Download or read book Empirical Evidence on Vertical Foreclosure written by Eric S. Rosengren and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure in the U S Cable Television Market written by Dong Chen and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We provide new evidence of vertical foreclosure in the U.S. cable television market, primarily using a 2004 database of 680 cable systems. Focusing on four program network groups (basic outdoor entertainment, basic cartoon, basic movie, and premium movie), we find that more frequent carriage of affiliated networks and less frequent carriage of rival networks, a pattern identified by previous empirical studies, persists in spite of extensive channel capacity expansion and digitization of cable systems, as well as new competition from DBS -- developments that might be expected to reduce or eliminate vertical foreclosure effects. We also find a new form of vertical foreclosure in the digital environment: integrated cable operators that do carry rival networks are more likely to position them on higher priced digital tiers, or in other ways that appear to limit demand for them.
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusivity Clauses written by Itai Ater and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Exclusive contracts are one of the most controversial topics in the economic analysis of antitrust. Yet, very few empirical papers analyze the determinants and the consequences of exclusive contracts. In this paper, I study exclusive contracts between hamburger restaurants and Israeli shopping malls, in which mall owners commit to prohibiting additional hamburger restaurants from entering their malls. I investigate the determinants of these exclusive contracts and examine how such contracts affect the number of hamburger restaurants and their sales. I show that exclusive contracts are less likely to be adopted in larger malls, in malls that face more competition from other malls, and in malls that opened before 1993, when McDonald's and Burger King entered the Israeli market. I then use the mall's opening year - before or after 1993 - as an instrumental variable to estimate a negative effect of exclusive contracts on the number of restaurants and on total mall hamburger sales. My findings are generally consistent with anti-competitive vertical foreclosure models.
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects of Vertical Rebates written by Christopher T. Conlon and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Vertical rebates are prominently used across a wide range of industries. These con- tracts may induce greater retail effort, but may also prompt retailers to drop competing products. We study these offsetting efficiency and foreclosure effects empirically, using data from one retailer. Using a field experiment, we show how the rebate allocates the cost of effort between manufacturer and retailer. We estimate structural models of demand and retailer behavior to quantify the rebate's effect on assortment and retailer effort. We find that the rebate increases industry profitability and consumer utility, but fails to maximize social surplus and leads to upstream foreclosure.
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure with Product Choice and Allocation written by Jaedo Choi and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate a vertically integrated theater's contract and screen allocation decisions in a movie industry characterized by demand uncertainty, price uniformity, and revenue-sharing contracts. Based on a simple theoretical model that describes the decisions of theaters and movie distributors, we derive two mechanisms of foreclosure behavior, termed the selection and allocation effects herein. Our empirical results suggest that integrated theaters not only impose a higher quality standard for movies from independent distributors but also play their affiliated movies more. Further, the magnitude of the foreclosure effects varies by movie quality.
Download or read book Reducing Foreclosures written by Christopher Foote and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2009 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Takes a skeptical look at a leading argument about what is causing the foreclosure crisis and what should be done to stop it. The authors focus on two key decisions: the borrower's choice to default on a mortgage and the lender's subsequent choice whether to renegotiate or modify the loan. Unaffordable loans, defined as those with high mortgage payments relative to income at origination, are unlikely to be the main reason that borrowers decide to default. The efficiency of foreclosure for investors is a more plausible explanation for the low number of modifications to date. Policies designed to reduce foreclosures should focus on ameliorating the effects of job loss rather than modifying loans to make them more affordable on a long-term basis. Illustrations.
Download or read book Cementing Relationships written by Ali Hortaçsu and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper empirically investigates the possible market power effects of vertical integration proposed in the theoretical literature on vertical foreclosure. It uses a rich data set of cement and ready-mixed concrete plants that spans several decades to perform a detailed case study. There is little evidence that foreclosure is quantitatively important in these industries. Instead, prices fall, quantities rise, and entry rates remain unchanged when markets become more integrated. These patterns are consistent, however, with an alternative efficiency-based mechanism. Namely, higher productivity producers are more likely to vertically integrate and are also larger, more likely to survive, and charge lower prices. We find evidence that integrated producers' productivity advantage is tied to improved logistics coordination afforded by large local concrete operations. Interestingly, this benefit is not due to firms' vertical structures per se: non-vertical firms with large local concrete operations have similarly high productivity levels.
Download or read book U S Department of Justice Merger Guidelines written by United States. Department of Justice. Antitrust Division and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Economic Assessment of Mergers Under European Competition Law written by Daniel Gore and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-04-25 with total page 559 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.
Download or read book The Antitrust Paradox written by Robert Bork and published by . This book was released on 2021-02-22 with total page 536 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Download or read book FCC Record written by United States. Federal Communications Commission and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 986 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Handbook of Antitrust Economics written by Paolo Buccirossi and published by . This book was released on 2008-03-21 with total page 716 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden
Download or read book Lectures on Antitrust Economics written by Michael Dennis Whinston and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Download or read book Vertical Relationships and Coordination in the Food System written by Giovanni Galizzi and published by Physica. This book was released on 1999-03-29 with total page 660 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: New analysis and empirical evidence on several topics such as the determinants of shape and nature of the vertical relationships in the food system, the determinants of vertical co-ordination and competition, types and mechanisms of co-ordination as well as the consequences for competitiveness, consumer welfare and policy implications are provided. The focus is on vertical issues at different stages of the food chain with a particular emphasis on the increasing role played by retailers in shaping the vertical relationships in the food system through the development of food supply-chain management.
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure and the Regulation of Vertical Mergers written by Jun Lu and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets written by Stephen Martin and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We report the results of experiments designed to test recent theories of vertical foreclosure. Consistent with the theory, vertical integration improves the upstream firm's ability to commit to restricting output to the monopoly level, as does the use of public contracts. Public contracts are not a perfect substitute for vertical integration, however: integration allows more surplus to be extracted from the unintegrated downstream firm, a bargaining effect that has been underemphasized in the recent foreclosure literature. Motivated by some observations that are difficult to reconcile with existing theory, we extend the theory to allow downstream firms to have heterogeneous (rather than purely passive or symmetric) out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
