Download or read book Analysis of the U S Military s Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq written by Adam Talaber and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2008-09 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Compares prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military¿s actual practice up to Oct. 2005. The DoD made policy decisions that increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with a previous estimate. That includes terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in NE Asia, and adopting more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. The major difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq 2003-10/05 and the estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD¿s practice of deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are considered sustainable. Illus.

Download or read book An Analysis of the U S Military s Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq written by and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In response to your request, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has compared its prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military's actual practice over the past few years. The Department of Defense (DoD) has made some policy decisions over the past two and a half years that have increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with CBO's previous estimate. Those decisions include terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in North East Asia, and adopting somewhat more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. However, the majority of the difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq over the past two and a half years and CBO's estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD's employing practices that depart from the standards that DoD states are preferable and that CBO uses in its analysis. The most significant such practice has been deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are generally considered sustainable. The attachment to this letter provides some background on the size and nature of the military forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, discusses how CBO compared its prior estimate with DoD's actual practice, and answers the remainder of your specific questions.

Download or read book Analysis of the U S Military s Ability To Sustain an Occupation of Iraq written by Adebayo Adedji and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Analysis of the U S Military s Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: More than 180,000 U.S. military personnel are currently involved in the occupation of Iraq about 150,000 of them deployed in Iraq itself and the rest supporting the occupation from neighboring countries (primarily Kuwait). According to the Department of Defense (DoD), the occupation is costing about $3.9 billion a month to sustain. At the request of the Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has examined the United States capability to sustain an occupation force in Iraq over the long term and the associated costs. In performing its analysis, CBO made no assumptions about how long the occupation might last or about the size of the force that might be necessary. Instead, CBO s work focused on determining how large an occupation the U.S. military could sustain in Iraq indefinitely while still maintaining acceptable levels of military readiness and not jeopardizing the quality of the all-volunteer force under various policy options. Those options include using only combat troops from the Army s active component for the occupation, employing other existing U.S. ground forces as well, and expanding current forces to incorporate two additional Army divisions.

Download or read book CBO Testimony The Ability of the U S Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: More than 150,000 U.S. military personnel are currently involved in the occupation of Iraq -- about 120,000 of them deployed in Iraq itself and the rest supporting the occupation from neighboring countries (primarily Kuwait). This past September, at the request of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the United States' capability to sustain an occupation force in Iraq over the long term and the associated costs. This testimony describes the results of that work. In performing its analysis, CBO made no assumptions about how long the occupation might last or about the size of the force that might be necessary. Instead, CBO's work focused on determining how large an occupation the U.S. military could sustain in Iraq indefinitely -- while still maintaining acceptable levels of military readiness and not jeopardizing the quality of the all-volunteer force -- under various policy options. Those options include using only combat troops from the Army's active component for the occupation, employing other existing U.S. ground forces as well, and expanding current forces to incorporate two additional Army divisions. CBO's analysis indicates that the active Army would be unable to sustain an occupation force of the present size beyond about March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for longer than one year without relief. In the 6 to 12 months after March, the level of U.S. forces in Iraq would begin to decline as units that had been deployed for a year were relieved and were not replaced on a one-for-one basis. After the winter of 2004-2005, the United States could sustain -- indefinitely, if need be -- an occupation force of 38,000 to 64,000 military personnel using only combat units from the Army's active component (and some support units from the reserves), the option that constitutes the base case in this analysis. With a force that size, the occupation would cost $8-$12 billion per year.

Download or read book Learning from Iraq written by Steven Metz and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 140 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?

Download or read book U S Military Operations in Iraq written by Kate Phillips and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.

Download or read book The Ability of the U S Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq written by Douglas Holtz-Eakin and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Some Implications of Increasing U S Forces in Iraq written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Administration is currently planning (and has begun to execute) an increase in U.S. ground forces in Iraq. That plan calls for increasing the number of U.S. combat brigades in-theater by 5 above the December 2006 level of 15, peaking at 20 combat brigades deployed. As of now, the Administration has not specified how long it plans to sustain such an increase. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis considers the effects of increasing U.S. ground forces in Iraq. In particular, it analyzes the effects on operational tempo and availability of units to respond to other contingencies. To analyze those effects and compare them with the alternatives for employing U.S. forces incorporated in the House and Senate versions of the supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 2007, CBO constructed five deployment scenarios: Scenario 1: U.S. force levels return to and are then maintained indefinitely at 15 combat brigades in-theater (i.e., no increase in forces beyond what has already been executed); Scenario 2: A 4-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until August 2007; Scenario 3: A 12-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until April 2008; Scenario 4: A 24-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until April 2009; and Scenario 5: A withdrawal from Iraq that steadily reduces the number of combat brigades in-theater from current levels until all U.S. combat brigades have departed by June 2008. This analysis updates CBO's previous work on this topic, "An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq" (Sep 2003) and "An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq: An Update" (Oct 2005), using the same measures of stress on the force (rotation ratios and number of brigades immediately available to respond to other contingencies).

Download or read book The Iraq Study Group Report written by Iraq Study Group (U.S.) and published by Vintage. This book was released on 2006-12-06 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.

Download or read book U S Military Operations in Iraq written by Kate Phillips and published by Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College. This book was released on 2006 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.

Download or read book Reconstructing Iraq written by Conrad C. Crane and published by Strategic Studies Institute. This book was released on 2003 with total page 92 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded. The current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.

Download or read book Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Catherine Dale and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2011-04 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the goal of removing Saddam Hussein¿s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction. The focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to helping the Gov¿t. of Iraq improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. This report addresses these policy issues: Identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and Laying the groundwork for a traditional bilateral relationship. Map. A print on demand report.

Download or read book Revisions in Need of Revising What Went Wrong in the Iraq War written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2005 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration's conduct of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers -- criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups -- were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself. Military and civilian planners were culpable in failing to plan for certain tasks, but the most serious problems had no good solution. The authors draw attention to a variety of lessons, including the danger that the imperatives of "force protection" may sacrifice the broader political mission of U.S. forces and the need for skepticism over the capacity of outsiders to develop the skill and expertise required to reconstruct decapitated states.

Download or read book A Revolution in Military Adaptation written by Chad C. Serena and published by Georgetown University Press. This book was released on 2011-09 with total page 223 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental process of organizational adaptation—a process driven by soldiers and leaders that spread throughout the institution and led to revolutionary changes in how the army supported and conducted its operations in Iraq. How the army adapted and the implications of this adaptation are the subject of this indispensable study. Intended for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a solid critique of the army’s current capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies and provides policy recommendations for retaining lessons learned in Iraq.

Download or read book Operation Iraqi Freedom written by Walt L. Perry and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Summarizes a report on the planning and execution of operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM through June 2004. Recommends changes to Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and Title 10 functions.

Download or read book Precedents Variables and Options in Planning written by W. Andrew Terrill and published by . This book was released on 2005-10-31 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The U.S. and coalition invasion of Iraq in spring 2003 has led to the most ambitious U.S. effort at nation-building since the end of World War II. Unlike the aftermath of World War II, however, the United States is faced with a ferocious insurgency that is threatening the emerging government of Iraq and its developing security forces. Moreover, this program of Iraqi political rehabilitation must be carried out in a part of the world that is well-known for its strong sensitivities about Western influence over that region. It must also be carried out without significant, in-country military support from the majority of U.S. allies, with the most important exception being the United Kingdom. Additionally, this transition must not only sweep aside an old society but build a new one based on the cooperation of Shi'ite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and other groups. Previous U.S. experience in coping with postwar problems has demonstrated that a military occupation resembles the major combat phase of a war in that both require maximum flexibility and adaptability on the part of military forces to meet consistently changing conditions. Moreover, past U.S. experience further illustrates that the population of a democratic country engaged in occupation duties can sometimes become first wary and then disillusioned as the enterprise continues into the indefinite future without clear and rapid progress. In the past, the United States has sometimes had to distinguish between optimal and acceptable end states in the countries being occupied, because the optimal end state is not always attainable, but worst case developments must still be prevented. These experiences are worthy of remembering as the United States struggles with the situation in Iraq. This report views the empowerment of a viable Iraqi central government and a security force to defend its authority as vital to the future of that country. Thus, to be successful in Iraq, the United States must help empower a functioning and unified Iraqi government, support the effort to build an indigenous security force to protect that government and the Iraqi public, and help prevent a breakdown in those intercommunal relations necessary to foster power-sharing and avoid civil war. The U.S. Government must also do this in a time frame that is acceptable to both Iraqis and U.S. public opinion. Furthermore, these tasks must be accomplished while coping with an ongoing and highly adaptive insurgency. The deeply challenging and multidimensional nature of this effort leaves little latitude for mistakes by the Iraqi government or in future U.S. dealings with Iraq. The United States must therefore decide how much it is prepared to sacrifice to help create and support a Western-style democratic government in Iraq. Since this is a finite commitment, the question arises as to when and how the United States is prepared to adjust its goals should it be faced with the prospect of less than full democracy in Iraq. A partially democratic system that can be encouraged to become more open even following a U.S. withdrawal would clearly be better than a variety of other plausible alternative regimes. In Iraq, it may be especially difficult for the United States to discern the optimal time to begin withdrawing the majority of its troops. Balancing the goals of supporting stable Iraqi self-government and leaving Iraq in a timely manner has emerged as a major requirement for U.S. regional policy. It is particularly important that the United States does not insist on remaining in Iraq to support maximalist goals and then find itself unable to sustain an ongoing presence there.