Download or read book Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market written by Peng Lin and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-05-20 with total page 92 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems. Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users’ dynamic demands. Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues.

Download or read book Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication written by Yanjiao Chen and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-02-06 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This brief explores current research on dynamic spectrum auctions, focusing on fundamental auction theory, characteristics of the spectrum market, spectrum auction architecture and possible auction mechanisms. The brief explains how dynamic spectrum auctions, which enable new users to gain spectrum access and existing spectrum owners to obtain financial benefits, can greatly improve spectrum efficiency by resolving the artificial spectrum shortage. It examines why operators and users face significant challenges due to specialty of the spectrum market and the related requirements imposed on the auction mechanism design. Concise and up-to-date, Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication is designed for researchers and professionals in computer science or electrical engineering. Students studying networking will also find this brief a valuable resource.

Download or read book Spectrum Auctions written by Geoffrey Myers and published by LSE Press. This book was released on 2023-02-15 with total page 314 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures. Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.

Download or read book Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design written by Martin Bichler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-10-26 with total page 935 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

Download or read book Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services written by Peter Cramton and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

Download or read book Spectrum Auctions written by Geoffrey Myers and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Right Sizing Spectrum Auction Licenses written by William Lehr and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The wireless sector is a key contributor to economic activity and growth. Over the next several years, wireless service providers are expected to invest $25 to $53 billion upgrading and expanding their networks to deploy 4G mobile broadband across the nation. All told, wireless broadband investment and the services and innovation supported by such investment are expected to add between $259 and $355 billion to US GDP each year through 2017. The Federal Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") is currently designing several spectrum auctions including the largest ever auction of terrestrial wireless spectrum, currently planned for 2015 (the "Incentive Auction"). The purpose of the Incentive Auction is to free up to 120 MHz of prime spectrum in the 600 MHz band, currently licensed to over-the-air TV broadcasting, to be repurposed for licensing for mobile broadband and other higher value wireless services. To accomplish this goal, the FCC proposes to use a two-part auction process in which broadcast television license holders submit bids for relinquishing their licenses ("Reverse Auction"); and commercial broadband providers bid to acquire licenses to the spectrum freed up ("Forward Auction"). The FCC is currently evaluating various auction design elements to promote competition in the auction. To best ensure this important goal, the FCC is considering a number of auction design features, including spectrum aggregation limits, constraints on the types of bidding allowed, and the appropriate framework to use for the license territories to be used in the Forward Auction. This paper focuses solely on this last issue. We explain here how adopting appropriately small-sized geographic territories is necessary to promote competition and other important economic and social goals, while noting that right-sizing the license territories may not by itself be sufficient to ensure adequate competition and participation in the Forward Auction. For example, the Commission could adopt smaller license sizes and still end with an auction where the two largest wireless carriers aggregate all of the offered spectrum. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the goal of promoting competition in wireless services. The territory size used for spectrum licenses is as important for valuing spectrum as the parcel size is to real estate value. If all plots were 50 acres, parcels in Manhattan would be too expensive and too large for most; this might compel buyers interested in a small parcel in Manhattan or a parcel in New Jersey adjacent to Manhattan to bid for land they don't want. Alternatively, otherwise qualified buyers might be prevented from buying land altogether. Analogously, wrong-sizing spectrum license territories to be used in future spectrum auctions, and in particular the Incentive Auction, is likely to result in significant and unnecessary inefficiencies in the allocation of scarce radio frequency spectrum resources. For carriers who are compelled to bid for wrong-sized spectrum license packages, the added cost may be sufficient to discourage their participation; or if they do participate, they are less likely to offer successful bids; or if they are successful, they will have fewer resources available to deploy services using the spectrum. In each case, the efficiency of the auction and the larger goals of the process suffer. This paper explains why sufficiently small geographic areas, such as Cellular Market Areas ("CMAs"), are a more appropriates license territory framework to use to ensure that licenses are right-sized in the Forward Auction. Industry participants and the FCC have successfully used smaller geographic license sizes to auction spectrum in the past, and doing so in the Forward Auction offers important advantages. Using smaller territories is better than using the larger Economic Areas ("EAs") or even intermediate-size Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs") because smaller areas efficiently match the needs of bidders to the spectrum they seek. Their use ensures that the planned auction will reallocate spectrum resources efficiently while promoting competition, economic growth, and universal broadband service. Smaller license areas are better than EAs because smaller areas will help to maximize the amount of spectrum that is repurposed for the Forward Auction. Specifically, smaller areas should increase the ability to allow for market variation in areas where limited amounts of spectrum are procured through the Reverse Auction, while reducing the amount of spectrum lost due to international border coordination with Canada and Mexico or other encumbrances. Smaller geographic license sizes should also maximize opportunities for efficient participation by both large and small wireless service providers, and promote efficient build out of spectrum acquired through the Forward Auction. Looking at past auctions, evidence suggests that auction proceeds would be optimized through the use of smaller areas as opposed to EAs. Moreover, using smaller territories is more consistent with the long-term direction of efficient spectrum management reform and future wireless markets, including access to spectrum through secondary market transactions. Finally, this paper rebuts some of the arguments made to date against the use of smaller geographic license areas. Interested parties, particularly the Competitive Carriers Association ("CCA") and their members, have pressed the FCC to license the Forward Auction licenses using smaller territory sizes. These efforts, which included sponsoring an earlier draft of this paper, resulted in a compromise, intermediate solution. The FCC has moved from recommending that the Forward Auction be licensed using Economic Area territories to a compromise territory size based on Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs"). Nonetheless, the debate over the appropriate territory size for FCC licenses continues. As the future of spectrum management is trending toward more granular management of spectrum resources (in space and time), moving toward smaller area regulatory licenses is consistent with this trend; however, the debate continues. We emphasize that while the geographic area of the license is important, there are many other features that must also be considered holistically in order to design an appropriate spectrum auction or management framework, and as such, are likely to vary by band. The focus of the analysis here, while applicable more generally, is on the design of the upcoming Broadcast Incentive Auctions.

Download or read book Full Committee Hearing on the Impact of the 700 Megahertz Wireless Spectrum Auction on Small Business written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Small Business and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Complementarities and Collusion in an FCC Spectrum Auction written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We empirically study bidding in the C Block of the US mobile phone spectrum auctions. Spectrum auctions are conducted using a simultaneous ascending auction design that allows bidders to assemble packages of licenses with geographic complementarities. While this auction design allows the market to find complementarities, the auction might also result in an inefficient equilibrium. In addition, these auctions have equilibria where implicit collusion is sustained through threats of bidding wars. We estimate a structural model in order to test for the presence of complementarities and implicit collusion. The estimation strategy is valid under a wide variety of alternative assumptions about equilibrium in these auctions and is robust to potentially important forms of unobserved heterogeneity. We make suggestions about the design of future spectrum auctions.

Download or read book Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications written by Gerhard Illing and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2003-12-23 with total page 332 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Leading experts in industrial organization and auction theory examine the recent European telecommunication license auction experience. In 2000 and 2001, several European countries carried out auctions for third generation technologies or universal mobile telephone services (UMTS) communication licenses. These "spectrum auctions" inaugurated yet another era in an industry that has already been transformed by a combination of staggering technological innovation and substantial regulatory change. Because of their spectacular but often puzzling outcomes, these spectrum auctions attracted enormous attention and invited new research on the interplay of auctions, industry dynamics, and regulation. This book collects essays on this topic by leading analysts of telecommunications and the European auction experience, all but one presented at a November 2001 CESifo conference; comments and responses are included as well, to preserve some of the controversy and atmosphere of give-and-take at the conference.The essays show the interconnectedness of two important and productive areas of modern economics, auction theory and industrial organization. Because spectrum auctions are embedded in a dynamic interaction of consumers, firms, legislation, and regulation, a multidimensional approach yields important insights. The first essays discuss strategies of stimulating new competition and the complex interplay of the political process, regulation, and competition. The later essays focus on specific spectrum auctions. Combining the empirical data these auctions provide with recent advances in microeconomic theory, they examine questions of auction design and efficiency and convincingly explain the enormous variation of revenues in different auctions.

Download or read book Determinants of Wireless Spectrum Prices written by Kenneth Tiedemann and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Those planning and implementing spectrum auctions generally have two primary objectives: increasing economic efficiency (or ensuring that spectrum is made available to those who can gain the most value from use of the spectrum) and revenue maximization (or ensuring that governments receive appropriate revenues from sales of the spectrum). There can, of course, sometimes be a trade-off between these two objectives. For example, a portion of the spectrum available for auction might be designated for new entrants to increase competition at the expense of some loss of revenue from incumbents who might be willing to pay more for additional spectrum than new entrants. Spectrum auction design has a significant impact on the extent to which the primary objectives of economic efficiency and revenue maximization are met. In his path-breaking examination of the policies of the Federal Communications Commission, Coase (1959) defined the terms of the debate on spectrum allocation. Coase argued that administrative licensing of spectrum was inefficient and that establishing a market for spectrum in which spectrum owners would be allowed to purchase, sell, lease, subdivide and aggregate spectrum would lead to more efficient spectrum allocation. A number of studies have built on Coase's insights to argue that administrative spectrum allocation and assignment techniques were inefficient, and that spectrum auctions produce superior results. Studies building on Coase's insights include Cramton's (1995, 1997, 2001) comprehensive analyses of FCC spectrum auctions, Chakravorti et al.'s (1995) study on Personal Communications Services spectrum auctions, de Vany's (1998) analysis of the implementation of market-based spectrum policy, Hazlett's (1990, 1998, 2001, 2008) wide-ranging work including studies of property rights and spectrum allocation, Binmore and Klemperer's (2002) analysis of the British 3G telecom auction, Klemper's (2002a) analysis of the European 3G telecom auctions, and McMillan's (1994, 1995) surveys of spectrum auctions. While these studies have produced rich insights into the determinants of spectrum prices, there appears to be relatively little quantitative analysis of the impact of alternative auction mechanisms on spectrum prices. The purpose of this paper is to help fill this gap by building and estimating a model of spectrum prices which focuses on the impact of alternative auction mechanisms. An outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of auction theory, Section 3 summarizes the data and approach, Section 4 provides the results of the regression analysis, and Section 5 states the conclusions.

Download or read book Discovering Prices written by Paul Milgrom and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2017-05-23 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.

Download or read book Auction Design for Secondary Spectrum Markets written by Yuefei Zhu and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Download or read book An Insider s View of FCC Spectrum Auctions written by Gregory L. Rosston and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Empirical Studies of the Market for Broadband Personal Communications Service Spectrum in the US written by Andraz Kavalar and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 98 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent proposals to limit the participation of Verizon Wireless and AT & T in the upcoming broadcast TV spectrum incentive auction have rekindled the debate on the interactions between auction design and competition policy. Existing literature analyzes the efficiency of spectrum auctions by focusing on auction outcomes, noticing that there is little immediate post-auction resale in the secondary market for spectrum. However, the effects of specific pro-competitive auction policies on the market structure can only be fully understood by considering long-run market outcomes. This dissertation provides a historical overview of the market for broadband PCS spectrum and then documents the construction of a unique and first comprehensive dataset of firms' spectrum licenses holdings. I then use this dataset to investigate the long-term effects of auction restrictions similar to the ones recently proposed. I document how eligibility restrictions for entrepreneurs in the early years of the market for broadband PCS spectrum initially create two separate markets, the gradual opening of the restricted market, and its eventual convergence with the unrestricted one. Second, and contrary to the existing literature, the detailed nature of my data shows there was a significant level of market activity immediately following the auctions, a portion of which can be attributed to specific preferential treatment policies used. To investigate the actual transition of restricted spectrum from entrepreneurs to large companies, my identification strategy uses the institutional design of eligibility restrictions, resulting in considerable differences in the observed build-out behavior of entrepreneurs and large companies. While the latter have no incentive to meet the construction requirements ahead of time, doing so allows entrepreneurs to potentially sell their licenses to large companies. Results show a consistent pattern of entrepreneurs building out their licenses early only to immediately sell them to large companies. By first constructing a unique spectrum license dataset and then exploring the effects of preferential treatment provisions used in spectrum auctions for PCS licenses, this dissertation provides evidence that these provisions did not achieve their long-run goal in terms of the desired market structure. Instead, there is strong evidence of opportunistic behavior of entrepreneurs, who get pulled in because of eligibility restrictions and then quickly resell their licenses to large companies. In general, it appears the presence of secondary markets undoes the outcomes generated in auctions (and desired by the policymaker). Because of this, FCC should consider regulating secondary markets in line with their existing regulatory practices rather than imposing auction restrictions, i.e. regulating auctions.

Download or read book Spectrum Auction Design written by Martin Bichler and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the FCC in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance.Recently, a number of countries have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. However, the number of possible packages grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices: simple "compact'' bid languages versus complex "fully expressive'' bid languages and simple "pay-as-bid'' payment rules versus complex "bidder-optimal core-selecting'' payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction's efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction's revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, scores worst on both dimensions.