Download or read book Auction Design for ROI Constrained Buyers written by Negin Golrezaei and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We combine theory and empirics to (i) show that some buyers in online advertising markets are financially constrained and (ii) demonstrate how to design auctions that take into account such financial constraints. We use data from a field experiment where reserve prices were randomized on Google's advertising exchange (AdX). We find that, contrary to the predictions of classical auction theory, a significant set of buyers lowers their bids when reserve prices go up. We show that this behavior can be explained if we assume buyers have constraints on their minimum return on investment (ROI). We proceed to design auctions for ROI-constrained buyers. We show that optimal auctions for symmetric ROI-constrained buyers are either second-price auctions with reduced reserve prices or subsidized second-price auctions. For asymmetric buyers, the optimal auction involves a modification of virtual values. Going back to the data, we show that usingROI-aware optimal auctions can lead to large revenue gains and large welfare gains for buyers.
Download or read book Discovering Prices written by Paul Milgrom and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2017-05-23 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.
Download or read book Web and Internet Economics written by Jugal Garg and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2024-01-31 with total page 728 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume LNCS 14413 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 19th International Conference, WINE 2023, in December 2023 held in Shanghai, China. The 37 full papers presented together with 29 one-page abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 221 submissions. The WINE conference series aims to exchange research ideas in a diverse area of application at the intercept of theoretical computer science , artificial intelligence, operations research, and economics.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Understanding Auctions written by Asunción Mochón and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-09-15 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
Download or read book Auctions with Budget constrained Buyers written by Yeon-Koo Che and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Understanding Auctions written by Srobonti Chattopadhyay and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2019-07-03 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.
Download or read book ECAI 2023 written by K. Gal and published by IOS Press. This book was released on 2023-10-18 with total page 3328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Artificial intelligence, or AI, now affects the day-to-day life of almost everyone on the planet, and continues to be a perennial hot topic in the news. This book presents the proceedings of ECAI 2023, the 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, and of PAIS 2023, the 12th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems, held from 30 September to 4 October 2023 and on 3 October 2023 respectively in Kraków, Poland. Since 1974, ECAI has been the premier venue for presenting AI research in Europe, and this annual conference has become the place for researchers and practitioners of AI to discuss the latest trends and challenges in all subfields of AI, and to demonstrate innovative applications and uses of advanced AI technology. ECAI 2023 received 1896 submissions – a record number – of which 1691 were retained for review, ultimately resulting in an acceptance rate of 23%. The 390 papers included here, cover topics including machine learning, natural language processing, multi agent systems, and vision and knowledge representation and reasoning. PAIS 2023 received 17 submissions, of which 10 were accepted after a rigorous review process. Those 10 papers cover topics ranging from fostering better working environments, behavior modeling and citizen science to large language models and neuro-symbolic applications, and are also included here. Presenting a comprehensive overview of current research and developments in AI, the book will be of interest to all those working in the field.
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2009-09-28 with total page 337 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-26 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Download or read book An Introduction to Auction Theory written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2005 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of auction theory and aims to provide an introductory treatment to allow students to work through all the basic results. The techniques and insights gained provide a useful starting point for those wanting to venture into information economics, mechanism design and regulatory economics.
Download or read book Auction Design for Multi item Procurement written by Debasis Mishra and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Auction Design Under Non commitment written by Vasiliki Skreta and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bidding Strategies in Agent Based Continuous Double Auctions written by Huiye Ma and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-09-15 with total page 142 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a new bidding strategy for agents to adopt in continuous double auctions (CDAs) and proposes some generally used tools to enhance the performance of existing bidding strategies in CDAs. It is the first book to focus on CDAs where a limited amount of seller agents and buyer agents trade what they want. The superior performance of the new bidding strategy and the tools proposed by this book are illustrated through extensive experiments.
Download or read book Sequential Auction Design and Participant Behavior written by Kendra C. Taylor and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis studies the impact of sequential auction design on participant behavior from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint. In the first of the two analyses, three sequential auction designs are characterized and compared based on expected profitability to the participants. The optimal bid strategy is derived as well. One of the designs, the alternating design, is a new auction design and is a blend of the other two. It assumes that the ability to bid in or initiate an auction is given to each side of the market in an alternating fashion to simulate seasonal markets. The conditions for an equilibrium auction design are derived and characteristics of the equilibrium are outlined. The primary result is that the alternating auction is a viable compromise auction design when buyers and suppliers disagree on whether to hold a sequence of forward or reverse auctions. We also found the value of information on future private value for a strategic supplier in a two-period case of the alternating and reverse auction designs. The empirical work studies the cause of low aggregation of timber supply in reverse auctions of an online timber exchange. Unlike previous research results regarding timber auctions, which focus on offline public auctions held by the U.S. Forest Service, we study online private auctions between logging companies and mills. A limited survey of the online auction data revealed that the auctions were successful less than 50% of the time. Regression analysis is used to determine which internal and external factors to the auction affect the aggregation of timber in an effort to determine the reason that so few auctions succeeded. The analysis revealed that the number of bidders, the description of the good and the volume demanded had a significant influence on the amount of timber supplied through the online auction exchange. A plausible explanation for the low aggregation is that the exchange was better suited to check the availability for custom cuts of timber and to transact standard timber.
Download or read book The Insider s Guide to Saving Thousands at Auction written by and published by Brolga Publishing. This book was released on with total page 149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Learning to Bid written by Thomas H. Noe and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed buyers and sellers of a good with a common but uncertain value learn through experience. Buyer strategies, even in the very long run, do not converge to the Bertrand-Nash strategy of bidding the expected value of the good. Moreover, first- and second-price auctions are not revenue equivalent. The outcomes of the auctions are sensitive to both the number of participating bidders and the reservation price. When only a small number of bidders participate, the sellers tend to employ a first-price auction even though it generates a lower average revenue than a second-price auction.
