Download or read book Fairness Incentives and Contractual Choices written by Ernst Fehr and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 14 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Fairness Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness written by Ernst Fehr and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contracts Fairness and Incentives written by Ernst Fehr and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contracts Fairness Incentives written by and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Fairness and Incentives in a Multi task Principal agent Model written by Ernst Fehr and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Getting Incentives Right written by Robert D. Cooter and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2014-02-23 with total page 241 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How tort, contract, and restitution law can be reformed to better serve the social good Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of society. If these incentives were ideal, tort law would reduce the cost and frequency of accidents, contract law would lubricate transactions, and restitution law would encourage people to benefit others. Unfortunately, the incentives in these laws lead to too many injuries, too little contractual cooperation, and too few unrequested benefits. Getting Incentives Right explains how law might better serve the social good. In tort law, Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat propose that all foreseeable risks should be included when setting standards of care and awarding damages. Failure to do so causes accidents that better legal incentives would avoid. In contract law, they show that making a promise often causes the person who receives it to change behavior and undermine the cooperation between the parties. They recommend several solutions, including a novel contract called "anti-insurance." In restitution law, people who convey unrequested benefits to others are seldom entitled to compensation. Restitution law should compensate them more than it currently does, so that they will provide more unrequested benefits. In these three areas of law, Getting Incentives Right demonstrates that better law can promote the well-being of people by providing better incentives for the private regulation of conduct.
Download or read book Optimal Contracts with Fairness Concerns written by Yin Chi Tam and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In an organization, the principal may care about both efficiency and fairness. In this paper, we study the optimal contracts between a principal and multiple agents when the principal favors a more even expost wage distribution. We characterize the principal's fairness concern by a convex shading cost function and it is shown that the optimal contract is either a fixed wage contract or an incentive contract. Moreover, interior solution exists under certain conditions where the principal would provide both fixed and incentive contracts to agents. We also show that the optimal contracts tend to be more hybrid if the shading cost becomes more convex and the fraction of the incentive contract would decrease as the principal cares more about fairness.
Download or read book Contract Choice written by Alexandros Karakostas and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We present a simple principal-agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue-sharing, a bonus, and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue-sharing contract. This choice turns out to be not only the most efficient but also, at the same time, fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that, under revenue-sharing contracts, concerns for fairness can be closely associated with the use of monetary incentives.
Download or read book Incentive Contracts written by United States. General Accounting Office and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incentives in Government Contracting written by R. Preston Mcafee and published by Heritage. This book was released on 1988-12 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Could the existing level of government services by provided at a lower cost? This study presents a convincing argument for incentive contracts as a means to this end. In a typical market economy, payments from the government to firms account for about one-half of government spending (excluding transfer payments). By changing the way in which a government pays the firms from which it procures goods and services, it would be possible to maintain the existing array of government programs at a lower price. The major finding of this study is that governments could significantly reduce their expenditures by making extensive use of incentive contracts where they currently use either fixed-price contracts or cost-plus contracts. An incentive contract shares cost overruns and cost underruns between the government and the contractor according to a predetermined ratio. An incentive contract stimulates competition among the firms bidding for the contract and shares the project's risk between the government and the selected firm, while giving the contractor incentives to keep incurred costs low. In addition to advocating the use of incentive contracts, the study analyses the consequences of preferential treatment for domestic content over foreign content in government procurement, discusses the choice for a government agency between producing a commodity or service in-house and contracting for its provision with a private firm, and examines the experience with contracting of both the Ontario government and the United States Department of Defense in order to draw lessons for government contracting in general.
Download or read book Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing Contracts written by Alexandros Karakostas and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: If principals are allowed to choose between a revenue sharing, a bonus and a trust contract, a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue sharing contract. We find that this choice is the most efficient while at the same time being fair in the Paretian sense that on average agents are not worse off than in the other contracts. Furthermore, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that under revenue sharing contracts concerns for fairness can go in hand with the use of monetary incentives.
Download or read book Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal agent Experiment written by Vital Anderhub and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law written by Gregory Klass and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2014-12-18 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law. Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.
Download or read book Effects of Incentive Contracts in Research and Development written by Edward B. Roberts and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Effects of Incentive Contracts in Research and Development: A Preliminary Research Report In the past several years an effort has originated in the Defense Department (and followed by other government agencies) to discourage the use of cost-p1us=fixed fee (cpff) contracts and substitute contractual incentive arrangements. This effort supposedly relies upon the profit motive to reduce requirements for direct government control and to stim ulate better contractor performance and cost estimating. Incentive type contracts are not new in government contracting. Production contracts have been awarded on a fixed price basis for many years. The fixed price contract provides maximum correlation of contract profits with contract cost, and in theory might offer maximum cost incentive. How ever the use of incentive arrangements on r&d contracts is the novel feature of the dod (and nasa) programs of the past several years. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Download or read book Inequality aversion Contracts and Incentives written by Bin Guan and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 390 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incentive Contracts Versus Non incentive Contracts written by Joseph Vincent McCarthy and published by . This book was released on 1967 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Multi Stage Incentive Contract Design of Aviation Complex Product Multi Task Delivery Strategy written by Yehui Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The increasing demand for aviation complex products makes complex product manufacturers pay more attention to delivery efficiency, and the efficiency and effect of delivery problems are the key factors that restrict the delivery efficiency. This study aims to design a long-term effective incentive contract, which stimulates the subjective initiative of each technical business department to deal with delivery problems so as to improve delivery efficiency. We consider the behavioral characteristics of each technical business department (fairness preference, interrelationship diversity, technical capability, etc.) to expand the benchmark incentive model. The multi-stage incentive mechanism which combines the explicit incentives and implicit incentives are developed to explore the optimal delivery strategies based on a benchmark model. The results show that the incentive contracts can improve delivery efficiency and benefit delivery centers and technical business departments. The delivery decisions of the department are influenced by the closeness of department relationships and the fairness of assignment, and the departments tend to pay more effort in tasks with high relative importance and low effort cost. When the relative importance of tasks is equal to the ratio of marginal cost, a weak incentive zone in the delivery incentive contract is existed. The incentive effect of reputation effect is obvious except for the last stage. Base on the designed incentive contracts, the subjective initiative of the participants can be effectively stimulated to empower complex product delivery.
