Download or read book Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously written by Georges Dionne and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selections Simultaneously written by Georges Dionne and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty written by Mark Machina and published by Newnes. This book was released on 2013-11-14 with total page 897 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The need to understand the theories and applications of economic and finance risk has been clear to everyone since the financial crisis, and this collection of original essays proffers broad, high-level explanations of risk and uncertainty. The economics of risk and uncertainty is unlike most branches of economics in spanning from the individual decision-maker to the market (and indeed, social decisions), and ranging from purely theoretical analysis through individual experimentation, empirical analysis, and applied and policy decisions. It also has close and sometimes conflicting relationships with theoretical and applied statistics, and psychology. The aim of this volume is to provide an overview of diverse aspects of this field, ranging from classical and foundational work through current developments. Presents coherent summaries of risk and uncertainty that inform major areas in economics and finance Divides coverage between theoretical, empirical, and experimental findings Makes the economics of risk and uncertainty accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 1133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.

Download or read book Simultaneous Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection with Risk Averse Agents written by Bernd Theilen and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Disentangling Adverse Selection Moral Hazard and Supply Induced Demand written by Vincenzo Atella and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the healthcare sector, Selection (S), Moral Hazard (MH) and Supply Induced Demand (SID) are three very important phenomena affecting patients' behavior. Despite there exists a vast theoretical and empirical literature on these phenomena, so far, no contribution has been able to approach them jointly. This is mostly due to difficulties in modelling the joint determinants of health service utilization and health insurance choice by means of a tractable structural simultaneous equation model. In this paper, we provide a solution to this problem and estimate a simultaneous four equation structural model with four latentvariables, where the first two equations are meant to deal with the adverse selection issue, while the third and fourth equation deal with moral hazard and SID issues. By doing so, our model seeks to identify causal effects while correcting for selection and endogeneity with the observational data we have. A closed form solution for the likelihood function - which guarantees an exact solution - is maximized via FIML, using a large cross-sectional dataset collected by the Italian national institute of statistic (ISTAT). The empirical analysis has con rmed the theoretical predictions of our structural model. In particular, we find evidence of selection in the choice of private insurance and SID, but do not find MH behavior on the patient side. These results are extremely important from a health policy perspective, given the existing international debate on the development of a second pillar in the fi nancing of the healthcare system.

Download or read book Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection with Multiple Agents written by Shirō Hagihara and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Integrated Risk Management Techniques and Strategies for Managing Corporate Risk written by Neil Doherty and published by McGraw Hill Professional. This book was released on 2000-04-17 with total page 657 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the years, risk management has developed separately in both the insurance and financial fields. Today, the two are finding value in each other's tools and techniques. Integrated Risk Management combines the best of the two notions of risk management, insurance and financial, to develop solutions ideal for taday's complex risk environment. Tools go beyond hedging strategies to also examine leveraging, post-loss financing, contingent financing, and fiversification.

Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.

Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Download or read book The Impact of Other Regarding Preferences on Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Thomas Daske and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Moral Hazard written by Fouad Sabry and published by One Billion Knowledgeable. This book was released on 2024-02-03 with total page 579 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is Moral Hazard The term "moral hazard" refers to a circumstance that occurs in the field of economics and describes a situation in which an economic actor has an incentive to expand its exposure to risk because it does not face the full costs of that risk. As an illustration, when a company is insured, it may be willing to take on additional risk since it is aware that its insurance will cover the costs connected with the risk. It is possible for a moral hazard to take place when, after a financial transaction has taken place, the actions of the party that is taking the risk change in a way that is detrimental to the party that is suffering the costs. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Moral hazard Chapter 2: Economic bubble Chapter 3: Debt Chapter 4: Contract theory Chapter 5: Adverse selection Chapter 6: Information asymmetry Chapter 7: Savings and loan crisis Chapter 8: Asset-backed security Chapter 9: Mortgage loan Chapter 10: Subprime mortgage crisis Chapter 11: Flight-to-quality Chapter 12: Subordinated debt Chapter 13: Subprime crisis impact timeline Chapter 14: Credit crunch Chapter 15: Subprime crisis background information Chapter 16: Interbank lending market Chapter 17: Government policies and the subprime mortgage crisis Chapter 18: Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate Chapter 19: Securitization Chapter 20: Financial fragility Chapter 21: 2007-2008 financial crisis (II) Answering the public top questions about moral hazard. (III) Real world examples for the usage of moral hazard in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Moral Hazard.

Download or read book Foundations of Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-11-11 with total page 742 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.

Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model written by Jeffrey S. Banks and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Economics of Social Insurance and Employee Benefits written by Richard J. Butler and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is intended for junior and senior undergraduate students, and master level students in human resources, risk management and insurance, industrial relations or public policy. The subject of the book is non-wage benefits paid to workers. Hence, it excludes discussion of needs-based programs such as welfare, food stamps, Supplementary Security Income, and Medicaid. It includes benefits mandated by the government including the major social insurance programs: workers' compensation, unemployment insurance and Social Security benefits. It also includes those benefits voluntarily provided by firms including: group medical care, disability benefits, paid sick time, pension benefits, life insurance, and assorted other fringe benefits. The book is divided into three parts. Part I (chapters 1 through 6) briefly introduces these programs and discusses some of the insurance and economic concepts that are useful in both evaluating the current programs, and in understanding what changes might mean for future costs and benefits. The next two parts of the book deal respectively with social insurance programs (Part II, chapters 7-10), and other employer provided benefits (Part III, chapters 11-16). Throughout, private sector human resource practice and public sector human resource policy is linked to various "ben~fit" models: the human capital model, the passive participant model, the insurance' model, the managed care model, and the integrated health benefits model.

Download or read book Insurance Contracting with the Coexistence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Zhiqiang Yan and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The asymmetric information problem has been widely discussed in the context of insurance markets. Most of previous research usually treats adverse selection and moral hazard separately, though it is quite possible that they may coexist and interact with each other. In this paper, we build a principal-agent model to examine optimal contracts in a competitive insurance market facing adverse selection and moral hazard simultaneously. We apply the change-of-variable method and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to solve the optimization programs and find that there are several forms of separating Nash equilibria, although separating Nash equilibria may not exist. Our model brings richer equilibria and retains some properties in the benchmark models of pure adverse selection and pure moral hazard. For example, no agent is offered full insurance, and the positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk type still holds. Our study on comparative statics indicates that, under some conditions, the optimal indemnity and premium, in general, decrease with the disutility, increase with the potential loss and decrease with the intial wealth of the insured.

Download or read book Contributions to Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 536 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For a number of years, I have been teaching and doing research in the economics of uncertainty, information, and insurance. Although it is now possible to find textbooks and books of essays on uncertainty and in formation in economics and finance for graduate students and researchers, there is no equivalent material that covers advanced research in insurance. The purpose of this book is to fill this gap in literature. It provides original surveys and essays in the field of insurance economics. The contributions offer basic reference, new material, and teaching supple ments to graduate students and researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. It represents a complement to the book of readings entitled Foundations of Insurance Economics - Readings in Economics and Finance, recently published by the S.S. Huebner Foundation of Insurance Education. In that book, the editors (G. Dionne and S. Harrington) disseminate key papers in the literature and publish an original survey of major contributions in the field.