Download or read book Decision Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Decision Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by Strategic Studies Institute. This book was released on 2010 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.--
Download or read book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 92 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.
Download or read book Decision Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.
Download or read book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by Strategic Studies Institute. This book was released on 2010 with total page 74 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible, perhaps probable, strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its "responsible withdrawal" from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged, with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision, could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.--
Download or read book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2010-02-26 with total page 88 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Understanding the ways that military leaders advise those who exercise civilian control over the military is important for the continuing prosecution of that war, but also for the inevitable next time that the United States considers embarking on such an endeavor. A second objective of this series is to provide military and civilian leaders a clearer picture of what they must do to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly prepared-with strategy, doctrine, force structure, equipment, training, and leadership-for future operations. Literature about the war in Iraq is already extensive, although-as the Foreword states-the definitive history of the war is still undoubtedly years away. However, most of the writing-by policymakers, journalists, scholars, and other students of national security issues-focuses on the effects of various decisions, not on the decisions themselves. For example, there is ample writing about how the 2003 decision to "de-Ba'athify" the Iraqi government was executed and what effects it had. How that decision was made, though, has been studied less. With this series, SSI intends to make a valuable addition to the literature on the war in Iraq by addressing the how and why of various key strategic decisions that were made over the past 8-plus years of planning and fighting. Some of the effects will inevitably be discussed as well, but the focus will clearly be on the decisionmaking processes, not the subsequent results. The facts and data presented and the ensuing analysis will identify the nature of the decisionmaking process involved as either idiosyncratic or systemic. Idiosyncratic decisions can be made based on the circumstances of a particular situation; a unique decision might have been required by the facts on the ground. The sectarian divisions, the long years of repression under Saddam, and the history of American inaction after Operation DESERT STORM in 1991- among other factors-might have combined to create distinctive conditions that led decisionmakers down idiosyncratic paths. The early years of the Iraq conflict offer several examples of another idiosyncrasy: the personalities of the different people making the key decisions. Different people viewing the same facts of a situation might draw different conclusions and make different decisions. Some key people making decisions about Iraq made dramatically different decisions than would have been expected of other reasonable people. At the very top of the pile is the strong personality of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, balanced somewhat by equally forceful Secretary of State Colin Powell. Coordination of the activities of their two Departments, though, was left to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, perhaps hopelessly outweighed-at least in public-by these two longtime players in major national security issues. Whether challenges in decisionmaking were idiosyncratic by personality or situation, though, differentiating them from systemic challenges is clearly important. Some analysts and pundits argue for procedural changes, either by executive fiat or legislative action, that are not supported by the relevant facts of the particular decision involved. One is the continuing call for a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire interagency. 1 Attempting to address idiosyncratic issues through systemic changes may not be the right approach; this monograph series should help identify the nature of the factors-processes or personalities- that led to certain decisions and to suggest ways to address any shortcomings.
Download or read book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2010-05-06 with total page 94 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible-perhaps probable-strategic success. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged-with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision-could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph is especially timely and shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.
Download or read book Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Catherine Dale and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2011-04 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the goal of removing Saddam Hussein¿s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction. The focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to helping the Gov¿t. of Iraq improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. This report addresses these policy issues: Identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and Laying the groundwork for a traditional bilateral relationship. Map. A print on demand report.
Download or read book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by U. S. Military and published by . This book was released on 2017-04-16 with total page 73 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This unique study in the Operation Iraqi Freedom Key Decisions Monograph Series looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible -- perhaps probable -- strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its "responsible withdrawal" from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged--with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision -- could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph is especially timely and shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another where different conditions applied.An argument can be made that victory--success against military foes in war--was an appropriate term in April 2003, when U.S. military forces deposed Saddam Hussein, but a military-only victory was far out of reach by 2007. The goal of victory articulated by Kagan and President George W. Bush perhaps still had merit in galvanizing public support of the war. However, the better goal -- particularly by late 2006, when a virulent insurgency and sectarian violence were raging in Iraq's cities -- was some semblance of strategic success, which would not come about purely by military action. That success would necessarily include a significant military component, but also required a broader approach that would support Iraq's economic, political, and societal development. Just as victory over Adolf Hitler in World War II required the Marshall Plan to cement the achievements of combat in Europe, the "victory" of 2003 in Iraq would require by 2007 much more than just military force to produce conditions that would ultimately be helpful to advancing American interests in the Middle East.The military component of the 2007 effort to achieve a positive result in Iraq became popularly known as "the surge." In this second volume of the Strategic Studies Institute's Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, Dr. Steven Metz covers this critical decision in the Iraq war, but correctly posits that the surge was only part of a broad strategic shift that produced the success -- still tenuous -- of 2008 and beyond. In doing so, Dr. Metz debunks some of the "surge triumphalism." In this view, the surge was almost solely responsible for the improvements in security that enabled the emerging positive results in Iraq. General David Petraeus--the man whose name became synonymous with the surge -- sees it differently. General Petraeus, who led the surge of troops into Iraq in 2007, freely admits that the success of the surge was due to a confluence of factors. Those factors include Iraqis tiring of both Sunni and Shi'a extremists, Iraqi Security Forces achieving at least limited capacity to provide security, and the U.S. military's growth in tactical and operational prowess in counterinsurgency. Dr. Metz argues that a "perfect storm" of conditions, accompanied by "good thinking, good luck, and good timing," were what allowed the success of the strategic shift that he describes. Dr. Metz may give short shrift to President George W. Bush's resolve and to the skill that General Petraeus and other senior leaders brought to the surge--or the strategic shift--but he presents a solid case against using the surge as a model for future operations, including in Afghanistan.
Download or read book Decision Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: By the time Fred Kagan penned the comment cited above, victory had already long been the wrong word to describe whatever outcome was going to befall the American adventure in Iraq. An argument can be made that victory-success against military foes in war-was an appropriate term in April 2003, when U.S. military forces deposed Saddam Hussein, but a military-only victory was far out of reach by 2007. The goal of victory articulated by Kagan and President George W. Bush perhaps still had merit in galvanizing public support of the war.2 However, the better goal- particularly by late 2006, when a virulent insurgency and sectarian violence were raging in Iraq's cities- was some semblance of strategic success, which would not come about purely by military action. That success would necessarily include a significant military component, but also required a broader approach that would support Iraq's economic, political, and societal development. Just as victory over Adolf Hitler in World War II required the Marshall Plan to cement the achievements of combat in Europe, the "victory" of 2003 in Iraq would require by 2007 much more than just military force to produce conditions that would ultimately be helpful to advancing American interests in the Middle East. The military component of the 2007 effort to achieve a positive result in Iraq became popularly known as "the surge." In this second volume of the Strategic Studies Institute's Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, Dr. Steven Metz covers this critical decision in the Iraq war, but correctly posits that the surge was only part of a broad strategic shift that produced the success-still tenuous-of 2008 and beyond. In doing so, Dr. Metz debunks some of the "surge triumphalism." In this view, the surge was almost solely responsible for the improvements in security that enabled the emerging positive results in Iraq. General David Petraeus-the man whose name became synonymous with the surge-sees it differently. General Petraeus, who led the surge of troops into Iraq in 2007, freely admits that the success of the surge was due to a confluence of factors. Those factors include Iraqis tiring of both Sunni and Shi'a extremists, Iraqi Security Forces achieving at least limited capacity to provide security, and the U.S. military's growth in tactical and operational prowess in counterinsurgency. Dr. Metz argues that a "perfect storm" of conditions, accompanied by "good thinking, good luck, and good timing," were what allowed the success of the strategic shift that he describes. Dr. Metz may give short shrift to President George W. Bush's resolve and to the skill that General Petraeus and other senior leaders brought to the surge-or the strategic shift-but he presents a solid case against using the surge as a model for future operations, including in Afghanistan. Without similar conditions-and good thinking, luck, and timing- the surge of troops in Afghanistan may not produce anything like the positive strategic results that appear to be emerging in Iraq.
Download or read book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Department of Defense and published by . This book was released on 2017-04-15 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In 1946, General Walter Bedell Smith wrote a series of articles describing six great decisions made in World War II by General Dwight David Eisenhower, for whom General Smith worked as Chief of Staff, Allied Expeditionary Forces. Writing so soon after the war, General Smith could not hope to produce a definitive history, but felt that writing then would document an important viewpoint of one of the major participants in Eisenhower's many significant decisions.With this initial volume of its Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) also attempts to write about key decisions while they are still fresh in the memories of the participants. As with General Smith's articles, this series will not produce a definitive history; that is still years away. However, the series will make a major contribution to understanding decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq. I am pleased to inaugurate the series, which looks more at the how and why of certain decisions than at the results of those same decisions. This will be particularly useful to senior leaders -- both uniformed and civilian--as they reflect on how decisions were made regarding Iraq and how better decisions might be made in future conflicts.Without taking anything away from Eisenhower's momentous decisions, they seem in some ways to be simpler than those made over the past 8-plus years for the planning and execution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As General James Mattis at Joint Forces Command recently said, the challenges of operating in a counterinsurgency can be greater than in large-scale conventional combat, "since the adversary has more flexibility to determine how, when, where, and whether to fight." This fact--plus the fact that irregular combat is the more likely challenge of the future operating environment--makes it even more important to examine the key decisions of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as soon as possible.The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to initiate its latest monograph series, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions. SSI started this project in an effort to give leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces some important insights into how military advice was provided to the Nation's civilian leadership during the many years--including the months before the invasion--of the war in Iraq. Understanding the ways that military leaders advise those who exercise civilian control over the military is important for the continuing prosecution of that war, but also for the inevitable next time that the United States considers embarking on such an endeavor. A second objective of this series is to provide military and civilian leaders a clearer picture of what they must do to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly prepared--with strategy, doctrine, force structure, equipment, training, and leadership--for future operations.Literature about the war in Iraq is already extensive, although--as the Foreword states -- the definitive history of the war is still undoubtedly years away. However, most of the writing--by policymakers, journalists, scholars, and other students of national security issues -- focuses on the effects of various decisions, not on the decisions themselves. For example, there is ample writing about how the 2003 decision to "de-Ba'athify" the Iraqi government was executed and what effects it had. How that decision was made, though, has been studied less. With this series, SSI intends to make a valuable addition to the literature on the war in Iraq by addressing the how and why of various key strategic decisions that were made over the past 8-plus years of planning and fighting. Some of the effects will inevitably be discussed as well, but the focus will clearly be on the decisionmaking processes, not the subsequent results.
Download or read book Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Walt L. Perry and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Summarizes a report on the planning and execution of operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM through June 2004. Recommends changes to Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and Title 10 functions.
Download or read book Developing Adaptive Leaders written by Leonard Wong and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author examines the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM environment and concludes that the complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity of postwar Iraq is producing a cohort of innovative, confident, and adaptable junior officers. They are learning to make decisions in chaotic conditions and to be mentally agile in executing counterinsurgency and nation-building operations simultaneously. As a result, the Army will soon have a cohort of company grade officers who are accustomed to operating independently, taking the initiative, and adapting to changes. The author warns that the Army must now acknowledge and encourage this newly developed adaptability in our junior officers or risk stifling the innovation critically needed in the Army's future leaders.
Download or read book Operation Iraqi Freedom Preliminary Observations on DoD Planning for the Drawdown of U S Forces from Iraq written by William M. Solis and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-06 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The U.S. and Iraq have signed a Security Agreement calling for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. Multi-National Force-Iraq has issued a plan for the reduction of forces to 50,000 U.S. troops by Aug. 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of forces by the end of 2011. The drawdown from Iraq includes the withdrawal of 128,700 U.S. troops, over 115,000 contractor personnel, the closure or transfer of 295 bases, and the retrograde of over 3.3 million pieces of equipment. This statement focuses on: (1) the extent to which the DoD has planned for the drawdown in accordance with timelines set by the Agreement and presidential directive; and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown in accordance with established timelines. Illus.
Download or read book Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Catherine Marie Dale and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 115 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Explaining Foreign Policy written by Steve A. Yetiv and published by JHU Press. This book was released on 2004-03-22 with total page 338 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Scholars of international relations tend to prefer one model or another in explaining the foreign policy behavior of governments. Steve Yetiv, however, advocates an approach that applies five familiar models: rational actor, cognitive, domestic politics, groupthink, and bureaucratic politics. Drawing on the widest set of primary sources and interviews with key actors to date, he applies each of these models to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis and to the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003. Probing the strengths and shortcomings of each model in explaining how and why the United States decided to proceed with the Persian Gulf War, he shows that all models (with the exception of the government politics model) contribute in some way to our understanding of the event. No one model provides the best explanation, but when all five are used, a fuller and more complete understanding emerges. In the case of the Gulf War, Yetiv demonstrates the limits of models that presume rational decision-making as well as the crucial importance of using various perspectives. Drawing partly on the Gulf War case, he also develops innovative theories about when groupthink can actually produce a positive outcome and about the conditions under which government politics will likely be avoided. He shows that the best explanations for government behavior ultimately integrate empirical insights yielded from both international and domestic theory, which scholars have often seen as analytically separate. With its use of the Persian Gulf crisis as a teachable case study and coverage of the more recent Iraq war, Explaining Foreign Policy will be of interest to students and scholars of foreign policy, international relations, and related fields.
Download or read book Modeling Simulation and Operations Analysis in Afghanistan and Iraq written by Ben Connable and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: RAND conducted an examination of operations analysis, modeling, and simulation support to decisionmaking in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to illustrate how these tools can support decisionmaking in irregular warfare.