Download or read book Authority Risk and Performance Incentives written by Julie Wulf and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I show that performance incentives vary by decision-making authority of division managers. For division managers with broader authority, i.e., those designated as corporate officers, both the sensitivity of pay to quot;globalquot; performance measures and the relative importance of quot;globalquot; to quot;localquot; measures are larger, relative to non-officers. There is no difference in sensitivity of pay to quot;localquot; measures by officer status. These results support theories suggesting that authority over project selection combined with incentives designed to maximize firm performance, as well as induce effort for the division, are important in incentive design for division managers. Consistent with earlier findings, the evidence strongly supports one of the main predictions of the principal-agent model, that is, a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives.
Download or read book Performance Incentives Within Firms written by Raj Aggarwal and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Empirical research on executive compensation has focused almost exclusively on the incentives provided to chief executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution of incentives and responsibilities for other members of the top management team. An extension of the standard principal-agent model to allow for multiple signals of effort predicts that executives who have other, more precise signals of their effort than firm performance will have compensation that is less sensitive to the overall performance of the firm. We test this prediction in a comprehensive panel dataset of executives at large corporations by comparing executives with explicit divisional responsibilities to those with broad oversight authority over the firm and to CEOs. Controlling for executive fixed effects and the level of compensation, we find that CEOs have pay-performance incentives that are $5.85 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than the pay-performance incentives of executives with divisional responsibility. Executives with oversight authority have pay-performance incentives that are $1.26 per thousand higher than those of executives with divisional responsibility. The aggregate pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is quite substantial, at $30.24 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth for the median firm in our sample. Our work sheds light on the alignment of responsibility and incentives within firms and suggests that the principal-agent model provides an appropriate characterization of the internal organization of the firm.
Download or read book Incentives and Performance written by Isabell M. Welpe and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-11-07 with total page 493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contributes to the current discussion in society, politics and higher education on innovation capacity and the financial and non-financial incentives for researchers. The expert contributions in the book deal with implementation of incentive systems at higher education institutions in order to foster innovation. On the other hand, the book also discusses the extent to which governance structures from economy can be transferred to universities and how scientific performance can be measured and evaluated. This book is essential for decision-makers in knowledge-intensive organizations and higher-educational institutions dealing with the topic of performance management.
Download or read book Risky Rewards written by Andrew Hopkins and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2019-07-23 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Financial incentives have long been used to try to influence professional values and practices. Recent events including the global financial crisis and the BP Texas City refinery disaster have been linked to such incentives, with commentators calling for a critical look at these systems given the catastrophic outcomes. Risky Rewards engages with this debate, particularly in the context of the present and potential role of incentives to manage major accident risk in hazardous industries. It examines the extent to which people respond to financial incentives, the potential for perverse consequences, and approaches that most appropriately focus attention on major hazard risk. The book is based in part on an empirical study of bonus arrangements in eleven companies operating in hazardous industries, including oil, gas, chemical and mining.
Download or read book Managerial Performance Incentives and Firm Risk During Economic Expansions and Recessions written by Elif Şişli-Ciamarra and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book On the Valuation and Incentive Effects of Executive Cash Bonus Contracts written by Lionel Martellini and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, i.e., before uncertainties are resolved, cash bonuses are valued ex-post, i.e., by discounting the realized cash grants. Such a lack of consistency can, potentially, distort empirical results. A related, yet mostly overlooked, problem is that when ex-post valuation is used pay-performance measures cannot be well defined. Consistent use of ex-ante valuation for all components of a compensation package would simultaneously resolve both of these problems and provide a natural framework for the analysis of agency problems.In this paper, we perform ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts as if the executive's performance were measured by the company stock price, demonstrate how the shape of the bonus contract influences the executive's attitude toward risk, and study the pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We commence by demonstrating that a typical executive bonus contract with a linear incentive zone has a payoff structure equivalent to a portfolio of standard and binary European call options so that the ex-ante contract value is given by the linear combination of Black and Scholes call and binary call prices, with the strike prices at the boundary points of the incentive zone. Assuming that a risk neutral executive can choose the level of stock price volatility by selecting a set of projects at origination, we show that bonus contract terms can dramatically affect the executive's risk taking behavior and pay-performance incentives. Our results are extended to bonus contracts with non-linear incentive zones, and performance share contracts with vesting risk. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.
Download or read book The New Standards written by Richard N Ericson and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2010-05-20 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Make the most of the new standards Every year companies spend millions of dollars on executive incentives. All too often, however, these programs provide a very weak link between pay and performance, with executives potentially rewarded as much for bad decisions as they are for good ones. Packed with examples, The New Standards insightfully discusses: How to link pay with business results that create long-term value Why incentive structures can discourage management from reasonable risk-taking, in some cases, and can enocourage imprudent risks in others The full range of inputs that should guide proper incentive policy Why performance measures must reflect both the quality and quantity of earnings Risk, executive behavior, and the cost of capital How to use valuation criteria when choosing metrics The pros and cons of common approaches to stock-based incentive pay Written by noted compensation expert Richard Ericson, this innovative book is a must-read for directors and management concerned with executive compensation design or financial performance measurement and forecasting. Get the guidance and concrete solutions you need to thoroughly reexamine your executive compensation policies and practices with the principles and financial maxims found in The New Standards.
Download or read book Pay for Results written by Mercer, LLC and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2009-03-17 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The numerous incentive approaches and combinations and their implications can be dizzying even to the compensation professional. Pay for Results provides a road map for developing and implementing executive incentives that drive business needs and strategy. It is filled with specific analytic tools, including tables, exhibits, forms, checklists. In addition, it uncovers myths in performance measurement strategy and design. Timely and thorough, this book expertly shows businesses how to drive their specific needs and strategy. Human resources and compensation officers will discover how to apply performance metrics that align with shareholder investment.
Download or read book Performance Incentives Performance Pressure and Executive Turnover written by Narayanan Subramanian and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the relationship between the optimal incentive contract and the firm's decision to fire a manager for poor performance. We first derive some theoretical results using a simple principal-agent model, and then examine the empirical evidence on the incidence of forced turnover among CEOs with different compensation contracts. We find that CEOs with steeper compensation contracts (i.e., with greater incentives) are more likely to be fired following poor firm performance. Logit estimations indicate that among poorly performing firms, a CEO receiving incentives at the 60th percentile level are roughly 10% more likely to be fired than a CEO with incentives at the 40th percentile. The results are robust to various performance and incentive measures. We also find that the performance pressure was greater in the latter half (1997-99) of the sample than in the first (1993-96). Increased firing pressure might have been one of the factors contributing to the accounting shenanigans of the late 1990's.
Download or read book Executive Compensation Incentives and Risk written by Dirk Jenter and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes the link between equity-based compensation and created incentives by (1) deriving a measure of incentives suitable for both linear and non-linear compensation contracts, (2) analyzing the effect of risk on incentives, and (3) clarifying the role of the agent's private trading decisions in incentive creation. With option-based compensation contracts, the average pay-forperformance sensitivity is not an adequate measure of ex-ante incentives. Pay-for-performance covaries negatively with marginal utility and hence overstates the created incentives. Second, more noise in the performance measure implies that the manager is less certain about the effect of effort on performance, which in turn makes her less willing to exert effort. Finally, the private trading decisions by the manager have first-order effects on incentives. By reducing her holdings of the market asset, the manager achieves an effect similar to "indexing" the stock or option grant, making explicit indexation of the contract redundant. Keywords: executive compensation, equity-based compensation, created incentives.
Download or read book An Empirical Analysis of Risk Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority written by Jed DeVaro and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Too Much Is Not Enough written by Robert W. Kolb and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2012-08-02 with total page 428 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or the attempted setting of incentives) and the behavior that is actually adduced. From this literature, there are several reasons for believing that one can set incentives in executive compensation with a high rate of success in guiding CEO behavior, and one might expect CEO compensation to be a textbook example of the successful use of incentives. Also, as executive compensation has been studied intensively in the academic literature, we might also expect the success of incentive compensation to be well-documented. Historically, however, this has been very far from the case. In Too Much Is Not Enough, Robert W. Kolb studies the performance of incentives in executive compensation across many dimensions of CEO performance. The book begins with an overview of incentives and unintended consequences. Then it focuses on the theory of incentives as applied to compensation generally, and as applied to executive compensation particularly. Subsequent chapters explore different facets of executive compensation and assess the evidence on how well incentive compensation performs in each arena. The book concludes with a final chapter that provides an overall assessment of the value of incentives in guiding executive behavior. In it, Kolb argues that incentive compensation for executives is so problematic and so prone to error that the social value of giving huge incentive compensation packages is likely to be negative on balance. In focusing on incentives, the book provides a much sought-after resource, for while there are a number of books on executive compensation, none focuses specifically on incentives. Given the recent fervor over executive compensation, this unique but logical perspective will garner much interest. And while the literature being considered and evaluated is technical, the book is written in a non-mathematical way accessible to any college-educated reader.
Download or read book The Unintended Costs of Performance Incentives written by Julia D. Hur and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Incentives for Public Sector Workers written by Lori L. Taylor and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2011 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Performance Incentives with Award Constraints written by Pascal Courty and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Complex Systems Multi Sided Incentives and Risk Perception in Companies written by Michael I.C. Nwogugu and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-09-06 with total page 864 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most research about financial stability and sustainable growth focuses on the financial sector and macroeconomics and neglects the real sector, microeconomics and psychology issues. Real-sector and financial-sectors linkages are increasing and are a foundation of economic/social/environmental/urban sustainability, given financial crises, noise, internet, “transition economics”, disintermediation, demographics and inequality around the world. Within complex systems theory framework, this book analyses some multi-sided mechanisms and risk-perception that can have symbiotic relationships with financial stability, systemic risk and/or sustainable growth. Within the context of Regret Minimization, MN-Transferable Utility and WTAL, new theories-of-the-firm are developed that consider sustainable growth, price stability, globalization, financial stability and birth-to-death evolutions of firms. This book introduces new behaviour theories pertaining to real estate and intangibles, which can affect the evolutions of risk-taking and risk perception within organizations and investment entities. The chapters address elements of the dilemma of often divergent risk perceptions of, and risk-taking by corporate executives, regulators and investment managers.
Download or read book Managerial Incentives Risk Management and Accounting Policy written by Sonku Kim and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
