Download or read book Does Tax Policy Affect Executive Compensation written by Carola Frydman and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Effect of Tax Policy on Executive and Worker Compensation written by Tax Institute and published by . This book was released on 1958 with total page 92 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Taxation of Executive Compensation written by Brian J. Hall and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of executive compensation paid through stock options. In this paper, we examine the extent to which tax policy has influenced the composition of executive compensation, and discuss the implications of rising stock-based pay for tax policy. We begin by describing the tax rules for executive pay in detail and analyzing how changes in various tax rates affect the tax advantages of stock options relative to salary and bonus. Our empirical analysis leads to three conclusions. First, there is little evidence that tax changes have played a major role int the dramatic explosion in executive stock option pay since 1980. Although the tax advantage of options has approximately dounbled since the early advantage of options has approximately doubled since the early 1980s options currently have only a slight tax advantage relative to cash - approximately $4 per $100 of pre-tax compensation to the executive. A more convincing story for the dramatic explosion in stock options involves changes in corporate governance and the market for corporate control. For example, there is a strong correlation between the fraction of shares held by large institutional investors and the fraction of ececutive pay in the form of stock options, a result that holds both longitudinally and cross-sectionally. Second, we find evidence that the million dollar rule (which limited the corporate deductibility of non-performance-related executive compensateion to $1 million) led firms to adjust the composition of their pay away from salary and toward "performance related pay, " although our estimates suggest that substitution was minor. We find no evience that the regulation decreased the level of total compensation. Third, we examine whether there is evidence for significant shifting of the timing of option exercieses in response to changes in tax rates. After replicating the Goolsbee (1999) result regardin tax-shifting with our data for the 1993 tax reform, we shoat no such shifting occurred in either of the two tax reforms of the 1980s. Moreover, we find evidence that much of the unusually large level of option exercises in 1992 was the result of the rising stock market rather than the change in marginal tax rates
Download or read book The Impact of Taxation on Management Responsibility written by Tax Institute of America and published by . This book was released on 1957 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Response of Deferred Executive Compensation to Changes in Tax Rates written by Aspen Gorry and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Given the increasing use of stock options in executive compensation, we examine how taxes influence the choice of compensation and document that income deferral is an important margin of adjustment in response to tax rate changes. To account for this option in the empirical analysis, we explore deferral by estimating how executives' choice of compensation between current and deferred income depends on changes in tax policy. Our empirical results suggest a significant impact of taxes on the composition of executive compensation.
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Download or read book Executive Compensation Best Practices written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2008-06-27 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Download or read book Regulating Executive Pay written by Nancy L. Rose and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores corporate responses to 1993 legislation, implemented as section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, that capped the corporate tax deductibility of top management compensation at $1 million per executive unless it qualified as substantially performance-based.' We detail the provisions of this regulation, describe its possible effects, and test its impact on U.S. CEO compensation during the 1990s. Data on nearly 1400 publicly-traded U.S. corporations are used to explore the determinants of section 162(m) compensation plan qualification and the effect of section 162(m) on CEO pay. Our analysis suggests that section 162(m) may have created a focal point' for salary compensation, leading some salary compression close to the deductibility cap. There is weak evidence that compensation plan qualification is associated with higher growth rates, as would be the case if qualification relaxed some political constraints on executive pay. There is little evidence that the deductibility cap has had significant effects on overall executive compensation levels or growth rates at firms likely to be affected by the deductibility cap, however, nor is there evidence that it has increased the performance sensitivity of CEO pay at these firms. We conclude that corporate pay decisions seem to be relatively insulated from this type of blunt policy intervention
Download or read book Papeles varios written by and published by . This book was released on 1701 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Impact of Personal Income Taxation on Executive Compensation written by Peter Katuscak and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes the effect of personal income taxation on the sensitivity of executive compensation to company performance and the use of stock option and restricted stock grants underlying this sensitivity. The theoretical model predicts that, if a single tax rate applies to the entire compensation package, an increase in the tax rate weakly diminishes the equilibrium level of managerial effort and the after-tax pay-to-performance sensitivity, with the effect on the pre-tax pay-to-performance sensitivity being ambiguous. When salary and option gains are taxed at a higher rate than stock gains, tax changes also induce shifting among the individual compensation instruments. Interestingly, this differential taxation leads to a positive amount of stocks in the compensation contract even in the absence of any desire to incentivize the manager. In addition, an increase in the tax rate applied to salary and option gains may increase the level of managerial effort in equilibrium. On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate applied to stock gains weakly decreases the equilibrium level of managerial effort and strictly decreases the amount of after-tax pay-to-performance sensitivity generated by stock grants. The second part of the paper exploits the variation in the U.S. federal personal income tax rate generated by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, as well as variation in the combined federal and state income tax rates during the period 1992-1996 to empirically evaluate the impact of personal income taxation on the pay-to-stock-price sensitivity generated by stock-option and restricted stock grants. The results show that an increase in the ordinary income tax rate decreases the pay-to-stock-price sensitivity generated by option grants when time series variation in the marginal tax rate is utilized in the identification, with the estimates retaining the same sign but being statistically insignificant when only the variation in the marginal tax rate originating from cross-sectional variation in the federal income tax rate and/or state tax rate changes is used in the estimation. On the other hand, stock grant sensitivity is found to be unresponsive to changes in the ordinary income tax rate.
Download or read book Tax Aspects of Executives Compensation written by Brady O. Bryson and published by . This book was released on 1955 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Effect of Tax Policy on Executive and Worker Compensation written by Gordon D. Henderson and published by . This book was released on 1958 with total page 80 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: S. 3-21: Henderson, Gordon D.: Taxation and employee compensation. Summary of seminar discussion on the effects of tax policy on executive and worker compensation.
Download or read book The Effect of Tax Policy on Executive and Worker Compensation written by Tax Institute (U.S.) and published by . This book was released on 1958 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Effects of Taxation written by Challis A. Hall and published by . This book was released on 1951 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Compensating the Corporate Executive written by George Thomas Washington and published by . This book was released on 1951 with total page 616 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Tax Aspects of Executives Compensation Rev to November 1952 written by Brady O. Bryson and published by . This book was released on 1953 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Tax s Triviality as a Pay Reforming Device written by Andrew Lund and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When the federal government wishes to change executive compensation practices it often attempts to do so through changes to compensation-related tax rules. These attempts to use tax policy to influence executive compensation - from Section 162(m) to the golden parachute provisions to more recent deferred compensation rules - have been routinely decried. This essay contends tax policy is generally ineffective in shaping executive compensation choices. 162(m) and 280G/4999 have either had no effect or perverse effects on compensation practices. Why have these kinds of tax interventions - the ones that try to optimize the pay-setting process between executives and boards - failed? Undoubtedly, there is a public choice explanation centered on political motivations and competence that is both popular and plausible. But the case for reforming executive pay through tax rules is even worse than that would imply. First, tax penalties pale in comparison with boards' perception of the performance-related gains to be realized by either hiring the best (even if most expensive) executive or properly incentivizing that executive with a particular mix of compensation elements. This is partially due to the modesty of the tax penalties imposed to this point. But because even critics of executive compensation practices believe that there is substantial heterogeneity among firms regarding optimal compensation practices, tax levers are apt to remain weak in future attempts to influence pay-setting out of a fear of coercing firms to pay executives in inefficient ways.
