Download or read book Auctions Vs Negotiations in Vertically Related Markets written by Emanuele Bacchiega and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential input. Auctioning off a two-part tariff contract is optimal for the supplier when its bar- gaining power is low and the final goods are not too differentiated. Otherwise, the supplier enters into exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations with the downstream firm(s). Finally, in contrast to previous findings, an auction is never welfare superior to negotiations.
Download or read book Auctions Vs Negotiations written by Jeremy Bulow and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the ability to withdraw the object from sale, provided that it attracts at least one extra bidder. An immediate public auction also dominates negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequently with more bidders. The results hold for both the standard independent private values model and a common values model. They suggest that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition.
Download or read book Negotiation Auctions and Market Engineering written by Henner Gimpel and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-02-05 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book A comparison of auctions and multilateral negotiations written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book On Auctions as the Negotiation Paradigm of Electronic Markets written by International Business Machines Corporation. Research Division. (IBMRD) and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: "In earlier days markets relied completely on negotiation protocols because prices were variable and goods uniquely produced or tailored to the needs of the customer. Fixed prices and uniform goods are a relatively recent development, which has grown even stronger with the rise of electronic commerce. But to fix a price imposes a risk to the seller -- the price might not reflect the current market balance of supply and demand. Electronic auctions eliminate this risk with an easy way of price discovery by soliciting a wide range of bids from multiple parties. In this paper reasons for the recent success of the auction paradigm in electronic markets are identified. But we will also illustrate one fundamental limitation: the price-based bidding of today's auctions supports only distributive negotiations and does not provide a model for integrative negotiations where differences in the valuations of consumers and providers are exploited in order to achieve joint gains. Several solutions have been suggested to address this issue. We review critically these approaches and outline directions for future research."
Download or read book The Double Auction Market written by Daniel Friedman and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2018-05-04 with total page 456 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.
Download or read book Dynamic Alliance Auctions written by Tobias Ihde and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 145 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An introduction to the new auction format known as ‘Dynamic Alliance Auctions’ which has been developed for Internet-based transportation marketplaces. The format allows for a packagewise placement of transportation orders even if these orders stem from different shippers. This, in turn, increases utilization of truck capacity and reduces risk for carriers. It also results in bringing down transportation prices without shrinking margins. After examining the landscape of Internet-based transportation marketplaces, the book identifies vital characteristics and needs of transportation business. The book shows how Dynamic Alliance Auctions combine ideas of matching theory, auctions and bargaining to fit these needs. Finally, the performance of this auction format is investigated analytically and experimentally using a modified private-value framework and different informational settings.
Download or read book Auctions Vs Negotiations The Case of Favoritism written by Vitali Gretschko and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions Versus Private Negotiations in Buyer Seller Networks written by Alison C. Watts and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks. However, it may be that some sellers are better off not participating in the auction. We consider what happens if sellers can make a take it or leave it offer to one of their linked buyers before the auction takes place and thus such a seller can choose not to participate in the auction. We give conditions on the graph and buyers valuations under which the buyer and seller will both agree to such a take it or leave it offer. Specifically, the buyer-seller pair will choose private negotiation over the auction if the seller acts as a network bridge with power over the buyer and if there are enough buyers with low valuations so that the seller does not expect to receive a high price in the auction.
Download or read book Double Marginalization Market Foreclosure and Vertical Integration written by Philippe Choné and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Double marginalization is a robust phenomenon in procurement under asymmetric information when sophisticated contracts can be implemented. In this context, vertical integration causes merger-specific elimination of double marginalization but biases the make-or-buy decision against independent suppliers. If the buyer has full bargaining power over prices and quantities, a vertical merger benefits final consumers even when it results in the exclusion of efficient suppliers. If on the contrary the buyer's bargaining power is reduced after she has committed to deal exclusively with a limited set of suppliers, exclusion of efficient suppliers may harm final consumers.
Download or read book Auctions Vs Negotiations written by Fabian Herweg and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Equilibrium in Auction and Bargaining Markets when Agents Can Wait and Search written by Klaus Kultti and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auction Vs Negotiations written by Fabian Herweg and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions Vs Negotiations written by Mengxi Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the design of the revenue maximizing selling mechanism in a scenario where bidders can make costly investments upfront to enhance their valuations. Unlike the case where bidders' values are exogenously fixed, here it may be profitable for the seller to discriminate among ex ante symmetric bidders. I first identify a sufficient and almost necessary condition under which symmetric auctions are optimal. When this condition fails, the optimal selling mechanism may be discriminatory. I further find that the optimal mechanism in general follows a structure which I call a threshold mechanism. Two extreme examples of the threshold mechanism are symmetric auctions and sequential negotiations. In general, any threshold mechanism can be implemented by a dynamic selling scheme which alternately utilizes auctions and negotiations.
Download or read book Technology Market Transactions written by Frank Tietze and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 397 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 'This study of technology auctions is long overdue. The book provides a better understanding of intermediaries, and their role and impact in markets for technology. Both scholars and managers will find it insightful.' Alfonso Gambardella, Bocconi University, Italy 'From this book, managers, academics and innovation policy makers will all benefit from new insights into the complex relationships between external technology exploitation strategies, patents, technology trade and open innovation processes. The convincing evidence drawn from a dataset of technology auctions helps firms to understand which of their patents are suitable for auction, and also provides guidance to intermediaries to help improve the auction models. The data presented in this book contributes to further price transparency on technology markets and hence to their further development.' Hugo Tschirky, ETH Zurich, Switzerland Within the open innovation paradigm, firms need to operate efficiently in markets for technology. This book presents original research on technology transactions, market intermediaries and, specifically, the role of auctions as a novel transaction model for patented technologies. Frank Tietze delivers an in-depth discussion of the impact of empirical results upon transaction cost theory, and in so doing, provides the means for better understanding technology transaction processes in general, and auctions in particular. Substantiating transaction cost theory with empirical auction data, the author goes on to explore how governance structures need to be designed for effective distributed innovation processes. He concludes that the auction mechanism is a viable transaction model, and illustrates that the auction design, as currently operated by market intermediaries, requires thorough adjustments. Various options for possible improvements are subsequently prescribed. The theoretical facets of this book will strongly appeal to business economists, whilst its practical implications will provide an illuminating read for both academics and practitioners in the fields of innovation and intellectual property. Revealing empirically substantiated technology prices, this book will also prove to be of great interest to policy makers for further developing the markets for technology.
Download or read book Information Competition and Auction Versus Negotiated Merger written by Ngoc Giang Hoang and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Intuition suggests that an auction maximizes revenue for the seller; yet empirically, many companies sell their businesses in a negotiation with one buyer. I argue that, when potential buyers are market competitors, an auction may generate lower revenue for the seller. First, in an auction, private information of the seller is disclosed to all bidders during the due diligence process. This is detrimental to the winner in the competition post-merger, leading to a lower bid ex-ante. Second, in an auction, resources are allocated efficiently. In my model, this means that the seller's cost-saving technology is always allocated to the least efficient buyer before the merger. This improves overall market efficiency and intensifies competition post-merger, leading to a lower expected profit for the winner, hence a lower bid ex-ante. This paper rationalizes the popularity of exclusive negotiation and has policy implications for the regulation of M&A activities.
