Download or read book Auctions of Homogeneous Goods written by Marek Pycia and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The pay-as-bid (or discriminatory) auction is a prominent format for selling homogenous goods such as treasury securities and commodities. We prove the uniqueness of its pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and establish a tractable representation of equilibrium bids. Building on these results we analyze the optimal design of pay-as-bid auctions, as well as uniform-price auctions (the main alternative auction format), allowing for asymmetric information. We show that supply transparency and full disclosure are optimal in pay-as-bid, though not necessarily in uniform-price; pay-as-bid is revenue dominant and might be welfare dominant; and, under assumptions commonly imposed in empirical work, the two formats are revenue and welfare equivalent.
Download or read book Threshold Auctions of Multiple Homogeneous Goods written by Ryan Keith French and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns written by Elena Katok and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most business-to-business (B2B) auctions are used to transact large quantities of homogeneous goods, and therefore use multiunit mechanisms. In the B2B context, bidders often have increasing returns to scale, or synergies. We compare two commonly used auction formats for selling multiple homogeneous objects, both sometimes called Dutch auctions, in a set of value environments that include synergies and potentially subject bidders to the exposure and free-riding problems. We find that the descending-price auction, best known for its use in the Dutch flower auctions, is robust and performs well in a variety of environments, although there are some situations in which the ascending uniform-price auction similar to the one used by eBay better avoids the free-riding problem. We discuss the factors that influence each mechanism's performance in terms of the overall efficiency, the informational requirements, the seller's revenue, and the buyer's profit.
Download or read book Auctioning Homogeneous Goods of Variable Supply written by Amy Lyn Buchmann and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Understanding Auctions written by Asunción Mochón and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-09-15 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Position Auctions for Homogeneous Goods with Pricing and Consumer Search written by Sean Alexander Myers and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 94 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Reputation Information Signals and Willingness to Pay for Heterogeneous Goods in Online Auctions written by Mikhail Ion Melnik and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In online commerce, a buyer cannot directly examine the product and has to rely heavily on the reliability of the seller. In this setting, the reputation of the seller, together with any other information signals on the quality of the product, can play an important role in determining the buyer's willingness to pay for the good. However, while the impact of reputation on willingness to pay for homogeneous goods has been examined, its impact on heterogeneous goods is largely unknown. This paper examines the effects of the seller's reputation and information signals in online auctions, using U.S. silver Morgan dollar coins in almost uncirculated condition that are sold on eBay. The empirical results indicate that a seller's overall reputation has a positive and statistically significant impact on a buyer's willingness to pay in online auctions, an impact that is larger than for homogeneous goods. The results also indicate that negative comments about a seller have larger, and negative, impact on price.
Download or read book Price variation in Internet auction markets for homogenous goods written by R. Aleksandar Kirov and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Towards Auctioning written by Stefan Weishaar and published by Kluwer Law International B.V.. This book was released on 2009-01-01 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Emissions trading systems have come to the fore as the most economically efficient mechanisms that can be employed to bring about an optimal greenhouse gas reduction goal. Even though much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of these systems, one element of crucial importance and emission allowance allocation and has not been considered in adequate depth until the present study. Such an analysis takes on increased importance as it seems likely that market-based auctioning will become the default allocation method throughout the EU under a proposed amendment to the Emissions Trading System (ETS) established by Directive 2003/87/EC. Taking a law and economics approach and that is, using a combined perspective of industrial economics and legal analysis and this important book examines the potential for anticompetitive distortion that may result from auctioning emission allowances. Among the issues investigated in depth are the following: whether the current setup of the EU ETS fosters allocative efficiency or whether this allocative efficiency is hindered by legal impediments or constraints; whether EU competition law can serve to remedy anticompetitive effects stemming from Member State actions taken pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC; which allocation formats are most desirable from an allocative efficiency and environmental effectiveness point of view; the importance of initial allocation and adjustment of out-of-equilibrium situations under the amended ETS; whether auctioning allowances serves the attainment of market equilibrium even in the continuing presence of andpolluter havensand; the effect of the ECJands so-called andjoint application jurisprudenceand on the ETS; and the allocation of allowances from a state aid perspective. The book provides both a coherent typology of emission allowance allocation mechanisms and the main characteristics of the present emissions trading system, setting the gained insights into a broader perspective. It examines how various assignment mechanisms deal with issues such as price determination, allocative efficiency and environmental effectiveness. It considers how market-based allocation mechanisms compare with administrative allocation mechanisms, particularly those based on the widely applied grandfathering method. And perhaps most important and and of especial value to practitioners and policymakers and it identifies the auction design challenges that must be addressed by the Commission in its implementing regulation due by 30 June 2010.
Download or read book Electricity Markets written by Jeremy Lin and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2017-08-30 with total page 349 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive resource that provides the basic concepts of electric power systems, microeconomics, and optimization techniques Electricity Markets: Theories and Applications offers students and practitioners a clear understanding of the fundamental concepts of the economic theories, particularly microeconomic theories, as well as information on some advanced optimization methods of electricity markets. The authors—noted experts in the field—cover the basic drivers for the transformation of the electricity industry in both the United States and around the world and discuss the fundamentals of power system operation, electricity market design and structures, and electricity market operations. The text also explores advanced topics of power system operations and electricity market design and structure including zonal versus nodal pricing, market performance and market power issues, transmission pricing, and the emerging problems electricity markets face in smart grid and micro-grid environments. The authors also examine system planning under the context of electricity market regime. They explain the new ways to solve problems with the tremendous amount of economic data related to power systems that is now available. This important resource: Introduces fundamental economic concepts necessary to understand the operations and functions of electricity markets Presents basic characteristics of power systems and physical laws governing operation Includes mathematical optimization methods related to electricity markets and their applications to practical market clearing issues Electricity Markets: Theories and Applications is an authoritative text that explores the basic concepts of the economic theories and key information on advanced optimization methods of electricity markets.
Download or read book In Defense of Pay as bid Auctions written by Kyle Leland Woodward and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Pay-as-bid auctions are commonly used to sell treasury securities, purchase government debt, distribute electrical generation, and allocate emissions credits. In spite of the practical relevance of the format, the pay-as-bid auction is a fundamentally misunderstood object. As compared to other popular auction formats used in the sale of homogeneous goods, the pay-as-bid auction is often incorrectly assumed to have comparatively bad incentive properties and to induce suboptimal outcomes. In this dissertation I model the pay-as-bid auction as a set of strategic bidders competing for units of a perfectly-divisible commodity. This model allows surprisingly tractable representations of bidder behavior, which provide novel evidence uniformly in favor of the pay-as-bid auction format. Chapters 2 and 3 consider the theoretical implications of this model for existing empirical work. I demonstrate that when bidders have private information, equilibrium behavior is well-defined and there is an equilibrium in pure strategies. I additionally show that, through a process I call strategic ironing, bidders face strong incentives to submit bids substantially below their true values. The nature of these incentives implies that previous intuition---the pay-as-bid auction is strategically similar to a single-unit first-price auction---is ill-founded. Although strategic ironing is shown to dramatically reduce equilibrium bids below an intuitive benchmark, the current misunderstanding of the properties of the auction format may perversely imply that the pay-as-bid format generates comparatively higher revenues than has been inferred. Chapters 4 and 5 engage in a direct comparative investigation of the pay-as-bid format when bidders have no private information. I obtain results on the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in this setting, and show that optimally-parameterized auction formats are revenue equivalent. When the auctions are nonoptimally parameterized, I demonstrate that the pay-as-bid auction revenue-dominates alternate formats. I show computationally that this dominance continues to hold within a broader class of randomized mechanisms. The computational results suggest large-market revenue equivalence within this class. The findings in this dissertation emphatically support the implementation of the pay-as-bid mechanism. It is well-behaved, potentially tractable, and smoothly revenue-dominant when compared to alternate auction formats.
Download or read book Auctions written by Paul Klemperer and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2018-06-05 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
Download or read book Auctions written by Timothy P. Hubbard and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2016-01-06 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How auctions work, in theory and practice, with clear explanations and real-world examples that range from government procurement to eBay. Although it is among the oldest of market institutions, the auction is ubiquitous in today's economy, used for everything from government procurement to selling advertising on the Internet to course assignment at MIT's Sloan School. And yet beyond the small number of economists who specialize in the subject, few people understand how auctions really work. This concise, accessible, and engaging book explains both the theory and the practice of auctions. It describes the main auction formats and pricing rules, develops a simple model to explain bidder behavior, and provides a range of real-world examples. The authors explain what constitutes an auction and how auctions can be modeled as games of asymmetric information—that is, games in which some players know something that other players do not. They characterize behavior in these strategic situations and maintain a focus on the real world by illustrating their discussions with examples that include not just auctions held by eBay and Sotheby's, but those used by Google, the U.S. Treasury, TaskRabbit, and charities. Readers will begin to understand how economists model auctions and how the rules of the auction shape bidder incentives. They will appreciate the role auctions play in our modern economy and understand why these selling mechanisms are so resilient.
Download or read book The Future of EMarkets written by Martin Bichler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2001 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Dynamic pricing and on-line auctions are emerging as the preferred models for e-business. Forrester Research predicts that business-to-business Internet auctions will grow to $52.6 billion by 2002, while dynamically priced business-to-business transactions will rise to $88 billion, representing 27% of the value of all business-to-business e-commerce transactions. This multi-disciplinary book presents a framework of negotiation protocols for electronic markets. It is the first book to combine economics with computer science and the first to describe multidimensional auction mechanisms - i.e. automated negotiations on multiple attributes and/or multiple units of a product. In addition it summarises the introductory economics needed to understand electronic markets, and surveys the literature on negotiation and auction theory. Case studies include the trading of financial derivatives. For use in the design, implementation and upgrade of electronic markets, for researchers in: economics, information systems and operations management, computer science and all students of the e-commerce phenomenon.
Download or read book Approximate Vickrey Auctions written by Eliot Levmore and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a socially efficient or "competitive" equilibrium in a market for homogenous goods, firms produce until their marginal cost of production is equal to the prevailing market price; identically, firms on the demand side consume until their marginal utility, or profit, is equal to that price. In imperfectly competitive markets for homogenous goods, firms may attempt to sell (buy) less than their socially efficient quantity in order to increase (decrease) the price of both marginal and infra-marginal units and increase their total profits. This strategic behavior, or distortion, leads to deadweight loss. The extent to which firms are able to distort the market depends both on the elasticity of demand and on the elasticity of supply from other firms. In a series of pioneering papers, William Vickrey sought to overcome this inefficiency by severing the connection between each firm's bids and the price it faces for infra-marginal units. These Vickrey mechanisms have theoretically attractive properties but have been widely criticized as impractical and are, in fact, rare or nonexistent in real-world auctions, although many ascending auctions resemble the simplest of these mechanisms. This paper shows that the usual framework of uniform price, multi-unit homogenous goods auctions is a first-order approximation of the two-sided auction described in Vickrey (1961). The paper examines some properties of a second-order approximation involving quadratic payments.
Download or read book Auctioning Public Assets written by Maarten Christiaan Wilhelmus Janssen and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 340 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public utility sectors such as gas, water and electricity, in transport sectors (such as rail and metro) and in radio and telephony. This book provides an overview of the economic issues that are involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets. Combining a theoretical framework with a set of case studies of recent sales of state-owned assets from Europe and the USA, it asks which sort of allocation mechanism can a government adopt? Which is most suited to a particular sale? And how will the choice of allocation mechanism affect future market outcomes? With contributions from international experts, this book offers an accessible introduction to auction theory and an invaluable, non-technical analysis of existing knowledge. It will be of interest to students, non-specialists and policy-makers alike.
