Download or read book Auctions in the Electricity Market written by Stefan Schöne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2009-01-06 with total page 230 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.

Download or read book Electricity Auctions written by Luiz Maurer and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2011-07-25 with total page 181 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Electricity-contract auctions have been getting increased attention as they have emerged as a successful mechanism to procure new generation capacity and. This book presents a comprehensive overview of international experiences in auction design and implementation.

Download or read book Auctions in the Electricity Market written by Stefan Schöne and published by Springer. This book was released on 2008-12-19 with total page 218 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.

Download or read book Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation written by Gerald B. Sheblé and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: `Electric energy must be treated as a commodity which can be bought, sold, and traded, taking into account its time- and space-varying values and costs.` Spot Pricing of Electricity, Schweppe et al, 1988. Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation outlines the application of auction methods for all aspects of power system operation, primarily for a competitive environment. A complete description of the industry structure as well as the various markets now being formed is given. A thorough introduction to auction basics is included to explain how auctions have grown in other industries. Auction methods are compared to classical techniques for power system analysis, operations, and planning. The traditional applications of economic dispatch, optimal power flow and unit commitment are compared to auction mechanisms. Algorithms for auctions using linearized power flow equations, DC power flow equations, and AC power flow equations are included. The bundling of supportive services, known as ancillary services within the United States, is discussed. Extensions to the basic auction algorithms for inclusion of supportive services as well as algorithms for scheduling and bidding on generation for GENCOs or independent power producers are presented. Algorithms for scheduling and contracting with customers are also presented for energy service companies. An introduction to the various commodity and financial market products includes the use of futures and options for GENCOs. The material is useful for students performing research on the new business environment based on competition. Regulators will find information on initial methods of designing and evaluating market systems, and power exchange and financial analysts will find information on the interdependence of markets and power system-based techniques for risk management. This information compares the new business environment solutions with old business environment solutions. Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation provides a first introduction to how electricity will be traded as a commodity in the future.

Download or read book Competitive Electricity Markets written by Fereidoon Sioshansi and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2011-10-10 with total page 625 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: After 2 decades, policymakers and regulators agree that electricity market reform, liberalization and privatization remains partly art. Moreover, the international experience suggests that in nearly all cases, initial market reform leads to unintended consequences or introduces new risks, which must be addressed in subsequent “reform of the reforms. Competitive Electricity Markets describes the evolution of the market reform process including a number of challenging issues such as infrastructure investment, resource adequacy, capacity and demand participation, market power, distributed generation, renewable energy and global climate change. Sequel to Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective in the same series published in 2006 Contributions from renowned scholars and practitioners on significant electricity market design and implementation issues Covers timely topics on the evolution of electricity market liberalization worldwide

Download or read book Renewable Energy Auctions Lessons from the Global South written by and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2023-11-16 with total page 513 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Renewable Energy Auctions provides an overview of renewable energy auctions globally, focusing on the Global South, since this is where auctions have been pioneered and provided most transformative results. Renewable energy auctions have become the dominant method for contracting utility-scale renewable energy projects, in large part due to the cost-efficient tariffs secured through this method. The ascent of auctions has been particularly rapid and transformative in the Global South, where many countries have secured renewable energy supplies at record-breaking prices. This book analyses the experiences of frontier auction markets in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and India, with the aim of improving how auctions are designed and implemented globally. The book goes beyond the topic of auction design - which is concerned with the micro-economics of design choices - to include auction implementation. Across ten chapters, the authors argue that choices around the auction implementing institution and the procurement process are overlooked in most publications on the subject, yet this is often a key factor for determining outcomes. Moving beyond the program level of analysis (auction design and implementation), the book includes both country and project level factors' impacts on auction outcomes, ultimately highlighting that successful price and investment outcomes are dependent upon integration of all three levels of auction design and implementation.

Download or read book Essays on Wholesale Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets written by Rimvydas Baltaduonis and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 101 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the last chapter of my dissertation, I use laboratory experiments to contrast the performance of two complex-offer auctions against the performance of a simple-offer auction, in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs - fixed and variable - through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that a simple-offer auction significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the complex-offer auctions and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

Download or read book A Survey on Auctions in Electricity Markets written by Raúl Bajo-Buenestado and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The purpose of the present paper is to explore the existing literature on auctions in the energy markets, and to investigate whether the most recent developments in the auction literature can help us to identify issues related with market power, collusion, efficiency and consumer welfare, all of them with notable policy implications.

Download or read book Renewable Auction Design in Theory and Practice written by Michael Hochberg and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Auction Design for the Colombian Electricity Market written by Ennio Stacchetti and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Capacity Auctions for Electricity written by Emre Yucel and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Faced with uncertainty of future electricity generation supply, many regional electricity markets have adopted or considered adopting capacity markets for electricity. We study the structure of these markets and in particular capacity supply auctions such as the one implemented by PJM Interconnection (PJM), a regional transmission organization. Participants bid generation capacity into the auction, and those that win receive a capacity payment in return for having this capacity available for generation at a future delivery date. The auctions can be classified as multi-unit uniform price auctions, though price is set according to a demand curve rather than by participants' bids. We find closed-form solutions for the optimal bids as a function of cost, study welfare impacts of the auction, and show how the results can be extended numerically for more complex situations. We then use these optimal bid functions in an agent-based simulation of electricity markets, comparing energy-only markets to capacity markets and measuring the impact on both the generators and consumers of electricity. Lastly we use our agent-based simulation model coupled with reinforcement learners to determine whether or not the optimal bid strategy discovered in the beginning can be learned over time by agents participating in the energy and capacity markets

Download or read book Payment Cost Minimization Auction for Deregulated Electricity Markets written by Feng Zhao and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Price Dispersion in Electricity Auctions written by Shanshan Hu and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We model uniform and discriminatory auctions in wholesale electricity markets. High variability of electricity prices is often explained by exogenous economic factors. We, however, show that it can result endogenously from suppliers' strategic bidding, and that the connection between demand and price uncertainties is not direct, but manifested through bidders' assessments of capacity scarcity. Under symmetric and risk-neutral suppliers, the two auction formats yield the same expected procurement cost for buyers, but the discriminatory auction results in substantially lower price variance. When suppliers are risk-averse or have asymmetric capacities, expected procurement costs are also lower in discriminatory auctions.

Download or read book A Comparison of Auction Types Used in Electricity Markets written by Gene Won Park and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comparison of uniform and discriminatory auctions in electricity markets. In a uniform auction, the last accepted bid determines the price that is paid to all accepted bidders; in a discriminatory auction, all accepted bids are paid according to what they bid. Analysis of the two types involves comparing the overall market clearing price and the amount of earnings for each agent. Matpower, a Matlab-based simulator, is used to make the auction comparison.

Download or read book Local Electricity Markets written by Tiago Pinto and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2021-07-03 with total page 474 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Local Electricity Markets introduces the fundamental characteristics, needs, and constraints shaping the design and implementation of local electricity markets. It addresses current proposed local market models and lessons from their limited practical implementation. The work discusses relevant decision and informatics tools considered important in the implementation of local electricity markets. It also includes a review on management and trading platforms, including commercially available tools. Aspects of local electricity market infrastructure are identified and discussed, including physical and software infrastructure. It discusses the current regulatory frameworks available for local electricity market development internationally. The work concludes with a discussion of barriers and opportunities for local electricity markets in the future. Delineates key components shaping the design and implementation of local electricity market structure Provides a coherent view on the enabling infrastructures and technologies that underpin local market expansion Explores the current regulatory environment for local electricity markets drawn from a global panel of contributors Exposes future paths toward widespread implementation of local electricity markets using an empirical review of barriers and opportunities Reviews relevant local electricity market case studies, pilots and demonstrators already deployed and under implementation

Download or read book Comparisons of Auction Mechanisms in a Multiple Unit Setting written by John Charles Bernard and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 524 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Market Power in Italian Electricity Auctions written by Mattias Almqvist and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study analyzes market power in the Italian adjustment market, one of the electricity auctions of the Italian electricity market, between 2005 and 2009. The purpose is to understand whether the four largest electricity producers submitted higher price offers to sell electricity when their levels of market power were higher. The study contributes by shedding light on producer behavior in a type of electricity auction that is rarely studied. It also contributes by incorporating the unusual empirical observation of price-elastic demand in the analysis. I compute hourly measures of ability and incentive to exercise market power for each producer using a theoretical model of bidding in electricity auctions and detailed auction data. Because the data include actual individual supply and demand functions, strong assumptions common in studies of imperfectly competitive markets can be relaxed. I estimate the relationship between producers' ability and incentive to exercise market power and their price offers controlling for daily changes in marginal cost. The results suggest that the producers submitted higher price offers when their levels of market power were higher. However, their levels of market power were mostly low and not all results are robust to changes in econometric specification. It is therefore unlikely that the producers distorted prices substantially in the Italian adjustment market by exercising market power.