Download or read book Asymmetric First Price Auctions With Uniform Distributions written by Todd R. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While auction research, including asymmetric auctions, has grown significantly in recent years, there is still little analytical solutions of first-price auctions outside the symmetric case. Even in the uniform case, Griesmer et al. (1967) and Plum (1992) find solutions only to the case where the lower bounds of the two distributions are the same. We present the general analytical solutions to asymmetric auctions in the uniform case for two bidders, both with and without a minimum bid. We show that our solution is consistent with the previously known solutions of auctions with uniform distributions. Several interesting examples are presented including a class where the two bid functions are linear. We hope this result improves our understanding of auctions and provides a useful tool for future research in auctions.
Download or read book Linear Bid in Asymmetric First Price Auctions written by Tadanobu Tanno and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the eqilibrium linear bid in asymmetric first-price auctions with two bidders and uniform distributions. Introducing asymmetry in linear symmetric equilibrium increases expected revenue subject to constant expected sum of valuations. If auctions are asymmetric, the revenue in the linear equiibrium is larger than that in second-price auctions. If auctions in simple case are similar enough, the revenue in the first-price auction moves close to the optimal revenue as auctions are asymmetric. If auctions are similar enough, the linear equilibrium more efficiently allocates the item than the optimal mechanism.
Download or read book The First Price Sealed Bid Auction with Asymmetric Bidders written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Sequential Bidding in Asymmetric First Price Auctions written by Gal Cohensius and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study asymmetric first price auctions in which bidders place their bids sequentially, one after the other and only once. We show that with a strong bidder and a weak bidder (in terms of first order stochastic dominance of their valuations distribution function), when the asymmetry between the bidders is large enough the expected revenue in the sequential bidding first price auction (when the strong bidder bids first) is higher than in the simultaneous bidding first price auction as well as in the second price auction. The expected payoff of the weak bidder is also higher in the sequential first price auction. Therefore a seller interested in increasing revenue facing asymmetric bidders may find it beneficial to order them and let them bid sequentially instead of simultaneously. In terms of efficiency, both the simultaneous first price auction and the sequential first price auction cannot guarantee full efficiency (as opposed to a second price auction which guarantees full efficiency). The sequential bidding auction when the stronger bidder bids first achieves lower efficiency than the simultaneous auction. However, when the order is reversed and bidders are asymmetric enough the sequential first price auction achieves higher efficiency than the simultaneous one.
Download or read book First Price Auctions When the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge written by Michael Landsberger and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider an augmented version of the symmetric private value auction model with independent types. The augmentation, intended to illustrate reality, concerns information bidders have about their opponents. To the standard assumption that every bidder knows his type and the distribution of types is common knowledge we add the assumption that the ranking of bidders' valuations is common knowledge. This set-up induces a particular asymmetric auction model that raises serious technical difficulties. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies in the two bidder case. We also show that the model generally has no analytic solution. If the distribution of valuations is uniform, both bidders bid pointwise more aggressively relative to the standard symmetric case. However, this property does not apply to all distributions of valuations. Finally, we also provide a numerical solution of equilibrium bid functions for the uniform distribution case.
Download or read book Asymmetric Auctions with Endogenous Participation written by Robert Marquez and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study endogenous participation in asymmetric second price auctions where one bidder is "special". We show seller revenue decreases whenever the special bidder becomes more dominant in the sense of FOSD, or more generally whenever the other bidders' profits are reduced. We also establish an equivalence result for second price auctions - any arbitrary distribution of the special bidder's value is "competitively equivalent" to one that is a power function of the value distribution of the other bidders. Finally, we analyze first-price auctions numerically and show that our results extend to this alternate mechanism.
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2009-09-28 with total page 337 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Download or read book Monotonicity in Asymmetric First Price Auctions with Affiliation written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in first-price auctions with symmetric bidders, risk-aversion, affiliated types, and interdependent values. I prove that every mixed-strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium under the priority rule for breaking ties. This provides a missing link to establish uniqueness in Milgrom and Weber (1982)'s general symmetric model. Non-monotone equilibria can exist under the coin-flip rule but they are distinguishable: all non-monotone equilibria have positive probability of ties whereas all monotone equilibria have zero probability of ties. This provides a justification for the standard empirical practice of restricting attention to monotone strategies.
Download or read book Pre Auction Offers in Asymmetric First Price and Second Price Auctions written by René Kirkegaard and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider must-sell auctions with asymmetric buyers. First, we study auctions with two asymmetric buyers, where the distribution of valuations of the strong buyer is stretched relative to that of the weak buyer. Then, it is known that inefficient first-price auctions are more profitable for the seller than efficient second-price auctions. This is because the former favor the weak buyer. However, we show that the seller can do one better by augmenting the first-price auction by a pre-auction offer made exclusively to the strong buyer. Should the strong buyer reject the offer, the object is simply sold in an ordinary first-price auction. The result is driven by the fact that the unmodified first-price auction is too favorable to the weak buyer, and that the pre-auction offer allows some correction of this to the benefit of the seller. Secondly, we show quite generally that pre-auction offers never increase the profitability of second-price auctions, since they introduce the wrong kind of favoritism from the perspective of seller profits.
Download or read book First Price Auctions with General Information Structures written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values. We also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms.
Download or read book Nonparametric Identification in Asymmetric Second price Auctions written by Toru Kitagawa and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper proposes an approach to proving nonparametric identification for distributions of bidders' values in asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data pertain to the winner's identity and the transaction price. My proof of identification is constructive and is based on establishing the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system of non-linear differential equations that describes relationships between unknown distribution functions and observable functions. The proof is conducted in two logical steps. First, I prove the existence and uniqueness of a local solution. Then I describe a method that extends this local solution to the whole support. This paper delivers other interesting results. I show how this approach can be applied to obtain identification in more general auction settings, for instance, in auctions with stochastic number of bidders or weaker support conditions. Furthermore, I demonstrate that my results can be extended to generalized competing risks models. Moreover, contrary to results in classical competing risks (Roy model), I show that in this generalized class of models it is possible to obtain implications that can be used to check whether the risks in a model are dependent. Finally, I provide a sieve minimum distance estimator and show that it consistently estimates the underlying valuation distribution of interest.
Download or read book Auctions with Weakly Asymmetric Interdependent Values written by Gadi Fibich and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Handbook of Computational Economics written by Karl Schmedders and published by Newnes. This book was released on 2013-12-31 with total page 680 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of Computational Economics summarizes recent advances in economic thought, revealing some of the potential offered by modern computational methods. With computational power increasing in hardware and algorithms, many economists are closing the gap between economic practice and the frontiers of computational mathematics. In their efforts to accelerate the incorporation of computational power into mainstream research, contributors to this volume update the improvements in algorithms that have sharpened econometric tools, solution methods for dynamic optimization and equilibrium models, and applications to public finance, macroeconomics, and auctions. They also cover the switch to massive parallelism in the creation of more powerful computers, with advances in the development of high-power and high-throughput computing. Much more can be done to expand the value of computational modeling in economics. In conjunction with volume one (1996) and volume two (2006), this volume offers a remarkable picture of the recent development of economics as a science as well as an exciting preview of its future potential. Samples different styles and approaches, reflecting the breadth of computational economics as practiced today Focuses on problems with few well-developed solutions in the literature of other disciplines Emphasizes the potential for increasing the value of computational modeling in economics
Download or read book Game Theory written by Michael Maschler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2020-06-25 with total page 1053 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Pak-Sing Choi and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-24 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
Download or read book Bidding Strategies Financing and Control written by B. Espen Eckbo and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2010-03-12 with total page 1088 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, the 600 pages of volume two, "Bidding Strategies, Financing, and Corporate Control", focus on a range of special topics, ranging from theories and evidence on strategic bidding behavior (offer premiums, toeholds, bidder competition, winner’s curse adjustments, and managerial overconfidence), issues arising when bidding for targets in bankruptcy auctions, effects of deal protection devices (termination agreements, poison pills), role of large shareholder voting in promoting takeover gains, deal financing issues (such as raising the cash used to pay for the target), managerial incentive effects of takeovers, governance spillovers from cross-border mergers, and returns to merger arbitrage. Including an index and new introduction, this volume will simplify and facilitate students’ interaction with new concepts and applications. Provides a status report about modern scientific evidence on corporate takeovers Exposes students to new methods and empirical evidence while reading high quality primary material Offers a concise and cost-efficient package of journal and book articles for advanced corporate finance students
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory written by Petyon Young and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2014-10-01 with total page 1025 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
