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Book An Examination of the Fundamental Reasons Why Frank Ramsey Failed in His Reviews of J M Keynes s a Treatise on Probability

Download or read book An Examination of the Fundamental Reasons Why Frank Ramsey Failed in His Reviews of J M Keynes s a Treatise on Probability written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Frank P Ramsey did not consider the possibility of representing the concept of probability by an interval valued approach in his lifetime. Ramsey considered probability to be either ordinal or numerical. There was absolutely no room for interval estimates and interval probability in his approach. It is mentioned nowhere in any of his published or unpublished work. Ramsey was not familiar with the applied work done by George Boole on interval valued probability. Ramsey believed only in the standard mathematical theory of probability. The crucial assumption for Ramsey was additivity. Of course, Keynes rejected additivity except as a special case. This is the major difference between Ramsey and Keynes. Keynes believed it obvious that there is missing relevant evidence or knowledge in many decisions made by human beings. Non addiitvity immediately leads to uncertainty. Uncertainty requires the existence of non additivity. Keynes made it explicit in Part II of the A Treatise on Probability that additivity was a special case and not the general case. Unfortunately, Ramsey could not follow Keynes's analysis in Part II of the TP. This, for instance, was a severe problem also for both F Y Edgeworth and E B Wilson. However, Edgeworth figured out that Keynes's “non numerical” probabilities were interval valued by means of a very careful reading of Chapter III of the TP. It is very probable that Edgeworth also had the benefit of many private discussions with Keynes between 1909 and 1920 when both men were co-editors of the Economic Journal. Unfortunately, Ramsey's conclusion was that Keynes's “non numerical probabilities” were ordinal probabilities. Economists have mistakenly followed Ramsey's assessment and ignored Edgeworth's vastly superior assessment of the interval valued nature of Keynesian probability. The major defect in the CWJMK version of the A Treatise on Probability is that the editorial foreword was written by a rabid proponent of Ramsey's belief in additivity, Richard Braithwaite. Anyone reading this editorial foreword before he/she reads the A Treatise on Probability will be completely biased against Keynes's technical analysis in the A Treatise on Probability. The only existing antidote to Braithwaite's “review” is the two combined reviews of Edgeworth, who provided, overall, the best reviews ever written of the A Treatise on Probability and Bertrand Russell's review. In fact, I had to use Edgeworth's two reviews to buttress my case in support of my dissertation with one of my dissertation committee members.

Book On the Impossibility That Any Academic Will Ever Understand Keynes s 1931 Assessment of Ramsey s Work in Probability  When Compared to His Own  Until Part II of the A Treatise on Probabilit Y 1921  Has Been Read

Download or read book On the Impossibility That Any Academic Will Ever Understand Keynes s 1931 Assessment of Ramsey s Work in Probability When Compared to His Own Until Part II of the A Treatise on Probabilit Y 1921 Has Been Read written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: By the time that Keynes's logical theory of probability appeared in 1921 in his A Treatise on Probability (1921), Keynes had already used it in his Indian Currency and Finance,1913, personally at the Treaty of Versailles negotiations as the official representative of the British Treasury Department, and in his Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). Keynes was a millionaire by 1922. Keynes's theory is an interval valued approach that can be applied in situations that require imprecise, inexact, non numerical, nonlinear, non additive, degree of rational belief. If the weight of the argument, w, is equal to, approaches, or is close to 1, 0≤w≤1, then Keynes's theory reduces to the use of precise, exact, numerical, linear, additive, degrees of belief. This conclusion can only be reached if an academic has read and understood Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. The only academic in the 20th or 21st century who read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability was Theodore Hailperin, a mathematician who had no idea about the strange and queer literature that has built up around this book in academia since 1921.One of the many queer and strange episodes that have been written about Keynes's theory over the last 100 years is the claim that in 1931 Keynes agreed to abandon his logical theory of probability because an 18 year old boy convinced Keynes that his theory had major logical, epistemological, and philosophical problems, such as mysterious and mystical non numerical probabilities, as well as bizarre claims by Keynes that the intuition and perception of the individual decision maker played an important role in allowing the decision maker to grasp an understanding of the fundamental nature of the current problem under investigation, as it related to past successful analyses of similar problems.Of course, it is in Parts II and III of the A treatise on Probability that Keynes demonstrates what his technical, mathematical apparatus is for dealing with problems of decision making concerning the future where only partial information, knowledge, evidence or data is available, but that is in many instances in conflict.Keynes was impressed with Ramsey's ability to grasp and talk with him about issues related to decision making. Unfortunately, Ramsey had NO experience at all in the real world of decision making subject to time constraint, a world that Keynes had used his theory between 1912 and 1919 to master. Ramsey's theory was a purely academic theory that required a complete information set, exactly what Keynes had shown was rarely the case. The belief, resurrected recently in 2020 by Cheryl Misak in her biography of Frank Ramsey, that Keynes's confidence in his theory was severely shaken, simply has no support for it .Did any academic economist or philosopher ever read Part II of the TP? I can find no evidence to support the hypothesis that there was an academic economist or philosopher who read Part II of the TP in the last 100 years. Such an economist or philosopher would have immediately objected to the 100 year old Ramsey myth that Keynes's mysterious and/or mystical non numerical probabilities and non measurable probabilities were not really mysterious at al .Such an economist or philosopher would have immediately pointed out that Keynes's "platonic entities" were intervals with an upper and lower bound, which means that they are non additive and do not satisfy the mathematical laws of the calculus of probabilities. Unfortunately, no such academic economist or philosopher exists, as a check of Google Scholar will make clear.

Book On Misak s 2020 Story about Ramsey  Keynes and Logical Probability

Download or read book On Misak s 2020 Story about Ramsey Keynes and Logical Probability written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A myth has been in existence since 1922 about Keynes, Ramsey and the logical theory of probability that Keynes constructed in Parts I-V of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921.This myth claims that Ramsey found major errors in logic and epistemology in Keynes's work, which supposedly was about mysterious,unfathomable non measurable,non numerical Platonic probabilities that could only be intuited. Keynes supposedly, according to this myth, instantly realized that his theory had been decimated, annihilated and demolished by the 18 year old boy genius, Frank Ramsey. Keynes then supposedly retracted his theory in 1931 and supported the subjective theory of probability presented in 1926 by Ramsey in “Truth and Probability” thereafter.This myth is the foundation for Robert Skidelsky's Post Keynesian assessment of Keynes's Theory of Probability and appears to be what S. Bradley presents as Keynes's theory in the latest 2019 assessment of Keynes's contributions in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.In C. Misak's recent 2020 biography of Ramsey ,as well as in other reviews and media, this myth is simply being restated.In reality, Ramsey's critique of Keynes, in either 1922 or 1926, was so poor that it is quite amazing that the vast majority of economists, philosophers, psychologist, and historians in the 20th and 21st centuries continue to believe something for which there is not a shred of historical evidence. Keynes was not going to waste his very valuable time restating the points he had already made in the A Treatise on Probability for an 18 year old boy. Everything is there in Parts II-V of the A Treatise on Probability that demonstrate that Ramsey's views on Keynes's theory of probability are nothing short of silly, preposterous and absolute nonsense masquerading as serious scholarship. What explains the longevity, nearly 100 years of this myth is the complete and total failure of academics to read the technical parts of the A Treatise on Probability, Parts II, III and V.Emile Borel made it very clear in his 1924 review of Keynes's book, a review that never mentions Ramsey 's 1922 review, that his review will be about Part I of Keynes's book only. Borel, alone among academics over the last 100 years, honestly admitted that he could not follow Keynes in Part II, although he also realized that this was the most important part of the book.For this oversight, he apologized to both Keynes and Russell in print.The Ramsey myth exists only due to the failure of historians, psychologists, philosophers and economists to read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability.

Book A Study of Ramsey s Extremely Poor Reading of Chapter III of J  M  Keynes s A Treatise on Probability and the Refutations Made by J  M  Keynes and Bertrand Russell

Download or read book A Study of Ramsey s Extremely Poor Reading of Chapter III of J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability and the Refutations Made by J M Keynes and Bertrand Russell written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Frank P Ramsey's critique of Keynes's logical Theory of Probability, presented in 1925 and published in 1930, is so weak and poor that J M Keynes or Bertrand Russell could easily have refuted and decimated Ramsey's claims in the space of one half of an hour to one hour at Keynes's Political Economy club in 1925 or 1926 if they had chosen to do so. This raises the question of whether or not Ramsey ever understood the book he had claimed to be reviewing. There is a very high probability that Ramsey did not read and understand Keynes's chapter III when he published both his 1922 review in the Cambridge Magazine and the 1926 review in 1930 posthumously.

Book J M Keynes s 1931 Comment        I Yield to Ramsey  I Think He Is Right    Refers to Ramsey s Work on Precise Probability and Degrees of Belief  Not to Imprecise Probability and Degrees of Rational Belief

Download or read book J M Keynes s 1931 Comment I Yield to Ramsey I Think He Is Right Refers to Ramsey s Work on Precise Probability and Degrees of Belief Not to Imprecise Probability and Degrees of Rational Belief written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A major error ,committed by all philosophers and economists in the 20th and 21st century who have written on the 1931 comment of Keynes on Ramsey about “...I yield to Ramsey, I think he is right”, is their failure to recognize that Keynes's logical theory of probability is an imprecise theory of non additive probability based on intervals and dealing with rational degrees of belief, whereas Ramsey's theory is a precise theory of additive probability that deals with degrees of belief only. The two theories merge only in the every special case where Keynes's weight of the argument, V(a/h) =w,0≤w≤1, has a value of w=1 and all probability preferences are linear.Nowhere in any of Ramsey's publications during his life is there ANY recognition on his part that the two theories are diametrically opposed except in the special case where w=1 and probability preferences are linear. It should have been obvious to Ramsey, if he had indeed read the book that he claimed he had read, that Keynes's probabilities MUST be non additive if, as Ramsey also failed to recognized, only a partial order can be defined on the probability space.

Book Comparing Edgeworth s and Ramsey s Understanding of the Meaning of  Logical  Objective  Probability Relations   Ramsey s View Is  Utterly Preposterous  and  Nonsense   Where We Have Borrowed Savage s Verbal Condemnation of Economists Who Attempted to Apply the Subjective Theory of Probability Beyond Small Worlds  Short Run and Micro Applications Only Are Allowed  on P 16 of His Foundations  1954

Download or read book Comparing Edgeworth s and Ramsey s Understanding of the Meaning of Logical Objective Probability Relations Ramsey s View Is Utterly Preposterous and Nonsense Where We Have Borrowed Savage s Verbal Condemnation of Economists Who Attempted to Apply the Subjective Theory of Probability Beyond Small Worlds Short Run and Micro Applications Only Are Allowed on P 16 of His Foundations 1954 written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Ramsey's complete and total ignorance of Keynes's definition of “objective, logical, probability relations”, contained on pages 35-36 of the A Treatise on Probability, which was explicitly referenced and discussed by Edgeworth in his two reviews, can only be explained by the conclusion that Ramsey never read more than a few pages of Part I of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability plus briefly looking at a maximum of an additional 2-3 pages from Parts II,III,and V.The very idea that an 18 year old teenager could show up at Cambridge in 1921 and ,based on a small, 4 page, unrefereed note, that contains nothing correct in it about Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, allegedly convince J M Keynes that his logical theory of probability had to be abandoned, is ludicrous, silly, stupid, and foolish.Ramsey's crucial error was his failure to identify Keynes's very clear definition of logical probability on pp.35-36,which was then developed in far, far, far greater detail in Part III of the A Treatise on Probability.Of far greater concern is that every single one of the six topics below that were covered by Edgeworth in his two reviews of the A Treatise on Probability is omitted from both of Ramsey's reviews:• Keynes's clearly defined connection between his objective, logical, probability relations and objective, logical, similarity relations, which form the foundation for cognitive science and psychology, on pp.35-36 of Part I(chapter III)• Keynes's initial specification of the evidential weight of the argument relation,V(a/h), in Part I (chapter 6) which Keynes finished in Part IV (chapter 26-V(a/h)=w,0≤w≤1)• Keynes's interval valued and non additive approach to probability (Part II,chapters 10-17) based on Boole's upper-lower probabilities approach specified in his The Laws of Thought (1954,pp.265-269), as well as Keynes's critique of the assumption of additivity• Keynes's finite probabilities of Part III using a modified version of Boole's Problem X to support his application of analogies• Keynes's use of decision weights to explicitly modify additive probability ,thereby transforming additive probability into non(sub) additive ,conventional coefficients of weight and risk, c, in Part IV.• Keynes's use of Chebyshev's Inequality to establish lower bounds for a safety first approach in Part V and use of the Lexis-Q test to establish the constancy(stability) of applications of the limiting frequency approach to probabilityGiven Edwin B .Wilson's correct 1923 conclusion, made in correspondence with Edgeworth, that only Edgeworth was fully qualified to review the A Treatise on Probability, we reach the conclusion that Ramsey and Braithwaite never actually read more than a very few pages of a book that they claimed to have read. The only conclusion that can be drawn that is consistent with this evidence is that Ramsey and Braithwaite were involved in an intellectual fraud in 1921 and 1922 that continues in the 21st century. See, for example, Misak (2020) and Janeway (2020).

Book Why the Edgeworth and Russell Reviews of the a Treatise on Probability Are So Vastly Superior to the Two F P  Ramsey Reviews

Download or read book Why the Edgeworth and Russell Reviews of the a Treatise on Probability Are So Vastly Superior to the Two F P Ramsey Reviews written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Both F. P. Ramsey reviews ...

Book A Treatise on Probability

Download or read book A Treatise on Probability written by John Maynard Keynes and published by . This book was released on 1921 with total page 494 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book The Myth that Ramsey Destroyed and Demolished Keynes s Logical Theory of Probability is Easily Dismissed as a Fairy Tale by Anyone who Has Read Parts II V of the A Treatise on Probability  1921

Download or read book The Myth that Ramsey Destroyed and Demolished Keynes s Logical Theory of Probability is Easily Dismissed as a Fairy Tale by Anyone who Has Read Parts II V of the A Treatise on Probability 1921 written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Ramsey's many ,many confusions and errors about Keynes's logical theory of Probability all stem from his failure to a) read more than just the first four chapters of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability(1921),b) his gross ignorance of Boole's logical theory of probability that Keynes had built on in Parts II,III,IV,and V of the A Treatise on Probability,c) his complete and total ignorance of real world decision making in financial markets(bond, money, stocks, commodity futures),government,industry and business,and d) his complete and total ignorance of the role that intuition and perception played in tournament chess competition under time constraint,a role that was taught to J M Keynes by his father ,J N Keynes,who was a rated chess master who played first board for Cambridge University in the late 1870's and early 1880's.Anyone who has read Parts II,III,IV and V of the A Treatise on Probability can avoid making the type of errors that have recently shown up again in C.Misak's( 2020) biography of Ramsey,where it is asserted that Ramsey easily demolished Keynes's logical theory of probability or S Bradley's (2019) historical foray into the beginnings of imprecise probability,which are based on B.Weatherson's (2002 ) bizarre claims that the “modern” theory of imprecise probability, which uses interval valued probability defined by lower and upper probabilities,as well as Kyburg's own deficient knowledge base,can be used to help explain Keynes's strange ,unfathomable and mysterious beliefs in “ non numerical” probabilities.Of course,since Keynes's work in the A Treatise on Probability in Parts II-V is directly based on Boole's theory of interval valued probability that defined lower and upper probabilities in chapters 16 -21 of the 1854 The Laws of Thought,what Weatherson(2002) and Bradley (2019)are doing is to reinvent the wheel,not knowing that the wheel had already been invented thousands of years before them.This error can be directly traced to both Weatherson's and Bradley's extremely limited understanding of Keynes's introductory,initial,beginning approach to the use of interval valued probability that takes place in chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability on pp.30 and 34,which are the same pages emphasized by philosophers,for example, such as H E Kyburg and I J Good.

Book On Fisher s Review of J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability   A Fiasco

Download or read book On Fisher s Review of J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability A Fiasco written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability is built on the mathematical and logical foundations of G E Boole's 1854 The Laws of Thought. Boole introduced the first technical attempt (Adam Smith was the first to specify and solve two such indeterminate problems in The Wealth of Nations) at systematically solving indeterminate, probability problems (where, under uncertainty, relevant knowledge or evidence is missing) using interval valued probability. His systematic techniques were presented in chapters 16-21 of The Laws of Thought. Fisher's review of the A Treatise on Probability demonstrates an astounding degree of ignorance on his part. Fisher has no idea of what an indeterminate probability is. For Fisher, ALL probabilities MUST be point estimates. We will show that Fisher, a biologist wedded to the Limiting (Relative) Frequency interpretation of probability, had no idea about what Keynes was doing or talking about in Parts I-IV of the A Treatise on Probability. We will conclude that Fisher was foolish to attempt a review of the A Treatise on Probability knowing that he had not read Boole. This conclusion is then shown to apply to practically all modern, twentieth and twenty-first century writers on the A Treatise on Probability.

Book Raymond Pearl s Review of J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability

Download or read book Raymond Pearl s Review of J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: R. Pearl's attempt to review J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability for Science is only a near fiasco compared with the failed attempt made by Ronald Fisher to review Keynes's book for the Eugenics Society. It provides the educated reader with minimal value. How this review made it through the referees, associate editors, and editors at the journal, Science, is a mystery worthy of investigation. Again, anyone attempting to read or review Keynes' A Treatise on Probability, without having any knowledge or familiarity of how J M Keynes made use in the A Treatise on Probability of George Boole's application of his logic to probability in chapters 16-21 of The Laws of Thought (1854), is foolish.

Book On J M Keynes s Rejection  in General  of Ramsey s Subjective Theory of Probability

Download or read book On J M Keynes s Rejection in General of Ramsey s Subjective Theory of Probability written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: J M Keynes rejected Ramsey's subjective theory of probability in general. He did accept Ramsey's betting quotient approach in the special case where the weight of the evidence, w, equaled one so that all the probabilities were linear, additive, precise, exact, definite, single number answers. In general, Keynes's probabilities were indeterminate, interval valued probabilities that were non additive and nonlinear because the weight, w, was less than 1. F.Y. Edgeworth, Bertrand Russell, and Edwin Bidell Wilson all recognized the interval valued nature of Keynes's probabilities (See my Reviewing the Reviewers of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, 2016). The Keynes - Townshend exchanges provide incontrovertible evidence that Keynes never accepted Ramsey's subjective approach to probability because there was no place in that theory for interval valued probability or for the concept of the weight of the evidence, since, for Ramsey, the subjective estimate of a degree of belief is the confidence a decision maker has in the betting odds while for Keynes, it is the degree of rational belief, not the degree of belief.The Keynes -Townshend exchanges, if carefully read and digested, contains the relevant evidence that allows a reader to conclude that Keynes remained an adherent practitioner of his theory of logical probability his entire life. He never changed his mind.Overlooking the Keynes - Townshend exchanges of 1937-38 explains why economists and academicians have failed to see the close connections that exist between the GT and TP.

Book Harold Jeffreys on J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability

Download or read book Harold Jeffreys on J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Harold Jeffreys' overall assessment of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, 1921, requires a reader to consider, not only his official review in Nature, 1922, but also the comments in his books, Scientific Inference, 1931 and Theory of Probability, 1939, as well as the second edition of Theory of Probability, 1947. Jeffreys' problem was that his approach to measurement required that all probabilities had to be measured by a single, precise number .This is tantamount to assuming that Keynes's weight of the evidence, w, or William Johnson's worth of the evidence, also denoted by w, are always equal to one. Jefferys obviously did not pick up this concept from his interactions with Johnson, as opposed to Keynes, who not only picked it up, but then connected it to Boole's earlier logical approach to probability. Boole expressed this concept in terms of interval valued probability. Only if the weight or the worth of the evidence is equal, approaching to, or approximated by 1 will precise numbers be able to measure the probability relation. Jefferys' failure to connect Boole to Keynes means that Jeffreys never understood what Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability at any time during his life.

Book Arne Fisher s  Review  of J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability

Download or read book Arne Fisher s Review of J M Keynes s A Treatise on Probability written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Arne Fisher attempted a cover up of an important footnote in chapter 29 of the A Treatise on Probability (1921), in which Keynes made it clear that he was not going to use the modern Method of Moments, which used a Moment Generating Function approach based on a Taylor Series expansion very similar to the Maclaurin Series, a special case of the Taylor series expansion, used by Keynes in chapter 17 of the A Treatise on Probability. Cumulants and semi-invariants, which A. Fisher claimed Keynes had no inkling of and did not understand, are simply terms used to describe particular parts of the Taylor series expansion carried out to provide the optimal estimate of a series using the Moment Generating Function technique. A. Fisher attempted to create the illusion that Keynes had made a number of very critical comments about the mathematical capabilities of Laplace, Bernoulli, and Poisson on pp. 358-361 of the A Treatise on Probability. These are figments of Fisher's own imagination. A. Fisher's “review” is really about one section of one chapter, chapter 29, sections 16-18, pp. 358-361, of the A Treatise on Probability. Nowhere in these pages will a reader find any such comments. A. Fisher, in his “review,” also sought to create the illusion that there were many mathematical errors in the A Treatise on Probability in these sections. In reality, there are no mathematical errors in these sections. Keynes simply used an older method of generating values for the Poisson distribution instead of using the most modern approach, the Method of Moments, which used the Moment Generating Function, with which Keynes was well acquainted with. A. Fisher gambled that no one reading his “review” would go back and check to see if his comments were correct. His gambit worked for nearly 94 years.

Book Reviewing the Reviewer s of Keynes s a Treatise on Probability

Download or read book Reviewing the Reviewer s of Keynes s a Treatise on Probability written by Michael Brady and published by Xlibris Corporation. This book was released on 2016-09-24 with total page 179 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The standard view of the economics profession is that Keynes was a brilliant, intuitive, nonrigorous innovator. These essays show that Keynes backed up his intuitions with a rigorous mathematical and logical supporting analysis, which has been overlooked.

Book The Assessment of Keynes s a Treatise on Probability from the Point of View of a PhD Student in Statistics from Harvard University s Department of Statistics in 2006

Download or read book The Assessment of Keynes s a Treatise on Probability from the Point of View of a PhD Student in Statistics from Harvard University s Department of Statistics in 2006 written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Historical, as well as practically all current, assessments of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability suffer immensely due to the failure of the readers of that book to cover Part II of the Treatise. As acknowledged by Emile Borel in his 1924 review of the A Treatise on Probability, this part of the book is extremely difficult and daunting. Borel's solution to this problem was to simply skip Part II entirely and base his review only on the other four parts of the book. This eventually lead to only Part I of the A Treatise on Probability being covered as future readers also skipped Part II. Unfortunately, in skipping this part of the book, Borel completely overlooked Keynes's explicit discussions about additivity being a special case while non(sub) additivity was the general case. Keynes then followed this analysis with his interval valued approach to estimating probabilities using Boole's lower and upper bounds approach that Keynes called approximation. Skipping Part II was also the solution chosen by F Y Edgeworth, by Edwin Bidell Wilson initially, and by Bruno de Finetti. It is highly likely that this same choice, to skip Part II and read only Part I, was made by the “Fundamentalist Keynesians” centered around the economics and philosophy departments at Cambridge University, England in the last quarter of the 20th century.It should not be surprising that this same approach would be taken toward Keynes's A Treatise on Probability at American universities, such as Harvard, as well.The idea that Keynes just had some suggestions,or intuitions, or hints, or ideas about non measurable probabilities (interval valued probabilities) has no support once Part II is fully integrated into an assessment of what it was that Keynes accomplished in 1921 in his A Treatise on Probability. Keynes's contribution to interval valued probability ,both indeterminate (chapters 15-17,20,22 of the TP) and imprecise(chapter 29) probabilities, far, far exceeds the small one paragraph discussions on pages 30 and 34 of chapter III.

Book John Maynard Keynes s Upper and Lower Valued Probabilities

Download or read book John Maynard Keynes s Upper and Lower Valued Probabilities written by Michael Emmett Brady and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the course of their professional lives, Henry E. Kyburg, Isaac Levi, and Jochen Runde have maintained the claim that J M Keynes's contributions to probability and decision theory were of a comparative, qualitative nature only. They maintained that J M Keynes had some interesting, but undeveloped ideas, hints, suggestions, and intuitions about the structure of his logical approach to probability. They assert that he made some progress in clearing the way for later researchers who would then create the interval estimate approach to probability that he did not. They claimed that Keynes himself had never provided any detailed, formal mathematical structure at any time in his life to support his intuitions and brilliant ideas. It is a rather simple task to demonstrate that these claims are false by pointing out that there are 17 worked out problems provided by J M Keynes in chapters 15 and 17 of his A Treatise on Probability (1921,TP), as well as the applications of interval estimates used by Keynes in chapters 20, 22, and 26 of the TP, that show beyond any doubt that J M Keynes had created the first explicit interval estimate approach to probability in history. George Boole was the first to work out the mechanics of an interval estimate approach. However, Keynes was the first to emphasize the application and importance of such an approach in applied areas like decision theory. I have chosen Kyburg, Runde ,and Levi because they are representative of how academics in the fields of philosophy and economics handle Keynes's TP. It must be noted here that Kyburg , Levi, and Runde have an understanding of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability that is superior to that of any statistician or mathematician with the exception of Hailperin (1986) .My disagreement with Kyburg, Levi, and Runde is that they have failed to adequately complete the job of correctly identifying Keynes's theory because they restricted their analysis to basically one chapter of the TP, chapter III. The worst treatment of the TP comes at the hands of statisticians. This is due to their commitment to the assertion that all probabilities must be precise, single number answers. NO statistician who reviewed the TP had any inkling of the case Keynes was making.