Download or read book Central Banks or Single Authorities A Delegation Puzzle Economics Politics and Law of Financial Supervision Architectures written by Donato Masciandaro and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this wor ...
Download or read book Handbook of Central Banking and Financial Authorities in Europe written by Donato Masciandaro and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Analyzing ongoing changes in the design of regulatory and supervisory authorities over the banking and financial industry in Europe, this comprehensive Handbook pays particular attention to the role of national central banks, the new financial supervisory authorities and the European Central Bank (ECB). The contributors, all experts in their fields, begin by presenting the current situation in Europe, focusing on the role of the central banks, before going on to illustrate the supervisory architecture reforms of the late 1990s. The Handbook also highlights the emerging role of new integrated financial authorities through an analysis of different national case studies. This new original reference book concludes with a review of the various options now available for the design of supervisory architecture at the European level, considering also the possible involvement of the ECB. The Handbook tackles a number of controversial issues including: - why financial supervision architecture is important and why the issue has arisen at the present time - the roles of national central banks and national policymakers in alternative financial supervisory structures - the advantages and potential hazards of single financial authorities unified or integrated agencies. This essential Handbook is a major multidisciplinary work and will be of great value to scholars and academics - principally in economics, finance and European studies but also politics and law - as well as regulators and supervisory institutions.
Download or read book Central Banks or Single Financial Authorities A Political Economy Approach written by Donato Masciandaro and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this work is to offer a political delegation approach for the analysis of the financial sector supervision. Focusing on the key issue in the debate on financial supervision structure - single authority versus multi-authorities model - the paper claims that the optimal degree of financial supervision unification cannot be defined a priori; rather it is an expected variable, calculated by the policymakers that maintains or reform the supervisory regime. The adopted approach is to consider the supervisory regime with one or more authorities as an endogenous variable, determined in turn by the dynamics of other structural variables, economic and institutional, that can explain the political delegation process. In order to construct this endogenous variable, it is introduced a Financial Authorities' Concentration Index (FAC Index). Then, given the importance to consider the nature of the institutions involved in the control responsibilities - i.e. what role the central bank plays - it is used as an index of the central bank's involvement in financial supervision, the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA Index). Each national supervisory regime can be identified with the two above characteristics. Two the most frequent models: countries with a high concentration of powers with low central bank involvement (Single Financial Authority Regime); countries with a low concentration of powers with high central bank involvement (Central Bank Dominated Multiple Supervisors Regime). Finally, to empirically gauge the possible structural determinants of the degree of supervision unification, it is performed an econometric analysis of the Probit and Logit types. The econometric results signal that the probability of supervision unification is inversely linked to the involvement of the central bank. The two possible explanation of this relationship are the blurring hazard effect and the monopolistic bureau effect. The unification of financial supervision also seems to be a more markedly European phenomenon, linked especially to the Germanic and Scandinavian roots of the legal institutions.
Download or read book Unelected Power written by Paul Tucker and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2019-09-10 with total page 662 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.
Download or read book Central Banks and Supervisory Architecture in Europe written by Holzmann, Robert and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2022-10-07 with total page 253 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: COVID-19 and other recent crises have proved the need to review the state-of-play and implement robust institutional frameworks in the complex, heterogenous and decentralised European financial supervisory architecture, this insightful book outlines what can be done to innovate the current set-up in the face of pressing issues like climate change, BigTech and crypto assets.
Download or read book Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions written by Philip Keefer and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2000 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence Targets and Credibility written by Francesco Lippi and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1999-01-27 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.
Download or read book Bankers Bureaucrats and Central Bank Politics written by Christopher Adolph and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-04-15 with total page 389 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.
Download or read book Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions written by Philip Keefer and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions. The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling credible commitment is to delegate authority to an agency that will not have an incentive to opportunistically change policies once the private sector has taken such steps as signing wage contracts or making irreversible investments. Delegating authority is suggested as a government strategy particularly for monetary policy. And existing work on the independence of central banks generally assumes that government decisions to delegate are irrevocable. But delegation - in monetary policy as elsewhere - is inevitably a political choice, and can be reversed, contend Keefer and Stasavage. They develop a model of monetary policy that relaxes the assumption that monetary delegation is irreversible. Among the testable predictions of the model are these: · The presence of an independent central bank should reduce inflation only in the presence of political checks and balances. This effect should be evident in both developing and industrial countries. · Political actions to interfere with the central bank should be more apparent when there are few checks and balances. · The effects of checks and balances should be more marked when political decisionmakers are more polarized. The authors test these predictions and find extensive empirical evidence to support each of the observable implications of their model: Central banks are associated with better inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances. The turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure protections supported by political checks and balances. And the effect of checks and balances is enhanced in more polarized political environments. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to identify the conditions under which regulatory reforms can be effective.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by Jan Kleineman and published by BRILL. This book was released on 2021-10-18 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In December 1999, prior to the forming of a Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law, an international symposium entitled Central Bank Independence was held at the Department of Law at Stockholm University in co-operation with the Swedish Central Bank (The Riksbank) and Queen Mary and Westfield College, London University. The participants were principally political, economic and legal specialists in the field, all with considerable international experience. This led to the topic being examined in detail from many different perspectives. This publication includes contributions by the participants and contains many important facts for those readers who wish to study and understand the different consequences of the yielding of control over financial policymaking by the traditional political organisations to a body of experts. For readers in some countries, who realise that the subject will revolutionise traditional Constitutional and Administrative Law, the topic and therefore this publication, cannot be ignored.
Download or read book Gatekeepers of Growth written by Sylvia Maxfield and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1998-07-13 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.
Download or read book Checks and Balances Private Information and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments written by Philip Keefer and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2001 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies.
Download or read book Central Bank Or Single Authority Political Cycle Monetary Policy and Financial Supervision written by Raffaella Barone and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The aim of this paper is to present a principal-and-two-agents model, by which to assess the role of the political cycle in determining the design of the institutions of monetary and of regulatory policy. In particular the specific issue is: should the responsibility of the two policies be concentrated in the hands of the central bank or not? In examining the policymaker's choice between single and multiple authority, two phases are identified, the electoral and non-electoral periods. The conclusion reached is that the electoral cycle is irrelevant, while what is relevant are the costs of "capture" involved in the different institutional scenarios.
Download or read book The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance Key Legal Design Issues written by Wouter Bossu and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2019-12-27 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper discusses key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks. Central banks are complex and sophisticated organizations that are challenging to manage. While most economic literature focuses on decision-making in the context of monetary policy formulation, this paper focuses on the Board oversight of central banks—a central feature of sound governance. This form of oversight is the decision-making responsibility through which an internal body of the central bank—the Oversight Board—ensures that the central bank is well-managed. First, the paper will contextualize the role of Board oversight into the broader legal structure for central bank governance by considering this form of oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks. Secondly, the paper will focus on a number of important legal design issues for Board Oversight, by contrasting the current practices of the IMF membership’s 174 central banks with staff’s advisory practice developed over the past 50 years.
Download or read book The Evolving Role of Central Banks written by Mr.Patrick Downes and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1991-06-15 with total page 476 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central Banks should enjoy a fair degree of autonomy in pursuing price stability to promote long-run growth and prosperity. This volume, edited by Patrick Downes and Reza Vaez-Zadeh, contains the papers presented at the fifth IMF seminar on central banking issues in November 1990. The theme was the interdependence of central bank functions and the role of central bank autonomy.
Download or read book A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence written by Mr.Eric Le Borgne and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2003-07-01 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
Download or read book Central Banks as a Bank Supervisor written by Stanyo Dinov and published by Tectum Verlag. This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Stanyo Dinov analyses and compares the three most advanced and most influential financial systems in the world, their structure, models of regulation and their actual financial legislation against the background of the global financial crisis in 2007. After a brief introduction, the first chapter is devoted to the function of the Central Banks and the two main divisions theories about the role of the CBs, namely their responsibility for monetary policy, or for monetary policy and banking supervision. The work also displays the four existing regulative approaches to financial supervision: the Institutional, the Functional, the Integrated and the Twin Peaks. The main part represents and compares the Central Banks and their regulatory structure, starting with the oldest one, the BoE. The benefits and the drawbacks of the one or the other system are outlined. In the conclusion, the most important results are presented and an ideal modal solution is suggested.
