Download or read book Seller Pricing Behavior in Auction and Posted price Markets written by Robert Guthrie Hammond and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation written by Jay R. Corrigan and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article, we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions.
Download or read book Posted Price Selling and Online Auctions written by Sajid Anwar and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In an auction-style listing at eBay, sellers have the option to set a posted price (also known as buy-it-now price), which allows buyers to instantly purchase an item before the start of the auction. This paper provides a rationale for such a selling mechanism. When many identical items are offered for sale and there are many buyers, random matching between auctions and the bidders can cause allocative inefficiency. We show that, with the buy-it-now option, some high valuation buyers buy the item before the start of the auction. In the case of a single seller with many items for sale, this not only reduces the allocative inefficiency, but also increases the seller's expected revenue. In the case of many competing sellers, if sellers choose between the strategies of (i) auction only or (ii) auction with buy-it-now option, the option of buy-it-now will be used with positive probability in any equilibrium.
Download or read book Posted Price Offers in Internet Auction Markets written by Stefan Seifert and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2006-09-25 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Applying a Market Engineering approach, this book introduces a model of an auction with a posted price offer, and investigates the characteristics of such mechanisms. It discusses the respective equilibrium strategies of sellers and the bidders, providing useful insight into actual behavior. The theoretic results are compared with strategies of students in a controlled experiment. The experimental observations expose shortcomings of standard economic theories and help to further improve electronic markets.
Download or read book Analyzing the Simultaneous Use of Auctions and Posted Prices for On Line Selling written by Hila Etzion and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many firms in the business to consumer market sell identical products online using auctions and posted prices at the same time. In this paper, we develop and analyze a model of the key tradeoffs sellers face in such a dual-channel setting that is built around the interplay of three design parameters, the posted price, the auction lot size, and the auction duration. Our results show that a monopolist seller can increase his revenues by offering auctions and a fixed price concurrently, and we identify when either a posted price only or a dual channel strategy is optimal for the seller. We model consumer choice of channels, and thus market segmentation, and find that consumers who value the item for more than its posted price use a threshold policy to choose between the two channels. The threshold defines an upper bound on the remaining time of the auction. We explain how optimizing the design parameters enables the seller to effectively segment the market so that the two channels reinforce each other and cannibalization is mitigated. Our findings also demonstrate that there are two dominant auction design strategies in this setting: one-unit auctions that tend to be short and long multi-unit auctions. Which of these two strategies is optimal for the seller depends on the consumer arrival rate and the disutility of delivery delay incurred by high valuation consumers. In either case, the optimal auction design of the dual channel can significantly outperform a single posted price channel. Our results indicate that the seller's surplus from offering auctions is lower when consumers are more sophisticated in estimating their expected discount from participating in the auction.
Download or read book Digital Dealing written by Robert Ernest Hall and published by W W Norton & Company Incorporated. This book was released on 2001 with total page 239 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A distinguished economist tackles the mysteries of the new world of e-commerce, explaining the principles of e-market systems, assessing how the major deal-making methods can determine the success or failure of an enterprise, and how information from various sources will help entrepreneurs make the most out of Internet business opportunities.
Download or read book Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second Price Auctions written by John A. List and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism.
Download or read book Posted Price Clauses in Ascending Auctions written by Y. Stephen Chiu and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Buy Price Options at Online Auctions in the Presence of Competing Posted Price Markets written by Ho-mu Lee and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Various buy-price options occupy a significant portion of transactions in major online auction sites, although their posted-price attribute seems to run counter to the virtue of the auction mechanism. To investigate their influence on the behavior of bidders and sellers, we examine auctions at Yahoo! and eBay in the presence of competing posted-price markets. The analysis of the equilibrium strategies of auction participants reveals some intriguing points including the fact that totally ineffective posted-price markets make buy-price options unnecessary to sellers. Additionally, the durations and the expected revenue of auctions are compared to illuminate sellers' motivation to adopt buy-price options.
Download or read book Common Value Auctions and the Winner s Curse written by John H. Kagel and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-04-11 with total page 424 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Download or read book A Theory of Bidding Dynamics and Deadlines in Online Retail written by Dominic Coey and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We present an equilibrium search model that parsimoniously rationalizes the use of auctions as a sales mechanism for new-in-box goods--a frequent occurrence in online retail markets--and analyze whether the existence of these auctions is welfare enhancing relative to a market consisting only of posted prices. Buyers have a deadline by which the good must be purchased, and sellers choose between auctions and posted-price mechanisms. As the deadline approaches, buyers increase their bids and are more likely to buy through posted-price listings. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion even for new, homogeneous goods. Using data on one million auction and posted-price listings for new-in-box items on eBay.com, we find robust evidence consistent with our model. As predicted, bidders increase their bids from one auction to the next, equilibrium price dispersion exists, and auctions and posted-price listings coexist. Fitting the model to the data, we find that retail auctions increase total welfare by 1.8% of the average retail price if listing fees exactly cover platform costs, but reduce welfare by 2.3% if listing fees are pure profit.
Download or read book Comparison of Auctions and Posted Prices in a Finite Random Matching Model written by Klaus Kultti and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions written by Timothy P. Hubbard and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2016-01-06 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How auctions work, in theory and practice, with clear explanations and real-world examples that range from government procurement to eBay. Although it is among the oldest of market institutions, the auction is ubiquitous in today's economy, used for everything from government procurement to selling advertising on the Internet to course assignment at MIT's Sloan School. And yet beyond the small number of economists who specialize in the subject, few people understand how auctions really work. This concise, accessible, and engaging book explains both the theory and the practice of auctions. It describes the main auction formats and pricing rules, develops a simple model to explain bidder behavior, and provides a range of real-world examples. The authors explain what constitutes an auction and how auctions can be modeled as games of asymmetric information—that is, games in which some players know something that other players do not. They characterize behavior in these strategic situations and maintain a focus on the real world by illustrating their discussions with examples that include not just auctions held by eBay and Sotheby's, but those used by Google, the U.S. Treasury, TaskRabbit, and charities. Readers will begin to understand how economists model auctions and how the rules of the auction shape bidder incentives. They will appreciate the role auctions play in our modern economy and understand why these selling mechanisms are so resilient.
Download or read book Mechanism Choice and the Buy it Now Auction written by Christoph Bauner and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms. Items on eBay, for instance, are frequently offered through auctions, posted prices, and buy-it-now auctions. In this article, I study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers. I specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets, in which I consider both sides of the market: On the demand side, buyers' choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game. On the supply side, sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices. I estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on eBay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets: the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed-price listings, respectively. I find that the addition of auctions to fixed-price markets hurts sellers and risk-averse buyers but benefits risk-neutral buyers. Additionally, the consumer surplus increases when buy-it-now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further. I discuss the intuition for the cause of this result.
Download or read book Reserve Prices in Online Auctions written by Kong-Pin Chen and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The paper proposes a simple model of auctions with an impatient seller who chooses the reserve price and the buy-it-now (BIN) price to maximize revenue. The three main sales channels in the online auction (the pure auction, the BIN auction, and the fixed-price sale) are each shown to be an optimal solution for the sellers with certain degrees of time-preference. The theory also predicts that the optimal posted price for the fixed-price listing is greater than the optimal reserve price for the BIN auction, which in turn is greater than that for the pure auction. This prediction is confirmed by data from eBay's auction of iPods. Using the seller's inventory as a proxy for his degree of time-preference, the data also confirm the theoretical prediction that there is an inverse relationship between the optimal reserve price and the seller's time-discount factor.
Download or read book Auctions and Posted Prices written by Patrick J. G. Van Cayseele and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In many countries, treasury bills are sold using an auction mechanism. In addition, the treasury also offers the bills for sale after the auction, by posting a price equal to the winning bid in de preceeding auction. Only some players (typically market makers) may buy at this price, and only up to a fraction of the volume that is sold in the auction. At all times, these market makers keep the market for treasury bills liquid by quoting bid and ask prices at which they are willing to enter into a trade. We show that particular conditions exist where the treasury benefits from using a combination of auctions and posted prices, at the same time explaining some stylized facts in the empirical literature on treasury bill auctions.
