Download or read book Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design written by Tim Roughgarden and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The field of optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, as well as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major search engines auction off online advertising. There are, however, some basic problems for which the traditional optimal mechanism design approach is ill suited--either because it makes overly strong assumptions or because it advocates overly complex designs. This article reviews several common issues with optimal mechanisms, including exorbitant communication, computation, and informational requirements; it also presents several examples demonstrating that relaxing the goal to designing an approximately optimal mechanism allows us to reason about fundamental questions that seem out of reach of the traditional theory.
Download or read book Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design Via Differential Privacy written by Kobbi Nissim and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an arbitrary objective function. We design a mechanism that allows for approximate optimal implementation of insensitive objective functions in ex-post Nash equilibrium. If, furthermore, values are private then the same mechanism is strategy proof. We cast our results onto two specific models: pricing and facility location. The mechanism we design is optimal up to an additive factor of the order of magnitude of one over the square root of the number of agents and involves no utility transfers. Underlying our mechanism is a lottery between two auxiliary mechanisms -- with high probability we actuate a mechanism that reduces players influence on the choice of the social alternative, while choosing the optimal outcome with high probability. This is where differential privacy is employed. With the complementary probability we actuate a mechanism that may be typically far from optimal but is incentive compatible. The joint mechanism inherits the desired properties from both.
Download or read book Approximately optimal Mechanisms in Auction Design Search Theory and Matching Markets written by Hedyeh Beyhaghi and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 179 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Algorithmic mechanism design is an interdisciplinary field, concerned with the design of algorithms that are used by strategic agents. This field has applications in many real-world settings, such as auction design, search problems, and matching markets. In this thesis we study the mechanisms in these areas through lenses of simplicity and practicality. We pursue two main directions: study the strength of simple mechanisms, and improve the efficiency of practical mechanisms. In auction design, we consider a setting where a seller wants to sell many items to many buyers, and establish a tight gap between the efficiency of a simple and commonly-used auction with the complicated revenue-optimal auction. In search theory context, we introduce Pandora's problem with alternative inspections and provide the first approximately-optimal mechanism for this problem. In Pandora's problem with alternative inspections, a searcher wants to select one out of n elements whose values are unknown ahead of time. The searcher evaluates the elements one by one and can choose among different costly ways to evaluate each element, the order to evaluate the elements, and how long to continue the search, in order to maximize her utility. In matching markets, we propose theoretical models that closely capture the participant behaviors in the real world, and provide methods to optimize the already implemented mechanisms.
Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Download or read book Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanisms Design written by Hu Fu and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 216 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design studies optimization problems with inputs from selfishly behaving agents. To a class of relatively simple questions, classical auction theory gives optimal solution which are often too complicated for practical use. This dissertation presents techniques and results on the design and analysis of simple and practical auctions that have provably approximately optimal performances. For single-parameter revenue optimization, we present the k-lookahead auction, which works for coorelated valuation distributions, and we discuss its consequences, which encompass a family of reserveprice-based auctions with approximately optimal revenue. For more general settings, we present the marginal revenue mechanisms as a framework for designing simple mechanisms in very general settings. Both frameworks are motivated with clear economic intuitions. For social welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions, we present an equilibrium analysis for simultaneous item auctions. In particular, we show that when valuations exhibit no complements, the welfare loss in these auctions at Bayesian Nash equilibria is bounded by small constants.
Download or read book Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory written by Tim Roughgarden and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-08-30 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-05-01 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-05-01 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Download or read book Mechanism Design written by Rakesh V. Vohra and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2011-05-09 with total page 185 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Mechanism Design for Total Quality Management Using the Bootstrap Algorithm for Changing the Control Game written by Petter Ogland and published by Lulu.com. This book was released on 2017-11-27 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This PhD thesis contributes to the theory of information infrastructures by explaining how to use game theory and genetic algorithms for turning the pseudo-code of the bootstrap algorithm into proper code. The study is the first known study to analyse the bootstrap algorithm from an action research perspective, and it has become an important reference for further research on how to bootstrap information infrastructures.
Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Noam Nisan and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2007-09-24 with total page 928 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.
Download or read book Computing and Combinatorics written by Dachuan Xu and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-06-23 with total page 778 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2015, held in Beijing, China, in August 2015. The 49 revised full papers and 11 shorter papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from various submissions. The papers cover various topics including algorithms and data structures; algorithmic game theory; approximation algorithms and online algorithms; automata, languages, logic and computability; complexity theory; computational learning theory; cryptography, reliability and security; database theory, computational biology and bioinformatics; computational algebra, geometry, number theory, graph drawing and information visualization; graph theory, communication networks, optimization and parallel and distributed computing.
Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Ron Lavi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-09-05 with total page 307 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2014, held in Haifa, Israel, in October 2014. The 24 full papers and 5 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. They cover various important aspects of algorithmic game theory, such as matching theory, game dynamics, games of coordination, networks and social choice, markets and auctions, price of anarchy, computational aspects of games, mechanism design and auctions.
Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Martin Gairing and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-09-01 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2016, held in Liverpool, UK, in September 2016.The 26 full papers presented together with 2 one-page abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 62 submissions. The accepted submissions cover various important aspectsof algorithmic game theory such as computational aspects of games, congestion games and networks, matching and voting, auctions and markets, and mechanism design. /div
Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Dimitris Fotakis and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-09-16 with total page 401 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2019, held in Athens, Greece, in September/October 2019. The 25 full papers presented together with 3 invited talks and one abstract paper were carefully reviewed and selected from 55 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections named: Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Auctions and Markets; Computational Aspects of Games; Network Games and Congestion Games; Social Choice; and Matchings and Fair Division.
Download or read book The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design written by Christos Tzamos and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorly understood. We answer this question by showing that a revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings cannot be found and implemented computationally efficiently, unless ZPP = P^#^p. This is true even for a single additive bidder whose values for the items are independently distributed on two rational numbers with rational probabilities. Our result is very general: we show that it is hard to compute any encoding of an optimal auction of any format (direct or indirect, truthful or non-truthful) that can be implemented in expected polynomial time. In particular, under well-believed complexity-theoretic assumptions, revenue-optimization in very simple multi-item settings can only be tractably approximated. We note that our hardness result applies to randomized mechanisms in a very simple setting, and is not an artifact of introducing combinatorial structure to the problem by allowing correlation among item values, introducing combinatorial valuations, or requiring the mechanism to be deterministic (whose structure is readily combinatorial). Our proof is enabled by a flow interpretation of the solutions of an exponential-size linear program for revenue maximization with an additional supermodularity constraint.
