Download or read book Analyzing Strategic Behaviors in Electricity Markets Via Transmission constrained Residual Demand written by Lin Xu (Ph. D.) and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies how to characterize strategic behaviors in electricity markets from a transmission-constrained residual demand perspective. This dissertation generalizes the residual demand concept, widely used by economists in general markets, to electricity markets, which are constrained by transmission networks. The transmission-constrained residual demand is characterized by a sensitivity analysis of the optimal power flow program, which is the electricity market clearing engine. Methods are proposed to optimize a generator or generation firm's profit utilizing the residual demand sensitivity information, which has several advantages over existing methods. The transmission-constrained residual demand concept and the methods are helpful for market participants to develop bidding strategies and for market monitors to analyze market power in electricity markets.

Download or read book Strategic Behavior Analysis in Electricity Markets written by You Seok Son and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Strategic behaviors in electricity markets are analyzed. Three related topics are investigated. The first topic is a research about the NE search algorithm for complex non-cooperative games in electricity markets with transmission constraints. Hybrid co-evolutionary programming is suggested and simulated for complex examples. The second topic is an analysis about the competing pricing mechanisms of uniform and pay-as-bid pricing in an electricity market. We prove that for a two-player static game the Nash Equilibrium under pay-as-bid pricing will yield less total revenue in expectation than under uniform pricing when demand is inelastic. The third topic is to address a market power mitigation issue of the current Texas electricity market by limiting Transmission Congestion Right (TCR) ownership. The strategic coordination of inter zonal scheduling and balancing market manipulation is analyzed. A market power measurement algorithm useful to determine the proper level of TCR ownership limitation is suggested.

Download or read book Network and Temporal Effects on Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets written by Youfei Liu and published by Open Dissertation Press. This book was released on 2017-01-27 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, "Network and Temporal Effects on Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets" by Youfei, Liu, 劉有飛, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: of thesis entitled "Network And Temporal Effects On Strategic Bidding In Electricity Markets" Submitted by Youfei Liu for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in February 2006 The global deregulation of power industries has given rise to many fascinating research topics. This thesis addresses issues of strategic bidding by power generators. The problem of strategic bidding is to optimize an individual power generation bid by maximizing profits, based on production cost, expectation of rival behavior and system demand. Electrical power flow over different links is governed by the physical law (Kirchhoff law). As a result, electrical power flow cannot be independently determined and the electricity transmission system has global network effects. One major contribution of this study is to investigate the network effects of electricity transmission on strategic bidding and analyze the network-constrained electricity market equilibria. A three-node electricity system is used for investigation. The decision space of generators is divided into the congestion-on region and congestion-off region, and the optimal response curves of generators in each region are then derived. The market equilibrium is located as the intersection of these optimal response curves. It is analytically shown that this may consist either of a unique unconstrained market equilibrium, a unique constrained market equilibrium, multiple-equilibria, or no pure Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, the interaction between transmission rights holding and market power exercising is addressed. It is shown that in the situation with a positive PTDF, holding transmission rights mitigate market power, and produce an improvement in market efficiency, while in other situations, the reverse is true. Furthermore it is demonstrated that a possible allocation of transmission rights to generators can be found to achieve maximum efficiency. Another unique characteristic of electricity markets is their notable temporal ii effects. In other words, electricity prices have significant volatilities because of the non-storability of power energy and the large variations of system demand. The second part of this study investigates the temporal effects of the electricity market on strategic bidding. A periodic dynamic feedback system is proposed to model the generation competition process. With the developed system dynamics, an optimal control problem is formulated to study the multi-period optimization behavior (called the 'advanced' strategy) of a generator, and the state-feedback control rule is then derived via a sweeping method. It is demonstrated that the generator with optimal control can obtain more profits, and a sensitivity analysis is provided to locate the market factors that affect the performance of optimal control. Next, system uncertainties are included, and a stochastic optimal control problem for generation decision is formulated and solved. Two interesting problems are investigated, namely the effect of the generator's 'advanced' strategic behavior on market efficiency, and the way in which an individual's payoff evolves with other generators' 'advanced' strategic behavior. It is shown that the 'advanced' strategic behavior of generators will improve market efficiency, while an individual's payoff evolution resembles a 'Prisoner Dilemma'. An analysis of risk management of generation decisi...

Download or read book Cap and Trade Modeling and Analysis written by Tanachai Limpaitoon and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation presents an equilibrium framework for analyzing the impact of cap-and-trade regulation on transmission-constrained electricity market. The cap-and-trade regulation of greenhouse gas emissions has gained momentum in the past decade. The impact of the regulation and its efficacy in the electric power industry depend on interactions of demand elasticity, transmission network, market structure, and strategic behavior of firms. I develop an equilibrium model of an oligopoly electricity market in conjunction with a market for tradable emissions permits to study the implications of such interactions. My goal is to identify inefficiencies that may arise from policy design elements and to avoid any unintended adverse consequences on the electric power sector. I demonstrate this modeling framework with three case studies examining the impact of carbon cap-and-trade regulation. In the first case study, I study equilibrium results under various scenarios of resource ownership and emission targets using a 24-bus IEEE electric transmission system. The second and third case studies apply the equilibrium model to a realistic electricity market, Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) 225-bus system with a detailed representation of the California market. In the first and second case studies, I examine oligopoly in electricity with perfect competition in the permit market. I find that under a stringent emission cap and a high degree of concentration of non-polluting firms, the electricity market is subject to potential abuses of market power. Also, market power can occur in the procurement of non-polluting energy through the permit market when non-polluting resources are geographically concentrated in a transmission-constrained market. In the third case study, I relax the competitive market structure assumption of the permit market by allowing oligopolistic competition in the market through a conjectural variation approach. A short-term equilibrium analysis of the joint markets in the presence of market power reveals that strategic permit trading can play a vital role in determining economic outcomes in the electricity market. In particular, I find that a firm with more efficient technologies can employ strategic withholding of permits, which allows for its increase in output share in the electricity market at the expense of other less efficient firms. In addition, strategic permit trading can influence patterns of transmission congestion. These results illustrate that market structure and transmission congestion can have a significant impact on the market performance and environmental outcome of the regulation while the interactions of such factors can lead to unintended consequences. The proposed approach is proven useful as a tool for market monitoring purposes in the short run from the perspective of a system operator, whose responsibility has become indirectly intertwined with emission trading regulation.

Download or read book Analyzing Firm Behaviour in Restructured Electricity Markets written by David P. Brown and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Handbook of Networks in Power Systems I written by Alexey Sorokin and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-02-29 with total page 588 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Energy has been an inevitable component of human lives for decades. Recent rapid developments in the area require analyzing energy systems not as independent components but rather as connected interdependent networks. The Handbook of Networks in Power Systems includes the state-of-the-art developments that occurred in the power systems networks, in particular gas, electricity, liquid fuels, freight networks, as well as their interactions. The book is separated into two volumes with three sections, where one scientific paper or more are included to cover most important areas of networks in power systems. The first volume covers topics arising in electricity network, in particular electricity markets, smart grid, network expansion, as well as risk management. The second volume presents problems arising in gas networks; such as scheduling and planning of natural gas systems, pricing, as well as optimal location of gas supply units. In addition, the second volume covers the topics of interactions between energy networks. Each subject is identified following the activity on the domain and the recognition of each subject as an area of research. The scientific papers are authored by world specialists on the domain and present either state-of-the-arts reviews or scientific developments.

Download or read book Alternative Models to Analyze Market Power and Financial Transmission Rights in Electricity Markets electronic Resource written by Bautista Alderete, Guillermo and published by University of Waterloo. This book was released on 2005 with total page 166 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the main concerns with the introduction of competition in the power sector is the strategic behaviour of market participants. Computable models of strategic behaviour are becoming increasingly important to understand the complexities of competition. Such models can help analyze market designs and regulatory policies. In this thesis, further developments on the modelling and analysis of strategic behaviour in electricity markets are presented. This thesis work has been conducted along three research lines. In the first research line, an oligopolistic model of a joint energy and spinning reserve market is formulated to analyze imperfect competition. Strategic behaviour is introduced by means of conjectured functions. With this integrated formulation for imperfect competition, the opportunity cost between generation and spinning reserve has been analytically derived. Besides, inter-temporal and energy constraints, and financial transmission rights are taken into account. Under such considerations, competition in electricity markets is modelled with more realism. The oligopolistic model is formulated as an equilibrium problem in terms of complementarity conditions. In the second research line, a methodology to screen and mitigate the potential exacerbation of market power due to the ownership of financial transmission rights is presented. Hedging position ratios are computed to quantify the hedging level of financial transmission rights. They are based on the actual impact that each participant has in the energy market, and on the potential impact that it would have with the ownership of financial transmission rights. Thus, hedging position ratios are used to identify the potential gambling positions from the transmission rights bidders, and, therefore, used to prioritize critical positions in the auction for transmission rights. In the last research line, alternative equilibrium models of markets for financial transmission rights are formulated. The proposed equilibrium framework is more natural and flexible for modelling markets than the classic cost-minimization markets. Different markets for financial transmission rights are modelled, namely: i) forwards, ii) options, and iii) joint forwards and options. Moreover, one-period, multi-period and multi-round markets for forwards are derived. These equilibrium models are proposed to analyze the bidding strategies of market participants. The potential impact of bidders on congestion prices is modelled by means of conjectured transmission price functions.

Download or read book Policy Analysis in Transmission constrained Electricity Markets written by Mostafa Sahraei-Ardakani and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 165 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Impact of Transmission on Strategic Behaviour in Electricity Markets written by Anthony Downward and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 234 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this thesis, we investigate the impact of transmission on the strategic behaviour of firms competing in deregulated electricity wholesale markets. Assuming uniform-price auctions and locational marginal pricing, we first investigate the properties of the dispatch problem over networks that are constrained and/or lossy. Without loops and losses we derive important results as to how price varies as a function of demand at each node. Whereas, for networks with loops and losses, we discuss the non-convexity of the dispatch problem and show that the optimal value function may be non-convex. We model the strategic firms as Cournot agents, and discuss how the assumptions surrounding the rationality of the agents can influence the equilibrium outcomes. Under a full-rationality assumption, we prove that over a lossless radial network, with firms owning single generators, the line capacities ensuring that a single-node Cournot equilibrium exists form a convex set. However, in the case of networks with loops or with firms owning multiple generators we provide counterexamples to this convexity. We investigate the prices coming from a two-node network with a lossy line and find the conditions such that a generator is guaranteed to have a quasi-concave revenue function. We use this result to prove that there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium for a Cournot game over the same network. In the final chapters we present some applications of this work. We first define a mixed-integer stochastic transmission planning model that uses the set of capacities derived earlier as constraints to ensure that the unconstrained equilibrium exists for all periods. Finally, we examine the effect of carbon charges over a two-node network and find that the imposition of a carbon charge may increase emissions when firms behave strategically over a constrained network.

Download or read book Restructured Electric Power Systems written by Xiao-Ping Zhang and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2010-10-15 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The latest practical applications of electricity market equilibrium models in analyzing electricity markets Electricity market deregulation is driving the power energy production from a monopolistic structure into a competitive market environment. The development of electricity markets has necessitated the need to analyze market behavior and power. Restructured Electric Power Systems reviews the latest developments in electricity market equilibrium models and discusses the application of such models in the practical analysis and assessment of electricity markets. Drawing upon the extensive involvement in the research and industrial development of the leading experts in the subject area, the book starts by explaining the current developments of electrical power systems towards smart grids and then relates the operation and control technologies to the aspects in electricity markets. It explores: The problems of electricity market behavior and market power Mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) Tools and techniques for solving the electricity market equilibrium problems Various electricity market equilibrium models State-of-the-art techniques for computing the electricity market equilibrium problems The application of electricity market equilibrium models in assessing the economic benefits of transmission expansions for market environments, forward and spot markets, short-term power system security, and analysis of reactive power impact Also featured are computational resources to allow readers to develop algorithms on their own, as well as future research directions in modeling and computational techniques in electricity market analysis. Restructured Electric Power Systems is an invaluable reference for electrical engineers and power system economists from power utilities and for professors, postgraduate students, and undergraduate students in electrical power engineering, as well as those responsible for the design, engineering, research, and development of competitive electricity markets and electricity market policy.

Download or read book Competitive Electricity Markets written by Fereidoon Sioshansi and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2011-10-10 with total page 625 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: After 2 decades, policymakers and regulators agree that electricity market reform, liberalization and privatization remains partly art. Moreover, the international experience suggests that in nearly all cases, initial market reform leads to unintended consequences or introduces new risks, which must be addressed in subsequent “reform of the reforms. Competitive Electricity Markets describes the evolution of the market reform process including a number of challenging issues such as infrastructure investment, resource adequacy, capacity and demand participation, market power, distributed generation, renewable energy and global climate change. Sequel to Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective in the same series published in 2006 Contributions from renowned scholars and practitioners on significant electricity market design and implementation issues Covers timely topics on the evolution of electricity market liberalization worldwide

Download or read book The Economics of Electricity Markets written by Darryl R. Biggar and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2014-07-10 with total page 493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bridges the knowledge gap between engineering and economics in a complex and evolving deregulated electricity industry, enabling readers to understand, operate, plan and design a modern power system With an accessible and progressive style written in straight-forward language, this book covers everything an engineer or economist needs to know to understand, operate within, plan and design an effective liberalized electricity industry, thus serving as both a useful teaching text and a valuable reference. The book focuses on principles and theory which are independent of any one market design. It outlines where the theory is not implemented in practice, perhaps due to other over-riding concerns. The book covers the basic modelling of electricity markets, including the impact of uncertainty (an integral part of generation investment decisions and transmission cost-benefit analysis). It draws out the parallels to the Nordpool market (an important point of reference for Europe). Written from the perspective of the policy-maker, the first part provides the introductory background knowledge required. This includes an understanding of basic economics concepts such as supply and demand, monopoly, market power and marginal cost. The second part of the book asks how a set of generation, load, and transmission resources should be efficiently operated, and the third part focuses on the generation investment decision. Part 4 addresses the question of the management of risk and Part 5 discusses the question of market power. Any power system must be operated at all times in a manner which can accommodate the next potential contingency. This demands responses by generators and loads on a very short timeframe. Part 6 of the book addresses the question of dispatch in the very short run, introducing the distinction between preventive and corrective actions and why preventive actions are sometimes required. The seventh part deals with pricing issues that arise under a regionally-priced market, such as the Australian NEM. This section introduces the notion of regions and interconnectors and how to formulate constraints for the correct pricing outcomes (the issue of "constraint orientation"). Part 8 addresses the fundamental and difficult issue of efficient transmission investment, and finally Part 9 covers issues that arise in the retail market. Bridges the gap between engineering and economics in electricity, covering both the economics and engineering knowledge needed to accurately understand, plan and develop the electricity market Comprehensive coverage of all the key topics in the economics of electricity markets Covers the latest research and policy issues as well as description of the fundamental concepts and principles that can be applied across all markets globally Numerous worked examples and end-of-chapter problems Companion website holding solutions to problems set out in the book, also the relevant simulation (GAMS) codes

Download or read book Economics of Electricity written by Anna Cretì and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2019-05-30 with total page 369 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Explains the economics of electricity at each step of the supply chain: production, transportation and distribution, and retail.

Download or read book Economic Regulation and Its Reform written by Nancy L. Rose and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2014-08-29 with total page 619 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.

Download or read book INFORMS Annual Meeting written by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. National Meeting and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 644 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Pricing and Regulatory Innovations Under Increasing Competition written by Michael A. Crew and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 213 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume focuses on incentive regulation and competition. While much of the regulatory action is taking place in telecommunications, the impact of competition and the resultant regulatory change is being felt in other traditional public utilities including electricity. The book reviews topics including price caps, incentive regulation, market structure and new regulatory technologies.

Download or read book The Manufacturing of Markets written by Eric Brousseau and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2014-05-22 with total page 549 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Leading scholars from law, political science and economics explore the challenges in designing efficient markets in both private and public sector.