Download or read book Bidder Behavior and Market Outcomes in Treasury Bill Auctions written by Berna Saniye Bayazitoglu and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 350 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions written by Daniel C. L. Hardy and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2000-06 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Behavior in the first three years of auctions for Pakistani treasury bills is studied. Bidding strategies rapidly converged to a consistent pattern after the auctions started in 1991. Factors are identified that influenced the expected profitability of auction participation, which was on average low and did not differ between types of bidders. Prices bid are found to reflected both ‘buy and sell’ and ‘buy and hold’ strategies, and were affected by risk considerations and bidder-specific variables. The Pakistani experience suggests the robustness of auctions as a market-based allocation mechanism, and their value in public debt management.
Download or read book Treasury Bill Auctions written by Mr.Carlo Cottarelli and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1994-11-01 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We review the main issues that arise in the design of treasury bill auctions and survey the relevant empirical literature. We also provide a detailed description of the actual design of these auctions in a sample of 42 industrial and developing countries.
Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions written by Daniel Hardy and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Behavior in the first three years of auctions for Pakistani treasury bills is studied. Bidding strategies rapidly converged to a consistent pattern after the auctions started in 1991. Factors are identified that influenced the expected profitability of auction participation, which was on average low and did not differ between types of bidders. Prices bid are found to reflected both 'buy and sell' and 'buy and hold' strategies, and were affected by risk considerations and bidder-specific variables. The Pakistani experience suggests the robustness of auctions as a market-based allocation mechanism, and their value in public debt management.
Download or read book Bidder Behavior in Uniform pricing Auctions an Empirical Study of the Danish Treasury Bill Auctions written by Heino Dossing and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 96 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper I analyze the bidder behavior in uniform-pricing auctions. The paper contains a description of the most fundamental theory on discriminatory and uniform pricing auctions, a review of the existing literature and a unique empirical study of the bidder behavior in the Danish Treasury-Bill auction of 2007. The bidder-behavior in the Danish T-bill auctions was compared to the predictions of four different theoretical models via a methodology developed by Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2005). It is found that the individual bidder's behavior is unaffected by risk and market power. Thus, price volatility and market power do not determine the profitability of the Danish T-bill Auctions. This leads to a suspicion of tacit collusion among the bidders in the Danish Treasury Bill auctions. As a consequence my empirical results could not contribute to a further mapping of the theoretical predictions on actual bidder behavior in Treasury security auctions that are confirmed by empirical data. In addition I did not come closer to an answer to the question: which auction procedure is most profitable - discriminatory or the uniform-pricing?However, my findings do add one interesting aspect to the existing literature: the relative profitability of any auction procedure can be affected by the degree of tacit collusion. Thus, any future comparisons of discriminatory and uniform-pricing auctions (across different countries or different time-periods) should take the possibility of collusion into account. Finally, future empirical studies of the bidder behavior in Treasury-security auctions could be devoted to the development of quantitative tools to detect collusion.
Download or read book Bidder Behavior in Multiple Unit Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Theory and Evidence on Reform of the Treasury s Auction Procedures written by Vincent Reinhart and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Liquidity Shocks Market Maker Turnover and Bidding Behavior in Treasury Auctions written by Jesper Rüdiger and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auction Performance Strategic Supply Management and Bidder Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions written by Eduardo Anthony G. Mariño and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Flexible Estimation of Demand Schedules and Revenue Under Different Auction Formats written by Robert A. Feldman and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Strategic Behaviour and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions written by Matti Keloharju and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Treasury Bill Auctions written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Behavioral biases of dealers in U S treasury auctions written by David Goldreich and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Electricity Auctions written by Luiz Maurer and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2011-07-25 with total page 181 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Electricity-contract auctions have been getting increased attention as they have emerged as a successful mechanism to procure new generation capacity and. This book presents a comprehensive overview of international experiences in auction design and implementation.
Download or read book Market Manipulation and a Model of the United States Treasury Securities Auction Market written by Robert A. Jarrow and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper develops in a new framework, an equilibrium model of the U.S. Treasury Securities auction market under both discriminatory and uniform price auction rules. In the model, traders participate in forward trading of Treasury securities in a quot;when-issuedquot; market before the Treasury auction. Next, bidding takes place in a Treasury auction and securities are delivered. Last, a resale market occurs where quot;short-corneringquot; and market manipulating quot;squeezesquot; can happen with rational traders. These manipulations occur in auctions by dealers who, participating in the when-issued market, use their knowledge of the net order flow to bid aggressively in the auction in order to corner the market and squeeze the shorts (from the when-issued market). This equilibrium is shown to be consistent with the abnormal price behavior of Treasury securities surrounding dealer induced squeezes. Our analysis also shows that manipulations will not occur in long-run equilibrium under uniform price auctions. Under this long-run equilibrium condition, the uniform price auction enhances social welfare by yielding greater revenue to the Treasury than does the discriminatory auction.
Download or read book Auctions written by Paul Klemperer and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2018-06-05 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
