Download or read book Competition and Strategic Behavior in Energy Markets written by Remco van Eijkel and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Economics of Electricity written by Anna Cretì and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2019-05-30 with total page 369 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Explains the economics of electricity at each step of the supply chain: production, transportation and distribution, and retail.

Download or read book Strategic behaviour resource valuation and competition in electricity markets written by Miguel A. Espinosa and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Complementarity Modeling in Energy Markets written by Steven A. Gabriel and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-07-20 with total page 637 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren’t specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach? s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers.

Download or read book Valuation Hedging and Speculation in Competitive Electricity Markets written by Petter L. Skantze and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The challenges currently facing particIpants m competitive electricity markets are unique and staggering: unprecedented price volatility, a crippling lack of historical market data on which to test new modeling approaches, and a continuously changing regulatory structure. Meeting these challenges will require the knowledge and experience of both the engineering and finance communities. Yet the two communities continue to largely ignore each other. The finance community believes that engineering models are too detailed and complex to be practically applicable in the fast changing market environment. Engineers counter that the finance models are merely statistical regressions, lacking the necessary structure to capture the true dynamic properties of complex power systems. While both views have merit, neither group has by themselves been able to produce effective tools for meeting industry challenges. The goal of this book is to convey the fundamental differences between electricity and other traded commodities, and the impact these differences have on valuation, hedging and operational decisions made by market participants. The optimization problems associated with these decisions are formulated in the context of the market realities of today's power industry, including a lack of liquidity on forward and options markets, limited availability of historical data, and constantly changing regulatory structures.

Download or read book Pricing in Competitive Electricity Markets written by Ahmad Faruqui and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 463 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Electricity markets are being deregulated or face new regulatory frameworks. In such changing markets, new pricing strategies will need to consider such factors as cost, value of service and pricing by objective. Pricing in Competitive Electricity Markets introduces a new family of pricing concepts, methodologies, models, tools and databases focused on market-based pricing. This book reviews important theoretical pricing issues as well as practical pricing applications for changing electricity markets.

Download or read book Strategic Behaviour in Energy Markets written by Daniel Huppmann and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Network and Temporal Effects on Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets written by Youfei Liu and published by Open Dissertation Press. This book was released on 2017-01-27 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, "Network and Temporal Effects on Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets" by Youfei, Liu, 劉有飛, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: of thesis entitled "Network And Temporal Effects On Strategic Bidding In Electricity Markets" Submitted by Youfei Liu for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in February 2006 The global deregulation of power industries has given rise to many fascinating research topics. This thesis addresses issues of strategic bidding by power generators. The problem of strategic bidding is to optimize an individual power generation bid by maximizing profits, based on production cost, expectation of rival behavior and system demand. Electrical power flow over different links is governed by the physical law (Kirchhoff law). As a result, electrical power flow cannot be independently determined and the electricity transmission system has global network effects. One major contribution of this study is to investigate the network effects of electricity transmission on strategic bidding and analyze the network-constrained electricity market equilibria. A three-node electricity system is used for investigation. The decision space of generators is divided into the congestion-on region and congestion-off region, and the optimal response curves of generators in each region are then derived. The market equilibrium is located as the intersection of these optimal response curves. It is analytically shown that this may consist either of a unique unconstrained market equilibrium, a unique constrained market equilibrium, multiple-equilibria, or no pure Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, the interaction between transmission rights holding and market power exercising is addressed. It is shown that in the situation with a positive PTDF, holding transmission rights mitigate market power, and produce an improvement in market efficiency, while in other situations, the reverse is true. Furthermore it is demonstrated that a possible allocation of transmission rights to generators can be found to achieve maximum efficiency. Another unique characteristic of electricity markets is their notable temporal ii effects. In other words, electricity prices have significant volatilities because of the non-storability of power energy and the large variations of system demand. The second part of this study investigates the temporal effects of the electricity market on strategic bidding. A periodic dynamic feedback system is proposed to model the generation competition process. With the developed system dynamics, an optimal control problem is formulated to study the multi-period optimization behavior (called the 'advanced' strategy) of a generator, and the state-feedback control rule is then derived via a sweeping method. It is demonstrated that the generator with optimal control can obtain more profits, and a sensitivity analysis is provided to locate the market factors that affect the performance of optimal control. Next, system uncertainties are included, and a stochastic optimal control problem for generation decision is formulated and solved. Two interesting problems are investigated, namely the effect of the generator's 'advanced' strategic behavior on market efficiency, and the way in which an individual's payoff evolves with other generators' 'advanced' strategic behavior. It is shown that the 'advanced' strategic behavior of generators will improve market efficiency, while an individual's payoff evolution resembles a 'Prisoner Dilemma'. An analysis of risk management of generation decisi...

Download or read book Microeconomics Competition and Strategic Behaviour written by Markus Thomas Münter and published by UTB. This book was released on 2022-09-05 with total page 421 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Microeconomics is not applied math – frameworks in this book are regularly in use in daily managerial practice and strategic decision-making. Numerous case studies cover price discrimination, economies of scale, digital business models, game theory, dealing with uncertainty, entry barriers or sunk costs – all of which are crucial for understanding market dynamics and competitive behaviour.

Download or read book Energy Foresight and Strategy written by Thomas J. Sargent and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2016-03-17 with total page 223 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The essays in Energy, Foresight and Strategy apply rational expectation theory to various energy markets with the intention of discussing issues relevant to analysis and decision making in the whole of the energy field. Originally published in 1985, issues explored include oil exportation, energy prices and embargoes, both focussing on how past regulation has created issues in the market at the time of publication as well as creating models to ascertain the futures of various energy resources. This title will be of interest to students of Environmental Studies and Economics.

Download or read book Essays on Competition in Electricity Markets written by Ricardo Javier Bustos Salvagno and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter two examines the Chilean experience on auctions for long-term supply contracts in electricity markets from 2006 to 2011. Using a divisible-good auction model, I provide a theoretical framework that explains bidding behavior in terms of expected spot prices and contracting positions. The model is extended to include potential strategic behavior on contracting decisions. Empirical estimations confirm the main determinants of bidding behavior and show heterogeneity in the marginal cost of over-contracting depending on size and incumbency.

Download or read book Essays on Market Design and Strategic Behaviour in Energy Markets written by Stefan Lorenczik and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Competition Contracts and Electricity Markets written by Jean-Michel Glachant and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2011 with total page 335 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term contracts and the efficiency of electricity markets. These include the impact of long-term contracts and vertical integration on effective competition, generation investment in risky markets, and the challenges for competition policy principles. On the one hand, long-term contracts may contribute to lasting generation capability by allowing for a more efficient allocation of risk. On the other hand, they can create conditions for imperfect competition and thus impair short-term efficiency. The contributors – prominent academics and policy experts with inter-disciplinary perspectives – develop fresh theoretical and practical insights on this important concern for current electricity markets. This highly accessible book will strongly appeal to both academic and professional audiences including scholars of industrial, organizational and public sector economics, and competition and antitrust law. It will also be of value to regulatory and antitrust authorities, governmental policymakers, and consultants in electricity law and economics.

Download or read book Local Electricity Markets written by Tiago Pinto and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2021-07-03 with total page 474 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Local Electricity Markets introduces the fundamental characteristics, needs, and constraints shaping the design and implementation of local electricity markets. It addresses current proposed local market models and lessons from their limited practical implementation. The work discusses relevant decision and informatics tools considered important in the implementation of local electricity markets. It also includes a review on management and trading platforms, including commercially available tools. Aspects of local electricity market infrastructure are identified and discussed, including physical and software infrastructure. It discusses the current regulatory frameworks available for local electricity market development internationally. The work concludes with a discussion of barriers and opportunities for local electricity markets in the future. - Delineates key components shaping the design and implementation of local electricity market structure - Provides a coherent view on the enabling infrastructures and technologies that underpin local market expansion - Explores the current regulatory environment for local electricity markets drawn from a global panel of contributors - Exposes future paths toward widespread implementation of local electricity markets using an empirical review of barriers and opportunities - Reviews relevant local electricity market case studies, pilots and demonstrators already deployed and under implementation

Download or read book Sequential Markets Market Power and Arbitrage written by Koichiro Ito and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We develop a theoretical framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and limited arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using micro-data from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In our setting, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing in the presence of market power, reducing consumer costs but decreasing productive efficiency.

Download or read book Energy Sustainability through Retail Electricity Markets written by John Collins and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2023-12-16 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The world is moving away from demand-driven electricity markets supplied by centralized generation and distribution of fossil-fuel-produced electricity. Increasing reliance on weather-dependent renewable sources will require a shift toward a supply-driven paradigm, while beneficial electrification, including widespread adoption of electric vehicles, heat pumps, and batteries will offer considerable but widely distributed demand flexibility that can be used to compensate for supply variability. The open-source Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) platform simulates a decentralized future, modeling the high complexity of future retail electricity markets. This book describes a variety of approaches to profitable trading in realistic wholesale and retail electricity markets. It presents actionable insights from extensive exploration of policies and business models for retail electricity markets gained from a decade of Power TAC tournaments, and from research inspired by the Power TAC experience. Featuring contributions from tournament designers, competitors, and scientists combining best practices from computer science and economics and management science, this book is of benefit to academics, researchers, practitioners and policy makers in sustainable energy and wholesale and retail electricity markets.

Download or read book Alternative Models to Analyze Market Power and Financial Transmission Rights in Electricity Markets electronic Resource written by Bautista Alderete, Guillermo and published by University of Waterloo. This book was released on 2005 with total page 166 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the main concerns with the introduction of competition in the power sector is the strategic behaviour of market participants. Computable models of strategic behaviour are becoming increasingly important to understand the complexities of competition. Such models can help analyze market designs and regulatory policies. In this thesis, further developments on the modelling and analysis of strategic behaviour in electricity markets are presented. This thesis work has been conducted along three research lines. In the first research line, an oligopolistic model of a joint energy and spinning reserve market is formulated to analyze imperfect competition. Strategic behaviour is introduced by means of conjectured functions. With this integrated formulation for imperfect competition, the opportunity cost between generation and spinning reserve has been analytically derived. Besides, inter-temporal and energy constraints, and financial transmission rights are taken into account. Under such considerations, competition in electricity markets is modelled with more realism. The oligopolistic model is formulated as an equilibrium problem in terms of complementarity conditions. In the second research line, a methodology to screen and mitigate the potential exacerbation of market power due to the ownership of financial transmission rights is presented. Hedging position ratios are computed to quantify the hedging level of financial transmission rights. They are based on the actual impact that each participant has in the energy market, and on the potential impact that it would have with the ownership of financial transmission rights. Thus, hedging position ratios are used to identify the potential gambling positions from the transmission rights bidders, and, therefore, used to prioritize critical positions in the auction for transmission rights. In the last research line, alternative equilibrium models of markets for financial transmission rights are formulated. The proposed equilibrium framework is more natural and flexible for modelling markets than the classic cost-minimization markets. Different markets for financial transmission rights are modelled, namely: i) forwards, ii) options, and iii) joint forwards and options. Moreover, one-period, multi-period and multi-round markets for forwards are derived. These equilibrium models are proposed to analyze the bidding strategies of market participants. The potential impact of bidders on congestion prices is modelled by means of conjectured transmission price functions.