Download or read book Bargaining with Incomplete Information written by Peter B. Linhart and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 576 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: These 22 contributions to the economic theory of non co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy and delay in bargaining outcomes.

Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by Allan Richard Young and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 218 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Quantifying Bargaining Power Under Incomplete Information written by Bradley J. Larsen and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information and the Design of Legal Rules written by Eric Leonard Talley and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Two Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information written by Bettina Kuon and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 305 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O

Download or read book Enhancing Honesty in Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by James E. Parco and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The sealed-bid k-double auction mechanism for two-person bargaining under incomplete information can be extended by providing a bonus for both traders if, and only if, an agreement is reached. Brams and Kilgour (1996) proved that there is a unique level of bonus, namely, half the difference between the buyer's bid and seller's ask, that induces the traders to bargain truthfully. Stein and Parco (2001) extend the theoretical work to the case of partial bonus levels that reduce, but do not completely eliminate, misrepresentation of the reservation values. In the present study, we experimentally investigate the effects of providing different bonus values on the misrepresentation of the bargainers' reservation values. Our results show that implementation of a bonus has a significant impact on bargaining behavior but not nearly to the extent predicted by the equilibrium analysis. A reinforcement-based learning model originally proposed for the no bonus case accounts quite well for the results of all three experimental conditions.

Download or read book Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1985-11-29 with total page 402 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.

Download or read book Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements written by Clara Ponsati-Obiols and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Axiomatic Models of Bargaining written by A.E. Roth and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 129 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.

Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by Reinhard Selten and published by . This book was released on 1974 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incomplete Information Bargaining and Business Cycles written by Daron Acemoglu and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Two Person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by James E. Parco and published by . This book was released on 2002-05-01 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: New theoretical developments and recent experimental studies involving the sealed-bid kappa-double auction mechanism for bilateral bargaining under incomplete information have raised new questions about procedures that induce efficient bargaining behavior and about the applicability of extant adaptive learning models. It is now generally accepted that a theory of bargaining behavior for individuals who typically do not meet the stringent assumptions about common knowledge of rationality cannot be complete without systematic empirical investigations of the properties of the various mechanisms that structure bargaining. The aim of this dissertation is to critically explore the extent to which efficient bargaining outcomes can be achieved while dynamically accounting for individual behavior across repeated play of the game. In the first study, an endogenous bonus is introduced into the baseline single- stage game. Although theoretically doing so induces truth-telling behavior for both players, the experimental data provide very limited support. In the second study, the baseline game is extended by incorporating an additional, costless period of bargaining, thereby giving players an increased opportunity to reveal information about their respective reservation values. The data show that subjects quickly learn not to reveal information about their private valuation despite the increased opportunity to bilaterally improve efficiency. Finally, the third study investigates behavior sensitivity to variation in the trading parameter, kappa. Instead of following the historical precedent of setting kappa = 1/2, extreme values of kappa are invoked in an asymmetric information environment endowing a player with exclusive price-setting power.

Download or read book Coasian Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by Glen S. Archibald and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 476 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model written by Klaus M. Schmidt and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information written by Shmuel Zamir and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Game theoretic Analysis of Transfer Price Negotiation Under Incomplete Information Conditions written by Yong-sik Hong and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 250 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information Fairness and the Hold Up Problem written by Ferdinand von Siemens and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.