Download or read book Debt and Equity as Optimal Contracts written by João A. C. Santos and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The model presented in this paper is a particular case of the principal-agent problem. An entrepreneur has an investment project whose returns depend on his effort, which is not observable by the financier. After determining the optimal contract that is used to finance such a project, I show that this contract can be replicated by a unique combination of debt and equity, which proves the optimality of these financial instruments.
Download or read book Debt and Equity as Optimal Contracts written by João Cabral dos Santos and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Use of Debt and Equity in Optimal Financial Contracts written by John H. Boyd and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider risk-neutral firms that must obtain external finance. They have access to two kinds of stochastic investment opportunities. For one, return realizations are costlessly observed by all agents. For the other, return realizations are costlessly observed only by the investing firm. We examine the optimal allocation of investment between the two projects and the optimal contract used to finance it. The optimal contractual outcome can be supported by appropriate (and determinate) quantities of debt and equity issues. Investments in projects with CSV problems are associated loosely with debt. Investments in projects with observable returns are associated with equity.
Download or read book The Use of Debt and Equity in Optimal Financial Contracts written by John H. Boyd and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Debt Contracts and Moral Hazard Along the Business Cycle written by Pietro Reichlin and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Equity Financing and Covenants in Venture Capital written by Karoline Jung-Senssfelder and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-12-08 with total page 301 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Karoline Jung-Senssfelder presents the first augmented contracting analysis, focusing on the interaction of both, financial instruments and covenants, in the creation of incentives to the contracting parties. With a focus on the German market, she integrates the findings of her model-based theoretical and survey-based empirical analyses to derive value-adding implications for an incentive-compatible contract design in the German venture capital market.
Download or read book A Continuous time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure written by Peter M. DeMarzo and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a principal-agent model in which the agent needs to raise capital from the principal to finance a project. Our model is based on DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), except that the agent's cash flows are given by a Brownian motion with drift in continuous time. The difficulty in writing an appropriate financial contract in this setting is that the agent can conceal and divert cash flows for his own consumption rather than pay back the principal. Alternatively, the agent may reduce the mean of cash flows by not putting in effort. To give the agent incentives to provide effort and repay the principal, a long-term contract specifies the agent's wage and can force termination of the project. Using techniques from stochastic calculus similar to Sannikov (2003), we characterize the optimal contract by a differential equation. We show that this contract is equivalent to the limiting case of a discrete time model with binomial cash flows. The optimal contract can be interpreted as a combination of equity, a credit line, and either long-term debt or a compensating balance requirement (i.e., a cash position). The project is terminated if the agent exhausts the credit line and defaults. Once the credit line is paid off, excess cash flows are used to pay dividends. The agent is compensated with equity alone. Unlike the discrete time setting, our differential equation for the continuous-time model allows us to compute contracts easily, as well as compute comparative statics. The model provides a simple dynamic theory of security design and optimal capital structure.
Download or read book Debt Contracts Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena written by Hans Gersbach and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Default and Renegotiation written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract -- specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment -- under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of (non-debt) contracts, and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these.
Download or read book Optimal Financial Contracts in a Two Sector Open Economy Ricardo Meets the CAPM written by Ronald M. Schramm and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The One Period Problem of a Monopoly Incentive Compatible Equity and Debt Linked Contracts written by Ayi Gavriel Ayayi and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The paper studies what is the optimal financial vehicle that serves a monopoly best interest in nurturing his investees and at the same time can provide a socially optimal welfare. I demonstrate that it is the equity contract that serves the monopoly best interest because the profits it generates are higher than the profits derived from the collateral debt and convertible debt contract. In addition, I show that the equity contract is socially better than the debt-linked. I also show that neither equity nor debt-linked contracts are able to reveal the ability of the entrepreneur.
Download or read book Firms Contracts and Financial Structure written by Oliver D. Hart and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1995-10-05 with total page 239 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other handwhy firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understandfirms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with aninterest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Download or read book Corporate Control and Capital Structure written by Erik Berglöf and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Disputes Debt and Equity written by Alfred Duncan and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We show how the prospect of disputes over firms' revenue reports promotes debt financing over equity. These findings are presented within a costly state verification model with a risk averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes encourages incentive contracts that limit penalties and avoid stochastic monitoring, even when the lender can commit to stochastic monitoring strategies. Consequently, optimal contracts shift away from equity and toward standard debt. For a useful special case of the model, closed form solutions are presented for leverage and consumption allocations under efficient debt contracts. Some empirical implications of the theory are pursued.
Download or read book Optimal Long Term Financial Contracting with Privately Observed Cash Flows written by Peter M. DeMarzo and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We characterize the optimal long-term financial contract in a setting in which a risk-neutral agent with limited capital seeks financing for a project that pays stochastic cash flows over many periods. These cash flows are observable to the agent but not to investors. The agent can be induced to pay investors via the threat of the loss of control of the project. After solving for the contract as an optimal mechanism, we demonstrate that it can be implemented by a combination of equity, long-term debt and a line of credit - very simple, standard securities. Thus our model provides a theory of capital structure, capturing both optimal debt maturity and debt vs. equity financing. Equity is issued to investors and is also used for the agent's compensation. In equilibrium, the agent may default on the debt and control of the project may pass to debt holders. The optimal capital structure is robust in the sense that it is independent of the amount financed and under certain circumstances, independent of the severity of the moral hazard problem. We also show how our characterization applies to settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort, or can alter the risk of cash flows.
Download or read book The Debt equity Choice written by Ronald W. Masulis and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Debt Contracts and Product Market Competition with Exit and Entry written by Naveen Khanna and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We show that optimal debt contracts in the presence of product market competition are typically different from standard debt contracts. We consider a market with two incumbents, one levered (target) and one with deep pockets (competitor). Renewal of target's debt depends on its profits, which are determined by the competitor's pricing strategy. When the competitor benefits from non-renewal of target's debt, it has incentive to price more aggressively. To counter this, bondholders make renewal less profit sensitive, and the optimal debt contract is smooth (nonkinked) and concave, and lies below the standard debt contract. Bondholders leave the limited liability constraint slack in a region of profits, and therefore appear to leave money on the table by failing to collect all profits when they fall short of the debt's face value. But this flattening of the contract results in higher profits for the levered firm for each state of demand, and a higher expected payout for bondholders. The larger the competitor's benefit from non-renewal, the flatter the contract. On the other hand, when the competitor benefits from renewal of the target's debt (say non-renewal results in target's replacement by a more efficient entrant), then the optimal debt contract is nonsmooth (sometimes taking the form of a binary option), and much more profit sensitive for some profit levels than the standard contract. This increased sensitivity amplifies the competitor's incentive to price less aggressively, resulting in higher profits for the levered firm and higher payout to bondholders. In either case, our results demonstrate the optimal contract must be designed accounting for the impact of the contract itself on the profit function of the levered firm. Furthermore, bondholders prefer lending to weaker firms (firms whose competitors benefit from renewal) because the competitor's pricing incentive, amplified by the more profit sensitive contract, results in higher expected payouts.
