Download or read book Correlated Equilibrium and Higher Order Beliefs about Play written by Songzi Du and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a refinement of correlated equilibrium in which players' actions are driven by their beliefs and higher order beliefs about the play of the game (beliefs over what other players will do, over what other players believe others will do, etc.). For any finite, complete-information game, we characterize the behavioral implications of this refinement with and without a common prior, and up to any a priori fixed depth of reasoning. In every finite game "most" correlated equilibrium distributions are consistent with this refinement; as a consequence, this refinement gives a classification of "most" correlated equilibrium distributions based on the maximum order of beliefs used by players in the equilibrium. On the other hand, in a generic two-player game any non-degenerate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is not consistent with this refinement.
Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Download or read book Issues in Behavioral Psychology 2013 Edition written by and published by ScholarlyEditions. This book was released on 2013-05-01 with total page 1149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Issues in Behavioral Psychology / 2013 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ book that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about Adaptive Behavior. The editors have built Issues in Behavioral Psychology: 2013 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about Adaptive Behavior in this book to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Issues in Behavioral Psychology: 2013 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.
Download or read book Essays in Game Theory written by Mr. Songzi Du and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on the foundation and applications of game theory. In Chapter 1 we study a refinement of correlated equilibrium in which players' actions are driven by their beliefs and higher order beliefs about the play of the game (beliefs over what other players will do, over what other players believe others will do, etc.). For any finite, complete-information game, we characterize the behavioral implications of this refinement with and without a common prior, and up to any a priori fixed depth of reasoning. In every finite game "most" correlated equilibrium distributions are consistent with this refinement; as a consequence, this refinement gives a classification of "most" correlated equilibrium distributions based on the maximum order of beliefs used by players in the equilibrium. On the other hand, in a generic two-player game any non-degenerate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is not consistent with this refinement. In the next two chapters we turn to the applications of game theory. In Chapter 2 we show that without flexible transfers, the timing of transactions is difficult to coordinate in large matching markets. In our model, some agents have the option of matching early before others arrive. We compare two regimes. In the first regime, transfers which divide surpluses created between the two sides of the market are exogenously fixed, perhaps due to some institutional constraints. Then even with a centralized mechanism that implements a stable matching after all agents arrive, some agents have incentives to match early. We prove that in this setting, as the market gets large, on average approximately one quarter of all agents have strict incentives to match early. Moreover, as the market gets large, with probability tending to 1 there is no early matching scheme that is dynamically stable. On the other hand, in the second regime in which agents can freely negotiate transfers, a stable matching after all agents arrive eliminates all incentives to match early and is dynamically stable. In Chapter 3 we study settlement auctions for credit default swaps (CDS). We find that the one-sided design of CDS auctions used in practice gives CDS buyers and sellers strong incentives to distort the final auction price, in order to maximize payoffs from existing CDS positions. Consequently, these auctions tend to overprice defaulted bonds conditional on an excess supply and underprice defaulted bonds conditional on an excess demand. In our model bidders have a commonly-known bond value but privately-known CDS positions. We prove that with a one-sided auction in every Bayesian-Nash equilibrium the final auction price is strictly greater than the common bond value given an excess supply of bonds, and strictly less than the common bond value given an excess demand of bonds. We propose a double auction to mitigate this price bias. Finally, we find the predictions of our model on bidding behavior to be consistent with data on CDS auctions.
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory written by Petyon Young and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2014-10-01 with total page 1025 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Download or read book Interactive Epistemology written by Robert J. Aumann and published by World Scientific Economic Theo. This book was released on 2023-01-29 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robert J Aumann has received numerous prizes, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2005.With his 1976 paper, 'Agreeing to Disagree', Robert Aumann pioneered the subject of interactive epistemology: the study of what people know, and what they know about what others know. Since then, the discipline has burgeoned enormously. This book documents Aumann's work leading to the 1976 paper and his subsequent contributions to the discipline. The scientific controversies emanating from his work are also included.
Download or read book The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis written by Sanjit Dhami and published by . This book was released on 2019-06-27 with total page 459 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This fourth volume of The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis covers behavioral game theory. It is an essential guide for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students seeking a concise and focused text on this important subject, and examines the evidence on classical game theory and several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological gametheory.This updated extract from Dhami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading to their specific interests inbehavioural economics.
Download or read book The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis written by Sanjit S. Dhami and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2016 with total page 1799 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory. Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory. Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics. Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition. Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.
Download or read book Belief Based Equilibrium written by Alvaro Sandroni and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We introduce a new solution concept for short-sighted players engaging in a repeated interaction: a Belief-based equilibrium (BBE). In a BBE, players optimize myopically given their beliefs which are not necessarily correct, but are not contradicted by the data. We show that, if the stage game has a unique correlated equilibrium then the play of a BBE resembles a Nash equilibrium play. However, a BBE may not be a Nash equilibrium. In particular, in a BBE players may play deterministically when the only Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
Download or read book Learning and Coordination written by Peter Vanderschraaf and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2014-01-02 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.
Download or read book Correlated Equilibrium Public Signalling and Absorbing Games written by Eilon Solan and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer s Assessment of the Game written by John Hillas and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these instances are identical in the sense that the observer cannot distinguish between the settings in which different plays occur. If the observer does not believe that he will be able to offer beneficial advice then he must believe that the players are playing a correlated equilibrium, though he may not initially know which correlated equilibrium. If the observer also believes that, in a certain sense, there is nothing connecting the players in a particular instance of the game then he must believe that the correlated equilibrium they are playing is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium.
Download or read book Polycentric Games and Institutions written by Michael Dean McGinnis and published by University of Michigan Press. This book was released on 2000 with total page 564 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Uses game theory to model institutions
Download or read book The Bounds of Reason written by Herbert Gintis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2014-03-30 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Game theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences—from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. However, as The Bounds of Reason demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. Herbert Gintis shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a handicapped enterprise. This edition has been thoroughly revised and updated. Reinvigorating game theory, The Bounds of Reason offers innovative thinking for the behavioral sciences.
Download or read book Handbook of Utility Theory written by Salvador Barbera and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 1998 with total page 714 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The standard rationality hypothesis implies that behaviour can be represented as the maximization of a suitably restricted utility function. This hypothesis lies at the heart of a large body of recent work in economics, of course, but also in political science, ethics, and other major branches of social sciences. Though the utility maximization hypothesis is venerable, it remains an area of active research. Moreover, some fundamental conceptual problems remain unresolved, or at best have resolutions that are too recent to have achieved widespread understanding among social scientists. The main purpose of the Handbook of Utility Theory is to make recent developments in the area more accessible. The editors selected a number of specific topics, and invited contributions from researchers whose work had come to their attention. Therefore, the list of topics and contributions is largely the editors' responsibility. Each contributor's chapter has been refereed, and revised according to the referees' remarks. This is the first volume of a two volume set, with the second volume focusing on extensions of utility theory.
Download or read book Essentials of Game Theory written by Kevin Gebser and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2022-05-31 with total page 88 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents. The audience for game theory has grown dramatically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professional interest in game theory is likely to require. Such a text would minimize notation, ruthlessly focus on essentials, and yet not sacrifice rigor. This Synthesis Lecture aims to fill this gap by providing a concise and accessible introduction to the field. It covers the main classes of games, their representations, and the main concepts used to analyze them.
Download or read book Handbook of Macroeconomics written by John B. Taylor and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2016-11-12 with total page 2744 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of Macroeconomics Volumes 2A and 2B surveys major advances in macroeconomic scholarship since the publication of Volume 1 (1999), carefully distinguishing between empirical, theoretical, methodological, and policy issues, including fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies to deal with crises, unemployment, and economic growth. As this volume shows, macroeconomics has undergone a profound change since the publication of the last volume, due in no small part to the questions thrust into the spotlight by the worldwide financial crisis of 2008. With contributions from the world’s leading macroeconomists, its reevaluation of macroeconomic scholarship and assessment of its future constitute an investment worth making. Serves a double role as a textbook for macroeconomics courses and as a gateway for students to the latest research Acts as a one-of-a-kind resource as no major collections of macroeconomic essays have been published in the last decade Builds upon Volume 1 by using its section headings to illustrate just how far macroeconomic thought has evolved
