Download or read book Clientelism Capitalism and Democracy written by Didi Kuo and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-08-16 with total page 181 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the United States and Britain, capitalists organized in opposition to clientelism and demanded programmatic parties and institutional reforms.
Download or read book Clientelism Social Policy and the Quality of Democracy written by Diego Abente Brun and published by JHU Press. This book was released on 2014-03 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abente Brun and Diamond invited some of the best social scientists in the field to systematically explore how political clientelism works and evolves in the context of modern developing democracies, with particular reference to social policies aimed at reducing poverty. Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy is balanced between a section devoted to understanding clientelism's infamous effects and history in Latin America and a section that draws out implications for other regions, specifically Africa, Southeast Asia, and Eastern and Central Europe.
Download or read book Democratization and Clientelism written by Philip Keefer and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2005 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.
Download or read book Brokers Voters and Clientelism written by Susan C. Stokes and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-09-23 with total page 343 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.
Download or read book Democracy Credibility and Clientelism written by Philip Keefer and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2005 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Keefer and Vlaicu demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly--informing voters of their promises, tracking those promises, and ensuring that voters turn out on election day. Alternatively, they can rely on intermediaries--patrons--who are already able to make credible commitments to their clients. Endogenizing credibility in this way, the authors find that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and public good provision lower than in democracies in which political competitors can make credible pre-electoral promises. They also argue that in the absence of political credibility, political reliance on patrons enhances welfare in the short run, in contrast to the traditional view that clientelism in politics is a source of significant policy distortion. However, in the long run reliance on patrons may undermine the emergence of credible political parties. The model helps to explain several puzzles. For example, public investment and corruption are higher in young democracies than old; and democratizing reforms succeeded remarkably in Victorian England, in contrast to the more difficult experiences of many democratizing countries, such as the Dominican Republic. This paper--a product of the Growth and Investment Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the political economy of development"--World Bank web site.
Download or read book Buying Audiences written by Paula Muñoz and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2019 with total page 319 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Develops a new theory of how politicians campaign and deploy electoral clientelism in weak party systems.
Download or read book Conditionality and Coercion written by Isabela Mares and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2019-10-17 with total page 338 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the "wrong" way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning including vote buying and electoral coercion persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate clientelistic strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. We document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. We also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians' personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. Most voters judge candidates who use clientelism harshly. So how does clientelism, including its most odious coercive forms, persist in democratic systems? This book suggests that politicians can get away with clientelism by using forms of it that are in line with the policy preferences of constituencies whose votes they need. Clientelistic and programmatic strategies are not as distinct as previous have argued. Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization process that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series is primarily Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia. The series editor is Laurence Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Download or read book Brokers Voters and Clientelism written by Susan C. Stokes and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-09-16 with total page 343 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.
Download or read book Democracy Clientelism and Civil Society written by Luis Roniger and published by Lynne Rienner Publishers. This book was released on 1994 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Clientelism Interests and Democratic Representation written by Simona Piattoni and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2001-09-10 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book charts the evolution of clientelist practices in several western European countries. Through the historical and comparative analysis of countries as diverse as Sweden and Greece, England and Spain, France and Italy, Iceland and the Netherlands, the authors study both the "supply-side" and the "demand-side" of clientelism. This approach contends that clientelism is a particular mix of particularism and universalism, in which interests are aggregated at the level of the individual and his family "particularism," but in which all interests can potentially find expression and accommodation in "universalism."
Download or read book Democratization and Clientelism written by Philip Keefer and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.
Download or read book The Politics of Clientelism written by John Martz and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2017-12-02 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In Latin America the state is the prime regulator, coordinator, and pace-setter of the entire national system, the apex of the pyramid from which patronage, wealth, power, and programs flow. The state bears responsibility for the realization of civic needs, providing goods and services to each citizen. Doing so requires the exercise and maintenance of social and political control. It is John Martz's contention that clientelism underlines the fundamental character of Latin American social and political life. As the modernizing bureaucratic state has developed in Latin America, there has been a concurrent shifting away from clientelistic relationships. Yet in one form or another, political clientelism still remains central.Clientelism occurs when large numbers of low-status individuals, such as those in the slums of rural and underdeveloped areas, are protected by a powerful patron who defends their interests in return for deference or material reward. In Colombia the rural patron has become a member of the higher clientelistic system as well; he is dependent on a patron who operates at the national level. This enables urban elites to mobilize low-status clients for such acts as mass demonstrations of political loyalty to the regime. Thus, traditional clientelism has been modified through the process of modernization.Part One of The Politics of Clientelism examines Colombian politics, focusing on the incarnation and traditional forms of clientelism. Part Two explores the policies of Colombian governance, from the administrations of Lleras Camargo through Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala. Part Three discusses the modernization and restructuring of Colombia in recent decades under Belisario Betancur, Virgilio Barco, and Cesar Gaviria.As the modernizing bureaucratic state has unfolded, there has been a similar shift in many clientelistic relationships. Martz argues that, whether corporate clientelism remains or more democratic organization develo"
Download or read book Democracy for Sale written by Edward Aspinall and published by Cornell University Press. This book was released on 2019-04-15 with total page 446 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Democracy for Sale is an on-the-ground account of Indonesian democracy, analyzing its election campaigns and behind-the-scenes machinations. Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot assess the informal networks and political strategies that shape access to power and privilege in the messy political environment of contemporary Indonesia. In post-Suharto Indonesian politics the exchange of patronage for political support is commonplace. Clientelism, argue the authors, saturates the political system, and in Democracy for Sale they reveal the everyday practices of vote buying, influence peddling, manipulating government programs, and skimming money from government projects. In doing so, Aspinall and Berenschot advance three major arguments. The first argument points toward the role of religion, kinship, and other identities in Indonesian clientelism. The second explains how and why Indonesia's distinctive system of free-wheeling clientelism came into being. And the third argument addresses variation in the patterns and intensity of clientelism. Through these arguments and with comparative leverage from political practices in India and Argentina, Democracy for Sale provides compelling evidence of the importance of informal networks and relationships rather than formal parties and institutions in contemporary Indonesia.
Download or read book Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics written by T. Hilgers and published by Springer. This book was released on 2012-12-05 with total page 383 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book improves understandings of how and why clientelism endures in Latin America and why state policy is often ineffective. Political scientists and sociologists, the contributors employ ethnography, targeted interviews, case studies, within-case and regional comparison, thick descriptions, and process tracing.
Download or read book Varieties of Clientelism written by Edward Aspinall and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2022-12-26 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Clientelism is a prominent feature of many of the world’s democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes. Yet the comparative study of this practice, which involves exchanging personal favours for electoral support, remains strikingly underdeveloped. This book makes the case that clientelistic politics take different forms in different countries, and that this variation matters for understanding democracy, elections, and governance. Involving collaboration by experienced observers of politics in several countries – Mexico, Ghana, Sudan to Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, Caribbean and Pacific Island states, and Malaysia – the chapters in this volume unpack the concept of clientelism and show that it is possible to identify different types of patronage democracies. The book proposes a comparative framework that focuses on the networks that politicians use, the type of resources they hand out, their degree of control over the distribution of state resources, and shows that the comparative study of a key informal dimension of politics offers much analytical promise for scholars of democracy and governance. Varieties of Clientelism is essential reading for scholars and students interested in clientelism, patronage democracies, comparative political economy, as well as party politics. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Democratization.
Download or read book Democracy Credibility and Clientelism written by Philip Keefer and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly: informing voters of their promises; tracking those promises; ensuring that voters turn out on election day. Alternatively, they can rely on intermediaries -- patrons - who are already able to make credible commitments to their clients. Endogenizing credibility in this way, the authors find that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and public good provision lower than in democracies in which political competitors can make credible pre-electoral promises. The authors also argue that in the absence of political credibility, political reliance on patrons enhances welfare in the short-run, in contrast to the traditional view that clientelism in politics is a source of significant policy distortion. However, in the long run reliance on patrons may undermine the emergence of credible political parties. The model helps to explain several puzzles. For example, public investment and corruption are higher in young democracies than old; and democratizing reforms succeeded remarkably in Victorian England, in contrast to the more difficult experiences of many democratizing countries, such as the Dominican Republic.
Download or read book Money for Votes written by Eric Kramon and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018 with total page 247 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book explains why vote buying is common in low-income democracies in Africa, and examines its consequences for democratic accountability.
