Download or read book Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality written by Richard Pettigrew and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2022-07-14 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James' ideas in 'The Will to Believe', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It's called epistemic utility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism about epistemic rationality: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit.

Download or read book Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality written by Richard Pettigrew and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2022-08-17 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James' ideas in 'The Will to Believe', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It's called epistemic utility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism about epistemic rationality: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit.

Download or read book Belief Action and Rationality over Time written by Chrisoula Andreou and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2018-04-19 with total page 314 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Action theorists and formal epistemologists often pursue parallel inquiries regarding rationality, with the former focused on practical rationality, and the latter focused on theoretical rationality. In both fields, there is currently a strong interest in exploring rationality in relation to time. This exploration raises questions about the rationality of certain patterns over time. For example, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of intention; similarly, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of belief. While the action-theoretic and epistemic questions raised are closely related, advances in one field are not always processed by the other. This volume brings together contributions by scholars in action theory and formal epistemology working on questions regarding rationality and time so that researchers in these overlapping fields can profit from each other’s insights. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Download or read book Risk and Rationality written by Lara Buchak and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2013-11 with total page 273 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view (expected utility theory) is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.

Download or read book Rationality and Belief written by Ralph Wedgwood and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2023-06-02 with total page 325 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book gives a general theory of rational belief. Although it can be read by itself, is a sequel to the author's previous book The Value of Rationality (Oxford, 2017). It takes the general conception of rationality that was defended in that earlier book, and combines it with an account of the varieties of belief, and of what it is for these beliefs to count as "correct", to develop an account of what it is for beliefs to count as rational. According to this account, rationality comes in degrees: the degree to which one's beliefs counts as rational is determined by their distance from a corresponding probability function - where this distance is measured by those beliefs' "expected degree of incorrectness" according to the probability function; the account also involves an explanation of what determines exactly which probability function plays this role in each case, and of why this probability function should play this role. In developing and defending this account, new light is shed on several central epistemological issues. These issues include: the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification; the debates between internalism and externalism, and between foundationalism and coherentism; the significance - or lack of it - of the notion of 'evidence'; the relationship between credences, full belief, inference, and suspension of judgment; the nature of the kind of possibility that is presupposed by the relevant sort of probability; and whether rationality is "diachronic" - so that the beliefs that it is rational for us to have now depend, in part, on the beliefs that we held in the past. Finally, some suggestions are made about how this theory bears on a range of further topics, including the defeasibility of inference, scepticism, and the analysis of knowledge.

Download or read book Rational Responses to Risks written by Paul Weirich and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2020-07-10 with total page 283 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Good decisions account for risks. For example, the risk of an accident while driving in the rain makes a reasonable driver decide to slow down. While risk is a large topic in theoretical disciplines such as economics and psychology, as well as in practical disciplines such as medicine and finance, philosophy has a unique contribution to make in developing a normative theory of risk that states what risk is, and to what extent our responses to it are rational. Weirich here develops a philosophical theory of the rationality of responses to risk. He first distinguishes two types of risk: first, a chance of a bad event, and second, an act's risk in relation to its possible outcomes. He argues that this distinction has normative significance in the sense that one's attitudes towards these types of risks - and how one acts on them - are governed by different general principles of rationality. Consequently, a comprehensive account of risk must not only characterize rational responses to risk but also explain why these responses are rational. Weirich explains how, for a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent's preferences among the acts. As a result, maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. His view takes an act's expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. The book's precise formulation of general standards of rationality for attitudes and for acts, and its rigorous argumentation for these standards, make it philosophical; but while mainly of interest to philosophers, its broader arguments will contribute to the conceptual foundations of studies of risk in all disciplines that study it.

Download or read book Pragmatic Reason written by Robert B Talisse and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2023-03-23 with total page 289 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Christopher Hookway has been influential in promoting engagement with pragmatist and naturalist perspectives from classical and contemporary American philosophy. This book reflects on Hookway’s work on the American philosophical tradition and its significance for contemporary discussions of the understanding of mind, meaning, knowledge, and value. Hookway’s original and extensive studies of Charles S. Peirce have made him among the most admired and frequently referenced of Peirce’s interpreters. His work on classical American pragmatism has explored the philosophies of William James, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce, and examined the influence of pragmatist ideas outside of the United States. Additionally, Hookway has participated in a number of celebrated exchanges with some of the most high-profile figures of twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy, including Karl-Otto Apel, Philip Pettit, Hilary Putnam, and W.V.O. Quine, through which his treatments of a large range of topics in epistemology and the philosophies of mind and language have been developed and promoted. The chapters in this book—which include contributions from several of Hookway’s former students and colleagues—include studies of Hookway’s engagement with the works of Peirce, James, and Dewey, his contributions to virtue epistemology, and his discussions of hope and pragmatist metaphysics. Pragmatic Reason will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on American philosophy, the history of analytic philosophy, and epistemology.

Download or read book Fitting Things Together written by Alex Worsnip and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2021 with total page 361 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Some combinations of attitudes-beliefs, credences, intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on-do not fit together right: they are incoherent. A natural idea is that there are requirements of 'structural rationality' that forbid us from being in these incoherent states. Yet many philosophers have recently attempted to minimize or eliminate structural rationality, arguing that it is just a 'shadow' of 'substantive rationality' - that is, correctly responding to one's reasons. In 'Fitting Things Together', Alex Worsnip pushes back against this trend, providing a sustained defense of the view that structural rationality is a genuine, autonomous, unified, and normatively significant phenomenon.

Download or read book The Grounds of Political Legitimacy written by Fabienne Peter and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2023-04-15 with total page 245 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Political decisions have the potential to greatly impact our lives. Think of decisions in relation to abortion or climate change, for example. This makes political legitimacy an important normative concern. But what makes political decisions legitimate? Are they legitimate in virtue of having support from the citizens? Democratic conceptions of political legitimacy answer in the affirmative. Such conceptions rightly highlight that legitimate political decision-making must be sensitive to disagreements among the citizens. But what if democratic decisions fail to track what there is most reason to do? What if a democratically elected government fails to take measures necessary to protect its population from threats related to climate change? Peter argues that the legitimacy of political decisions doesn't just depend on respect for the citizens' will; and defends a novel hybrid conception of political legitimacy, called the Epistemic Accountability conception. According to this conception, political legitimacy also depends on how political decision-making responds to evidence for what there is most reason to do. The Grounds of Political Legitimacy starts with an overview of the main ways in which philosophers have thought about political legitimacy, and identifies the epistemic accountability conception as an overlooked alternative. It then develops the epistemic accountability conception of political legitimacy and discusses its implications for legitimate political decision-making. Considering the norms that should govern political debate, it examines the role of experts in politics, and probes the responsibilities of democratically elected political leaders and as well as of citizens.

Download or read book The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy written by Ben Colburn and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2022-12-30 with total page 692 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The question of autonomy is fundamental to understanding some of the most important questions and debates in contemporary political and moral life, from freedom of the individual, free will and decision-making to controversies surrounding medical ethics, human rights and the justifications for state intervention. It is also a crucial concept for understanding the development of liberalism. The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy is a comprehensive survey and assessment of the key figures, debates and problems surrounding autonomy. Comprising over forty chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook is divided into five clear parts: Autonomy through History Foundations of Autonomy Threats to Autonomy The Significance of Autonomy Autonomy in Application. Within these sections, all the essential topics are addressed, making The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy an outstanding reference source for those in political philosophy, ethics, applied ethics and philosophy of law. It is also highly recommended reading for those in related subjects, such as politics, social policy and education.

Download or read book The Rational Mind written by Scott Sturgeon and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2020-01-30 with total page 384 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Scott Sturgeon presents an original account of mental states and their dynamics. He develops a detailed story of coarse- and fine-grained mental states, a novel perspective on how they fit together, an engaging theory of the rational transitions between them, and a fresh view of how formal methods can advance our understanding in this area. In doing so, he addresses a deep four-way divide in literature on epistemic rationality. Formal epistemology is done in specialized languages—often seeming a lot more like mathematics than Plato—and so can alienate philosophers who are drawn to more traditional work on thought experiments in epistemic rationality. Conversely, informal epistemology appears to be a lot more like Plato than mathematics and, as such, it tends to deter philosophers drawn to formal models of the phenomena. Similarly, the epistemology of coarse-grained states boils down everything to a discussion of rational belief—making the area appear a lot more like foundations of knowledge than anything useful for the theory rational decision, such as decision-making under uncertainty. The Rational Mind unifies work in all of these areas for the first time.

Download or read book Unsettled Thoughts written by Julia Staffel and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2020-01-05 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How should thinkers cope with uncertainty? What makes their degrees of belief rational, and how should they reason about uncertain matters? In epistemology, recent research has attempted to answer these questions by developing formal models of ideally rational credences. However, we know from psychological research that perfect rationality is unattainable for human thinkers--and so this raises the question of how rational ideals can apply to human thinkers. A popular reply is that the more a thinker's imperfectly rational credences approximate compliance with norms of ideal rationality, the better. But what exactly does this mean? Why is it better to be less irrational, if we can't ever be completely rational? And what does being closer to ideally rational amount to? If ideal models of rationality are supposed to help us understand the rationality of human, imperfect thinkers, we need answers to these questions. Unsettled Thoughts breaks new ground in the study of rationality in providing these answers: we can explain why it's better to be less irrational, because less irrational degrees of belief are generally more accurate and better at guiding our actions. Moreover, the way in which approximating ideal rationality is beneficial can be made formally precise by using a variety of distance measures that track the benefits of being more rational.

Download or read book Accuracy and the Laws of Credence written by Richard Pettigrew and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2016 with total page 251 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). He draws on decision theory in order to justify the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, and sets out a veritistic account of epistemic utility.

Download or read book Fuzziness and Approximate Reasoning written by K. K. Dompere and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2009-03-25 with total page 311 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph is special in its orientation and contribution to current state of our understanding of decision-choice process and knowledge production. Its special orientation is to bring to the scientific community the discussions on the epistemic structure of the relationships among uncertainty, expectations, risk, possibility, probability and how the rules of fuzzy paradigm and the methods of fuzzy rationality bring new and different understanding to the relationships. At the level of theory of knowledge, it presents the structure and epistemic analysis of uncertainty, expectations and risk in decision-choice actions through the characteristics of substitution-transformation and input-output processes in categorial dynamics of actual-potential duality. The interactive effects of rationality and expectation are examined around belief, prospect, time and conditions of belief justification where the relationship between possibility and probability as a sequential link between potential and actual is analyzed to provide some understanding of the role of relative costs and benefits in defining risk in both nature and society. The concepts of possibilistic and probabilistic beliefs are explicated in relation to rationality and the decision-choice process where the analytical relationship between uncertainty and expectation formation is presented leading to the introduction of two types of uncertainty composed of fuzzy uncertainty and stochastic uncertainty.

Download or read book Epistemic Consequentialism written by Kristoffer Ahlström and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2018 with total page 344 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms that are conducive to epistemic value. This volume presents the latest work on epistemic consequentialism by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.--

Download or read book Risk and Rationality written by K. S. Shrader-Frechette and published by Univ of California Press. This book was released on 2022-05-27 with total page 324 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1991.

Download or read book Risk Uncertainty and Rational Action written by Carlo C. Jaeger and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2013-11-05 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Risk as we now know it is a wholly new phenomenon, the by-product of our ever more complex and powerful technologies. In business, policy making, and in everyday life, it demands a new way of looking at technological and environmental uncertainty. In this definitive volume, four of the world's leading risk researchers present a fundamental critique of the prevailing approaches to understanding and managing risk - the 'rational actor paradigm'. They show how risk studies must incorporate the competing interests, values, and rationalities of those involved and find a balance of trust and acceptable risk. Their work points to a comprehensive and significant new theory of risk and uncertainty and of the decision making process they require. The implications for social, political, and environmental theory and practice are enormous. Winner of the 2000-2002 Outstanding Publication Award of the Section on Environment and Technology of the American Sociological Association