Download or read book Auctioning Incentive Contracts written by Sander Onderstal and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Auctioning Incentive Contracts an Experimental Study written by Sander Onderstal and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Auctioning Incentive Contracts written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Auctioning Incentive Contracts written by Alexander Marinus Onderstal and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Auctions of Incentive Contracts for Policy Choice written by Francisco Del Villar and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A risk-neutral principal considers hiring one agent to improve a valuable, observable outcome. Who to hire? How to motivate? In this paper, the principal designs an incentive contract that pays according to the realized outcome and sells the contract to an agent through an auction. The paper finds the class of contract-auction pairs that guarantee the principal a non-negative expected payoff. Such pairs, which include linear contracts, are maximin-optimal: they maximize the principal's worst-possible expected payoff. The work is based on two contract-auction-specific assumptions: that the contract induces the contracted agent to weakly improve the outcome, and that the auction satisfies a revenue guarantee. Under these assumptions, the principal pays only for outcome improvements that the contract induces. Therefore, she achieves a non-negative payoff guarantee if her marginal benefit of the outcome exceeds the contract's marginal payment schedule. The principal can design an auction that attains the revenue guarantee if she knows the expected contract payment of the outcome that would occur absent agent activities or if agents know this quantity. The paper extends the analysis to situations where the principal incurs various costs and she or agents have limited commitment power.

Download or read book Auctioning Incentive Contracts written by Fernando M. R. Branco and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts Investment and Bidding Parity written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentive Contracts Adverse Selection and Risk Transfer written by Meng Liu and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Multi-attribute auctions, designed to address multi-dimensional preference, make a good casestudy where incentive provisions interact with competition. By studying "Cost Time" highwayprocurement that aims to incentivize timely project delivery, we show that awarding incentivecontracts by bidding mechanisms can yield sub-optimal outcomes. Our theory demonstratesthat bidders, facing high-powered incentives and production uncertainty, optimally skew theirtime bids while transferring production risk to buying agencies. This gaming behavior leads toadverse selection and efficiency loss, in that a less-efficient bidder can outbid the efficient bidderdue to the misalignment between bidder types and the auction rule that determines winners.We estimate our model using data from the California Department of Transportation and findthat 18% of auctions are allocated to inefficient bidders. Counterfactual analyses suggest thatprocurement schemes with lower incentives can yield less mis-allocation with lower productioncosts and less buyer budget pressure.

Download or read book Incentive Contracts written by United States. General Accounting Office and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Empirical Investigation of Auctions of Incentive Contracts written by Harry J. Paarsch and published by Forest Economics and Policy Analysis Research Unit, University of British Columbia. This book was released on 1991 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts written by Byoung Heon Jun and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Study of Incentive Contracts written by Edward Adolph Schroeder and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 314 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction determined Contracts written by Laurent Lamy and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Quality Incentives in Auctions for Construction Contracts written by Thomas Von Ungern-Sternberg and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Competitive Bidding for Incentive Contracts written by Paul William Marshall and published by . This book was released on 1972 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1993 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Based on their work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach to this field, focusing on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities.

Download or read book Effects of Incentive Contracts in Research and Development written by Edward B. Roberts and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Effects of Incentive Contracts in Research and Development: A Preliminary Research Report In the past several years an effort has originated in the Defense Department (and followed by other government agencies) to discourage the use of cost-p1us=fixed fee (cpff) contracts and substitute contractual incentive arrangements. This effort supposedly relies upon the profit motive to reduce requirements for direct government control and to stim ulate better contractor performance and cost estimating. Incentive type contracts are not new in government contracting. Production contracts have been awarded on a fixed price basis for many years. The fixed price contract provides maximum correlation of contract profits with contract cost, and in theory might offer maximum cost incentive. How ever the use of incentive arrangements on r&d contracts is the novel feature of the dod (and nasa) programs of the past several years. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.