Download or read book Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss Averse Bidders written by Akitoshi Muramoto and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study optimal auctions with expectation-based loss-averse bidders. We first consider when bidders are ex-ante identical. Although symmetric designs are optimal for bidders with expected-utility preferences, if the degree of loss aversion is sufficiently large relative to the variation in valuations, expected revenues are higher in the optimal design with one buyer than in any symmetric mechanism with multiple bidders. Further, we provide a sufficient condition under which optimal mechanisms are necessarily asymmetric. When bidders are ex-ante heterogeneous, the optimal degree of favoritism must be modified from the level in Myerson (1981) to reduce the uncertainty in auction outcomes. Not only the degree of the required modification but also the direction of the modification may not be monotone in the degree of loss aversion.
Download or read book Costly Auction Entry Royalty Payments and the Optimality of Asymmetric Designs written by Dan Bernhardt and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book English Auctions with Loss Averse Bidders written by Anna Dodonova and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A lot of experimental evidence document that people are loss averse and that the compensation that they require to give up a possession of a good is higher than the amounts they agree to pay to get this possession. This paper analyzes how optimal English auction design changes when we take people's loss aversion into account. It shows that the order in which bidders place their bids does matter and that the first bidder always has an advantage. We analyze how the choice between English and second-price sealed-bid auctions and the optimal reserve price in the English auction depend on the degree of bidders' loss aversion and on seller's valuation of the object. We show that it might be optimal for a seller to set a reserve price below his own valuation of the object. We also show that a seller who wants to maximize his expected revenue should implement the open-bid English auction.
Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-26 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Download or read book Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition written by Xianwen Shi and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information gathering. We develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers, who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation in the auction. We first demonstrate that the optimal monopoly price is always lower than the standard monopoly price. We then show that standard auctions with a reserve price remain optimal among symmetric mechanisms, but the optimal reserve price lies between the ex ante mean valuation of bidders and the standard reserve price in Myerson (1981). Finally, we show that the optimal asymmetric mechanism softens the price discrimination against quot;strongquot; bidders.
Download or read book The First Price Sealed Bid Auction with Asymmetric Bidders written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Information Structures in Optimal Auctions written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Common Value Auction Model Allowing Asymmetrically Informed Bidders Risk Averse Bidders and a Comparison of Sequential Versus Simultaneous Auctions for Multiple Objects written by Donald B. Hausch and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 143 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Auction Design with Risk Aversion and Correlated Information written by Frank H. Page and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Auction Design with Risk Aversion and Correlated Information written by Frank H. Page (Jr.) and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auction Design for ROI Constrained Buyers written by Negin Golrezaei and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We combine theory and empirics to (i) show that some buyers in online advertising markets are financially constrained and (ii) demonstrate how to design auctions that take into account such financial constraints. We use data from a field experiment where reserve prices were randomized on Google's advertising exchange (AdX). We find that, contrary to the predictions of classical auction theory, a significant set of buyers lowers their bids when reserve prices go up. We show that this behavior can be explained if we assume buyers have constraints on their minimum return on investment (ROI). We proceed to design auctions for ROI-constrained buyers. We show that optimal auctions for symmetric ROI-constrained buyers are either second-price auctions with reduced reserve prices or subsidized second-price auctions. For asymmetric buyers, the optimal auction involves a modification of virtual values. Going back to the data, we show that usingROI-aware optimal auctions can lead to large revenue gains and large welfare gains for buyers.
Download or read book An Introduction to Auction Theory written by Flavio M. Menezes and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2005 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of auction theory and aims to provide an introductory treatment to allow students to work through all the basic results. The techniques and insights gained provide a useful starting point for those wanting to venture into information economics, mechanism design and regulatory economics.
Download or read book Auctioning Public Assets written by Maarten Christiaan Wilhelmus Janssen and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 340 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public utility sectors such as gas, water and electricity, in transport sectors (such as rail and metro) and in radio and telephony. This book provides an overview of the economic issues that are involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets. Combining a theoretical framework with a set of case studies of recent sales of state-owned assets from Europe and the USA, it asks which sort of allocation mechanism can a government adopt? Which is most suited to a particular sale? And how will the choice of allocation mechanism affect future market outcomes? With contributions from international experts, this book offers an accessible introduction to auction theory and an invaluable, non-technical analysis of existing knowledge. It will be of interest to students, non-specialists and policy-makers alike.
Download or read book OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN WITH RISK AVERSION AND CORRELATED INFORMATION written by Frank -II- jr PAGE and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Common Value Auction Allowing Asymmetrically Informed Bidders Risk Averse Bidders and a Comparison of Sequential Versus Simultaneous Auctions for Multiple Objects written by Donald Bruce Hausch and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Virtue of Simplicity in Asymmetric Auctions written by Shraman Banerjee and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
