocates future business among agents depending on past performance. An optimal allocation rule favors an agent who performs well, even if he later performs poorly. An agent loses favor only if he is unable to produce and his replacement performs well. The principal may allows some relationships to deteriorate into persistent shirking in order to better motivate other agents. We find conditions under which the principal either does or does not benefit by concealing information from the agents. The second chapter proves that approximately Pareto efficient outcomes can be sustained in a broad class of games with imperfect public monitoring and Markov adverse selection when players are patient. Consider a game in which one player's utility evolves according to an irreducible Markov process and actions are imperfectly observed. Then any payoff in the interior of the convex hull of all Pareto efficient and min-max payoffs can be approximated by an equilibrium payoff for sufficiently patient players. The proof of this result is partially constructive and uses an intuitive "quota mechanism" to ensure approximate truth-felling. Under stronger assumptions, the result partially extends to games where one player's private type determines every player's utility. The final chapter explores how firms might invest to facilitate their relationships with one another. Consider a downstream firm who uses relational contracts to motivate multiple suppliers. In an applied model with imperfect private monitoring, this chapter shows that the suppliers might "put the relationship first:" they invest to flexibly produce many of the products required by the downstream firm, rather than cutting costs by specializing. A downstream firm that relies on relational contracts tends to source from fewer suppliers, each of whom can inefficiently manufacture many different products required by that firm.
Download or read book Essays in Game Theory written by Nimrod Megiddo and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Game Theory written by Gyu Ho Wang and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 314 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Complexity of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1997-08-18 with total page 247 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that landmark book. It collects seven essays, originally published in a broad range of journals, and adds an extensive new introduction to the collection, along with new prefaces to each essay and a useful new appendix of additional resources. Written in Axelrod's acclaimed, accessible style, this collection serves as an introductory text on complexity theory and computer modeling in the social sciences and as an overview of the current state of the art in the field. The articles move beyond the basic paradigm of the Prisoner's Dilemma to study a rich set of issues, including how to cope with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how new political actors and regions of shared culture can develop. They use the shared methodology of agent-based modeling, a powerful technique that specifies the rules of interaction between individuals and uses computer simulation to discover emergent properties of the social system. The Complexity of Cooperation is essential reading for all social scientists who are interested in issues of cooperation and complexity.
Download or read book Dynamic Games Theory and Applications written by Alain Haurie and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2005-12-06 with total page 279 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Dynamic games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in modelling competitive as well as conflict situations exhibiting an intertemporel aspect. Applications of dynamic games have proven to be a suitable methodology to study the behaviour of players (decision-makers) and to predict the outcome of such situations in many areas including engineering, economics, management science, military, biology and political science. Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications collects thirteen articles written by established researchers. It is an excellent reference for researchers and graduate students covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in both cooperative and non-cooperative games in different areas of applications, especially in economics and management science.
Download or read book Games Economic Dynamics and Time Series Analysis written by XY. Deistler and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-14 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Strategy of Conflict written by Thomas C. Schelling and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 1980 with total page 332 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.
Download or read book Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications written by Leon A. Petrosyan and published by Birkhäuser. This book was released on 2016-09-30 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This contributed volume contains fourteen papers based on selected presentations from the European Conference on Game Theory SING11-GTM 2015, held at Saint Petersburg State University in July 2015, and the Networking Games and Management workshop, held at the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Petrozvavodsk, Russia, also in July 2015. These papers cover a wide range of topics in game theory, including recent advances in areas with high potential for future work, as well as new developments on classical results. Some of these include A new approach to journal ranking using methods from social choice theory; A differential game of a duopoly in which two firms are competing for market share in an industry with network externalities; The impact of information propagation in the model of tax audits; A voting model in which the results of previous votes can affect the process of coalition formation in a decision-making body; The Selten-Szidarovsky technique for the analysis of Nash equilibria of games with an aggregative structure; Generalized nucleoli and generalized bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation; Bayesian networks and games of deterrence; and A new look at the study of solutions for games in partition function form. The maturity and vitality of modern-day game theory are reflected in the new ideas, novel applications, and contributions of young researchers represented in this collection. It will be of interest to anyone doing theoretical research in game theory or working on one its numerous applications.
Download or read book Political Game Theory written by Nolan McCarty and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2014-10-30 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.
