Download or read book Collusive Communication Schemes in a First price Auction written by Helmuts Āzacis and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study optimal bidder collusion at first-price auctions when the collusive mechanism only relies on signals about bidders' valuations. We build on Fang and Morris (2006) when two bidders have low or high private valuation of a single object and additionally each receives a private noisy signal from an incentiveless center about the opponent's valuation. We derive the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first price auction for any symmetric, possibly correlated, distribution of signals, when these can only take two values. Next, we find the distribution of 2-valued signals, which maximizes the joint payoffs of bidders. We prove that allowing signals to take more than two values will not increase bidders' payoffs if the signals are restricted to be public. We also investigate the case when the signals are chosen conditionally independently and identically out of n = 2 possible values. We demonstrate that bidders are strictly better off as signals can take on more and more possible values. Finally, we look at another special case of the correlated signals, namely, when these are independent of the bidders' valuations. We show that in any symmetric 2-valued strategy correlated equilibrium, the bidders bid as if there were no signals at all and, hence, are not able to collude. -- Bidder-optimal signal structure ; Collusion ; (Bayes) correlated equilibrium ; First price auction ; Public and private signals

Download or read book Communication and Correlated Equilibria in First price Auctions written by Caleb South and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We explore the question of collusion through communication in first-price auctions, asking whether there exist any collusive equilibria with higher bidder surplus than the Nash equilibrium. We show that the set of collusive equilibria in first-price auctions is strictly smaller than in second-price auctions. We apply linear programming techniques to the problem of finding collusive equilibria, considering both communication equilibrium and Bayes correlated equilibrium as solution concepts. We also consider the Lagrange relaxation of these programs, a dual optimization problem which bounds their results. We approximate these programs numerically and make several observations about the structure of their solutions.

Download or read book Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication written by Masaki Aoyagi and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.

Download or read book Handbook of Experimental Economics Results written by Charles R. Plott and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2008-08-21 with total page 1175 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appears blurred and may produce uncertain results. The contributors to this volume have provided brief notes describing specific experimental results.

Download or read book A Study of Collusion in First Price Auctions written by Martin Pesendorfer and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in Florida and Texas during the 1980s. In both states firms were convicted of bid-rigging. The data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways: One cartel divides the market among members, while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal, provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large. In the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non-cartel bidders. The presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction. The selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non-cartel bidder. The data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels.

Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics written by Roger D. Blair and published by Oxford Handbooks. This book was released on 2015 with total page 665 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.

Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics Volume 2 written by Roger D. Blair and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2014-11-03 with total page 665 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.

Download or read book The Handbook of Experimental Economics written by John H. Kagel and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 739 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.

Download or read book The Economics of Collusion written by Robert C. Marshall and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2012-04-27 with total page 315 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.

Download or read book Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions written by Shiran Rachmilevitch and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, called endogenous bid-rotation, which gives a payoff larger than the bid-rotation payoff, when valuations are drawn from a continuous distribution. In the special case where the stage game is a second-price auction, the scheme has the following additional properties: (1) it is supported in equilibrium independently of the discount factor, and (2) it is supported in equilibrium even when each player's participation decision is not known to his opponent. Finally, when the distribution of valuations is Bernoulli, the scheme delivers the first-best.

Download or read book journal of economic theroy written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Advances in Systems Science written by Jerzy Swiątek and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-08-13 with total page 796 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The International Conference on Systems Science 2013 (ICSS 2013) was the 18th event of the series of international scientific conferences for researchers and practitioners in the fields of systems science and systems engineering. The conference took place in Wroclaw, Poland during September 10-12, 2013 and was organized by Wroclaw University of Technology and co-organized by: Committee of Automatics and Robotics of Polish Academy of Sciences, Committee of Computer Science of Polish Academy of Sciences and Polish Section of IEEE. The papers included in the proceedings cover the following topics: Control Theory, Databases and Data Mining, Image and Signal Processing, Machine Learning, Modeling and Simulation, Operational Research, Service Science, Time series and System Identification. The accepted and presented papers highlight new trends and challenges in systems science and systems engineering.

Download or read book The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy written by Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2017-11-16 with total page 145 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.

Download or read book Collusion and Information Revelation in Auctions written by Aniol Llorente-Saguer and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. However, such analyses neglect to consider the effects of failed collusion attempts, wherein information revealed in the negotiation process may affect bidding behavior. We experimentally test a setup in which theory predicts no collusion and no information revelation in first-price auctions. The results reveal a hitherto overlooked failing of the first-price mechanism: failed collusion attempts distort bidding behavior, resulting in a loss of seller revenue and efficiency. Moreover, the first-price mechanism does not result in less collusion than the second-price mechanism. We conclude that, while the features of the first-price mechanism may have the potential to deter bidder collusion, the role of beliefs in guiding bidding behavior make it highly susceptible to distortions arising from the informational properties of collusive negotiation. Auction designers should take this phenomenon into account when choosing the auction mechanism.

Download or read book The Economic Theory of Auctions written by Paul Klemperer and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 720 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Collusion in repeated auctions with cheap talk messages written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Este trabalho apresenta um modelo de conluio em leilões repetidos de primeiro preço estático, ou seja, um esquema de conluio que usa a mesma regra de conluio em toda a fase de cooperação, independente da história do superjogo. Neste ambiente, introduzimos um mecanismo de comunicação sem custo, por meio do qual os jogadores transmitem sua ordenação de preferências sobre os bens a serem leiloados no jogo estágio. A partir deste modelo, obtemos um aumento da receita esperada agregada por parte dos participantes do leilão frente a um modelo de conluio estático tácito. Além disso, o resultado de dominância do conluio dinâmico com comunicação - esquema no qual a regra de conluio depende de toda a história pública do superjogo - apresentado por Aoyagi (2002), frente a qualquer conluio estático nãose verifica. Outro ponto a se destacar é que o refinamento do sistema de comunicação, por meio de um aumento do número de bens ordenados em cada mensagem, embora leve a um aumento da receita esperada, pode gerar uma elevação da taxa de paciência necessária para a manutenção do conluio.

Download or read book How Do Cartels Operate written by Joseph Emmett Harrington and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2006 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel's organizational structure.