Download or read book Three Essays in Microeconomic Theory written by Tymofiy Mylovanov and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays in Principal agent Theory written by Liang Zou and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1993 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Based on their work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach to this field, focusing on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities.

Download or read book Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing written by and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 824 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems Bilevel Programming and MPEC written by Didier Aussel and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-04-03 with total page 134 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The book discusses three classes of problems: the generalized Nash equilibrium problems, the bilevel problems and the mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). These problems interact through their mathematical analysis as well as their applications. The primary aim of the book is to present the modern tool of variational analysis and optimization, which are used to analyze these three classes of problems. All contributing authors are respected academicians, scientists and researchers from around the globe. These contributions are based on the lectures delivered by experts at CIMPA School, held at the University of Delhi, India, from 25 November–6 December 2013, and peer-reviewed by international experts. The book contains five chapters. Chapter 1 deals with nonsmooth, nonconvex bilevel optimization problems whose feasible set is described by using the graph of the solution set mapping of a parametric optimization problem. Chapter 2 describes a constraint qualification to MPECs considered as an application of calmness concept of multifunctions and is used to derive M-stationarity conditions for MPEC. Chapter 3 discusses the first- and second-order optimality conditions derived for a special case of a bilevel optimization problem in which the constraint set of the lower level problem is described as a general compact convex set. Chapter 4 concentrates the results of the modelization and analysis of deregulated electricity markets with a focus on auctions and mechanism design. Chapter 5 focuses on optimization approaches called reflection methods for protein conformation determination within the framework of matrix completion. The last chapter (Chap. 6) deals with the single-valuedness of quasimonotone maps by using the concept of single-directionality with a special focus on the case of the normal operator of lower semi-continuous quasiconvex functions.

Download or read book Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design written by Jacob Glazer and published by World Scientific Publishing Company. This book was released on 2016-08-22 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.

Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Download or read book Psychology Rationality and Economic Behaviour written by B. Agarwal and published by Springer. This book was released on 2005-08-03 with total page 281 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has paid little attention to the psychology of economic behaviour, leading to somewhat simplistic assumptions about human nature. The psychological aspects have typically been reduced to standard utility theory, based on a narrow conception of rationality and self-interest maximization. The contributions in this volume, some focused on analytical models and methodology, others on laboratory and field experiments, challenge these assumptions, and provide novel and complex understandings of human motivation and economic decision-making. With a pioneering introduction by the book's two editors, this volume brings together exciting contributions to a field that is rapidly growing in influence and reach.

Download or read book Supermodularity and Complementarity written by Donald M. Topkis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2011-02-11 with total page 285 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The economics literature is replete with examples of monotone comparative statics; that is, scenarios where optimal decisions or equilibria in a parameterized collection of models vary monotonically with the parameter. Most of these examples are manifestations of complementarity, with a common explicit or implicit theoretical basis in properties of a super-modular function on a lattice. Supermodular functions yield a characterization for complementarity and extend the notion of complementarity to a general setting that is a natural mathematical context for studying complementarity and monotone comparative statics. Concepts and results related to supermodularity and monotone comparative statics constitute a new and important formal step in the long line of economics literature on complementarity. This monograph links complementarity to powerful concepts and results involving supermodular functions on lattices and focuses on analyses and issues related to monotone comparative statics. Don Topkis, who is known for his seminal contributions to this area, here presents a self-contained and up-to-date view of this field, including many new results, to scholars interested in economic theory and its applications as well as to those in related disciplines. The emphasis is on methodology. The book systematically develops a comprehensive, integrated theory pertaining to supermodularity, complementarity, and monotone comparative statics. It then applies that theory in the analysis of many diverse economic models formulated as decision problems, noncooperative games, and cooperative games.

Download or read book The Economics of Contracts second edition written by Bernard Salanie and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2005-03-11 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2022-09-13 with total page 596 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022, which took place in Colchester, UK, in September 2022. The 31 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 83 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Auctions, markets and mechanism design; computational aspects in games; congestion and network creation games; data sharing and learning; social choice and stable matchings.

Download or read book Local Electricity Markets written by Tiago Pinto and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2021-07-03 with total page 474 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Local Electricity Markets introduces the fundamental characteristics, needs, and constraints shaping the design and implementation of local electricity markets. It addresses current proposed local market models and lessons from their limited practical implementation. The work discusses relevant decision and informatics tools considered important in the implementation of local electricity markets. It also includes a review on management and trading platforms, including commercially available tools. Aspects of local electricity market infrastructure are identified and discussed, including physical and software infrastructure. It discusses the current regulatory frameworks available for local electricity market development internationally. The work concludes with a discussion of barriers and opportunities for local electricity markets in the future. - Delineates key components shaping the design and implementation of local electricity market structure - Provides a coherent view on the enabling infrastructures and technologies that underpin local market expansion - Explores the current regulatory environment for local electricity markets drawn from a global panel of contributors - Exposes future paths toward widespread implementation of local electricity markets using an empirical review of barriers and opportunities - Reviews relevant local electricity market case studies, pilots and demonstrators already deployed and under implementation

Download or read book Proceedings of the Thirty first Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing written by and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 812 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Bernard Salanié and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2005-03-11 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.

Download or read book Dynamic Allocation and Pricing written by Alex Gershkov and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-12 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A new approach to dynamic allocation and pricing that blends dynamic paradigms from the operations research and management science literature with classical mechanism design methods. Dynamic allocation and pricing problems occur in numerous frameworks, including the pricing of seasonal goods in retail, the allocation of a fixed inventory in a given period of time, and the assignment of personnel to incoming tasks. Although most of these problems deal with issues treated in the mechanism design literature, the modern revenue management (RM) literature focuses instead on analyzing properties of restricted classes of allocation and pricing schemes. In this book, Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu propose an approach to optimal allocations and prices based on the theory of mechanism design, adapted to dynamic settings. Drawing on their own recent work on the topic, the authors describe a modern theory of RM that blends the elegant dynamic models from the operations research (OR), management science, and computer science literatures with techniques from the classical mechanism design literature. Illustrating this blending of approaches, they start with well-known complete information, nonstrategic dynamic models that yield elegant explicit solutions. They then add strategic agents that are privately informed and then examine the consequences of these changes on the optimization problem of the designer. Their sequential modeling of both nonstrategic and strategic logic allows a clear picture of the delicate interplay between dynamic trade-offs and strategic incentives. Topics include the sequential assignment of heterogeneous objects, dynamic revenue optimization with heterogeneous objects, revenue maximization in the stochastic and dynamic knapsack model, the interaction between learning about demand and dynamic efficiency, and dynamic models with long-lived, strategic agents.

Download or read book Government and the Environment written by Laura Castellucci and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2014-06-13 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the today’s global "commercial society" an inquiry into the economic role of government is gaining momentum. Many crucial goods for the wellbeing of a society are not "commercial", national security and clean air are great examples. This means that the economic role of government is not limited to cure the so called "market failures" but it has to provide for non-commercial goods. Unfortunately in the last few decades the decline of the political-economic culture of western post-industrial societies has left scope for people to blindly believe in a free, deregulated market. This book brings the culture of the state in from the cold, by confronting readers at the start with the necessity of recognizing the fundamental difference between private commercial interests, whose provision rests on the culture of profit, and public shared interests, whose provision rests on the culture of the state. This book also explores how much individual wellbeing does depend on both. The only chance for public shared interests, with their non-profit nature, to successfully keep their ground in the face of the overwhelming power of private commercial/financial interests, lies in regenerating a political-economic state culture whereby governments and policy makers/politicians understand their responsibility and social function to consist primarily in pursuing the satisfaction of the formers and not in acting on behalf of the latter.

Download or read book Advances in Agent Based Complex Automated Negotiations written by Takayuki Ito and published by Springer. This book was released on 2009-10-06 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Complex Automated Negotiations have been widely studied and are becoming an important, emerging area in the field of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. In general, automated negotiations can be complex, since there are a lot of factors that characterize such negotiations. These factors include the number of issues, dependency between issues, representation of utility, negotiation protocol, negotiation form (bilateral or multi-party), time constraints, etc. Software agents can support automation or simulation of such complex negotiations on the behalf of their owners, and can provide them with adequate bargaining strategies. In many multi-issue bargaining settings, negotiation becomes more than a zero-sum game, so bargaining agents have an incentive to cooperate in order to achieve efficient win-win agreements. Also, in a complex negotiation, there could be multiple issues that are interdependent. Thus, agent’s utility will become more complex than simple utility functions. Further, negotiation forms and protocols could be different between bilateral situations and multi-party situations. To realize such a complex automated negotiati on, we have to incorporate advanced Artificial Intelligence technologies includes search, CSP, graphical utility models, Bays nets, auctions, utility graphs, predicting and learning methods. Applications could include e-commerce tools, decisionmaking support tools, negotiation support tools, collaboration tools, etc. These issues are explored by researchers from different communities in Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent systems. They are, for instance, being studied in agent negotiation, multi-issue negotiations, auctions, mechanism design, electronic commerce, voting, secure protocols, matchmaking & brokering, argumentation, and co-operation mechanisms. This book is also edited from some aspects of negotiation researches including theoretical mechanism design of trading based on auctions, allocation mechanism based on negotiation among multi-agent, case-study and analysis of automated negotiations, data engineering issues in negotiations, and so on.