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Book Counterfactuals  Rationality and Equilibrium Concepts in Game Theory

Download or read book Counterfactuals Rationality and Equilibrium Concepts in Game Theory written by Graciela Küchle and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 136 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Collective Rationality

    Book Details:
  • Author : Paul Weirich
  • Publisher : Oxford University Press
  • Release : 2009-12-01
  • ISBN : 019974145X
  • Pages : 283 pages

Download or read book Collective Rationality written by Paul Weirich and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-01 with total page 283 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action. The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts. By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.

Book Epistemic Game Theory and Logic

Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory and Logic written by Paul Weirich and published by MDPI. This book was released on 2018-04-27 with total page 189 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic" that was published in Games

Book The Oxford Handbook of Rationality

Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Rationality written by Alfred R. Mele and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-08 with total page 498 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument.

Book Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games

Download or read book Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games written by Eduardo Zambrano and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When evaluating the rationality of a player in an epistemic model of a noncooperative game one has to examine counterfactuals such as ``what would happen if the player were to do what he actually does not do?'' In this paper I develop an epistemic model of a normal form game where counterfactuals of this sort are evaluated as in the philosophical literature (cf. Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker , 1968). According to this method one evaluates a statement like ``what would the player believe if he were to do what he actually does not do'' at the world that is closest to the actual world in which the hypothetical deviation actually occurs. I show that, in this extended model, common knowledge of rationality need not lead to rationalizability. I also present assumptions that allow rationalizability to be a consequence of common knowledge of rationality in this extended model. These assumptions suggest that it may be misleading to believe that, from an epistemic point of view, rationalizability relies on weaker assumptions about belief consistency than Nash equilibrium.

Book Rational Choice and Strategic Conflict

Download or read book Rational Choice and Strategic Conflict written by Gabriel Frahm and published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. This book was released on 2019-09-23 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This book is refreshing, innovative and important for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it attempts to reconcile game theory with one-person decision theory by viewing a game as a collection of one-person decision problems. As natural as this approach may seem, it is hard to find game theory books that really implement this view. This book is a wonderful exception, in which the transition between decision theory and game theory is both smooth and natural. It shows that decision theory and game theory can go—and, in fact, must go—hand in hand. The careful exposition, the many illustrative examples, the critical assessment of traditional game theory concepts, and the enlightening comparison with the subjectivistic approach advocated in this book, make it a pleasure to read and a must have for anyone interested in the foundations of decision theory and game theory." Andrés Perea (Maastricht University) "Gabriel Frahm's relatively nontechnical book is a bold synthesis of decision theory and game theory from a Bayesian or subjectivist perspective. It distinguishes between decisions, or one-person games, and games with two or more players, but Frahm argues that this distinction is not always necessary—the two kinds of games can be analyzed within a common theoretical framework. He models the dynamics of choice in several different settings (e.g., information may be complete or incomplete as well as perfect or imperfect), including one in which players look ahead and make farsighted calculations on which they base their choices. His book contains many provocative examples that illustrate the advantages of a unified theory of rational decision-making." Steven J. Brams (New York University)

Book Epistemic Game Theory

Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.

Book Equilibrium and Rationality

Download or read book Equilibrium and Rationality written by Paul Weirich and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1998-01-28 with total page 253 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This major contribution to game theory offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium.

Book Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations

Download or read book Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations written by John C. Harsanyi and published by CUP Archive. This book was released on 1986 with total page 340 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.

Book Knowledge  Belief  and Strategic Interaction

Download or read book Knowledge Belief and Strategic Interaction written by Cristina Bicchieri and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-08-28 with total page 444 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A group of pre-eminent figures offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and episemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning.

Book The Language of Game Theory

Download or read book The Language of Game Theory written by Adam Brandenburger and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2014 with total page 298 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program OCo now called epistemic game theory OCo extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (39 KB). Introduction (132 KB). Chapter 1: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (299 KB). Contents: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (Adam Brandenburger and H Jerome Keisler); Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Intrinsic Correlation in Games (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg); Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger); Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty (Lawrence Blume, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel); Admissibility in Games (Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg and H Jerome Keisler); Self-Admissible Sets (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg). Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the fields of game theory, theoretical computer science, mathematical logic and social neuroscience."

Book The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science

Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science written by Paul Humphreys and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2016-08-04 with total page 960 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This handbook provides both an overview of state-of-the-art scholarship in philosophy of science, as well as a guide to new directions in the discipline. Section I contains broad overviews of the main lines of research and the state of established knowledge in six principal areas of the discipline, including computational, physical, biological, psychological and social sciences, as well as general philosophy of science. Section II covers what are considered to be the traditional topics in the philosophy of science, such as causation, probability, models, ethics and values, and explanation. Section III identifies new areas of investigation that show promise of becoming important areas of research, including the philosophy of astronomy and astrophysics, data, complexity theory, neuroscience, simulations, post-Kuhnian philosophy, post-empiricist epistemology, and emergence. Most chapters are accessible to scientifically educated non-philosophers as well as to professional philosophers, and the contributors - all leading researchers in their field -- bring diverse perspectives from the North American, European, and Australasian research communities. This volume is an essential resource for scholars and students.

Book Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations

Download or read book Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations written by John C. Harsanyi and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1977-10-01 with total page 352 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.

Book Knowledge of Counterfactuals

Download or read book Knowledge of Counterfactuals written by Ana Smaranda Sandu and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We formalize agents' knowledge of counterfactuals in two different settings, players' behavior in extensive-form games and the process of agents' conditioning their beliefs. For extensive-form games, we define the notion of subgame-rationality, where players best-respond to what they believe would happen at any subgame where they are due to play. This approach settles a well-known disagreement in the literature between Aumann and Stalnaker - supporting Aumann - regarding whether common knowledge of rationality leads to the backwards induction solution in perfect information games. Subgame-rationality also makes it easier to relate epistemic characterizations of Nash equilibrium to those of subgame-perfect equilibrium. We also turn our attention to adding counterfactuals to agents' language, which leads to definitions of rationality which use iterated counterfactuals. For conditional beliefs, we propose new public-announcement style semantics which factor out the act of conditioning, using two traditional modalities, beliefs and counterfactuals. We investigate the set of validities for these semantics. We also take a closer look at the relationship between traditional plausibility models for conditional beliefs within Dynamic Epistemic Logic and models which use, instead, explicit counterfactual shifts. We identify properties that counterfactual shifts need to satisfy in order to simulate plausibility models.

Book Equilibrium Concepts in Game Theory

Download or read book Equilibrium Concepts in Game Theory written by Jack Hirshleifer and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Equilibrium Concepts in Game Theory

Download or read book Equilibrium Concepts in Game Theory written by Jeremy Kettering and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: