Download or read book Adverse Selection and Equilibrium in Liability Insurance Markets written by Larry Berger and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection written by Jonathan A. K. Cave and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 1984 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report examines possible outcomes of greater competition in insurance markets. The report describes the nature of insurance offerings in equilibrium if firms offer multiple policies; but it replaces the conventional assumption that each policy must earn nonnegative profits with the more realistic requirement that the portfolio of policies offered by the firm earn nonnegative profits in the aggregate. Theorems regarding the existence, optimality, and uniqueness of the subsidy equilibrium are presented, together with a simple characterization of the subsidy equilibrium and a comparison with existing equilibrium notions. Because the subsidy patterns, from low to high, that emerge under this formulation appear to characterize multiple-option insurance plans such as the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan, this model may be more useful than conventional methods in the analysis of such plans.

Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 980 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the 1970's, the research agenda in insurance was dominated by optimal insurance coverage, security design, and equilibrium under conditions of imperfect information. The 1980's saw a growth of theoretical developments including non-expected utility, price volatility, retention capacity, the pricing and design of insurance contracts in the presence of multiple risks, and the liability insurance crisis. The empirical study of information problems, financial derivatives, and large losses due to catastrophic events dominated the research agenda in the 1990's. The Handbook of Insurance provides a single reference source on insurance for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants, and practitioners, that reviews the research developments in insurance and its related fields that have occurred over the last thirty years. The book starts with the history and foundations of insurance theory and moves on to review asymmetric information, risk management and insurance pricing, and the industrial organization of insurance markets. The book ends with life insurance, pensions, and economic security. Each chapter has been written by a leading authority in insurance, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.

Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Ex Ante Adverse Selection and Ex Post Moral Hazard written by William Jack and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Foundations of Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-11-11 with total page 742 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.

Download or read book Strategic Adverse Selection written by Kevin Shaver and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A key feature of insurance markets is that the cost of selling insurance policies is contingent upon not only the number of policies sold but to whom they are sold. This differentiates insurance markets from conventional markets and admits novel strategies, such as segmentation strategies, through which firms may project market power. This paper clarifies how segmentation strategies differ from simple increases in pricing precision, details the implications of their use, gives an explanation for the divergence of firms' ability to segment, and provides evidence of their effective utilization. To these ends, a two stage spatial model of Bertrand price competition is specified, with an endogenously determined rule for sharing demand, to illustrate the consequences of the strategic use of information asymmetries between competing firms. Two implications of the model's equilibrium are tested against an original dataset that provides comprehensive pricing and categorization data for the Washington state non-standard private passenger automobile liability insurance market. This unique data set provides the first opportunity to test for segmentation strategies where regulation and the development of a market have not constrained the evolution of categorization strategies.

Download or read book Time Risk Precommitment and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets written by Mark V. Pauly and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This informal paper explores models of competitve insurance market equilibrium when individuals of initially similar apparent risk experience divergence in risk levels over time. The information structrue is modeled in three alternative ways: all insurers and insureds know risk at any point in time, current insurer and insured know risk, and only the individual knows risk. Insurers always know the average risk. It is shown that some models lead to "backloading" of premiums in which initial period expected expense, and that other models lead to "frontloading" of premiums and policy provisions of "guaranteed renewability." Finally, it is shown that guaranteed renewability greatly reduces the possibility of adverse selection.

Download or read book Contributions to Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 536 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For a number of years, I have been teaching and doing research in the economics of uncertainty, information, and insurance. Although it is now possible to find textbooks and books of essays on uncertainty and in formation in economics and finance for graduate students and researchers, there is no equivalent material that covers advanced research in insurance. The purpose of this book is to fill this gap in literature. It provides original surveys and essays in the field of insurance economics. The contributions offer basic reference, new material, and teaching supple ments to graduate students and researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. It represents a complement to the book of readings entitled Foundations of Insurance Economics - Readings in Economics and Finance, recently published by the S.S. Huebner Foundation of Insurance Education. In that book, the editors (G. Dionne and S. Harrington) disseminate key papers in the literature and publish an original survey of major contributions in the field.

Download or read book Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Joseph E. Stiglitz and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes optimal and equilibrium insurance contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard, comparing them with those under a single informational asymmetry. The complex interactions of self-selection and moral hazard constraints have important consequences. We develop an analytic approach that allows a characterization of equilibrium and optimal (Pareto Optimal (PO), and Utilitarian optimal (UO)) allocations. Among the results : (i) a PO allocation may involve "shirking" (not only less care in accident avoidance than is possible, but less care compared to the case of pure moral hazard) either by high risk individuals in the case of single-crossing preference or by one or both types in the case of multi-crossing preference (as may naturally be the case under the double informational asymmetry); and (ii) while an equilibrium, which is unique (even under multi-crossing preferences) if it exists, is more likely to exist as the non-shirking constraint for low-risk type gets more stringent (i.e. when low risk individuals shirk with lower levels of insurance). We also show that a pooling equilibrium, which is not feasible under pure adverse selection, may exist when individuals differ in risk aversion (as well as in accident probability) or when the provision of insurance is non-exclusive (i.e. individuals can purchase insurance from more than one firm). Furthermore, while with pure adverse selection, UO always entails pooling with complete insurance (in the standard model), with adverse selection and moral hazard, all PO allocations may entail separation and the UO may entail incomplete insurance. We show further that, in general, any PO allocation can be implemented by a basic pooling insurance provided by the government and a supplemental separating contracts that can be offered by the market, although, in the presence of moral hazard, a tax needs to be imposed upon the market provision. The analysis suggests that two commonly obser.

Download or read book Equilibrium in an Insurance Market with Imperfect Information and Transaction Costs written by Wenjiu Liu and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Price Equilibrium Efficiency and Decentralizability in Insurance Markets written by Richard Arnott and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 80 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we investigate the descriptive and normative properties of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard when firms offer "price contracts" which allow clients to purchase as much insurance as they wish at the quoted prices. We show that a price equilibrium always exists and is one of three types: i) zero profit price equilibrium - zero profit, zero effort, full insurance ii) positive profit price equilibrium - positive profit, positive effort, partial insurance iii) zero insurance price equilibrium - zero insurance, zero profit, positive effort. We also demonstrate circumstances under which the linear taxation of price insurance allows decentralization of the social optimum (conditional on the unobservability of effort), and when it, does not, whether it is at least utility-improving

Download or read book A Game theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection written by Wanda Mimra and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting written by Georges Dionne and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 74 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Insurance Economics written by Peter Zweifel and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-10-05 with total page 545 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Insurance Economics brings together the economic analysis of decision making under risk, risk management and demand for insurance among individuals and corporations, objectives pursued and management tools used by insurance companies, the regulation of insurance, and the division of labor between private and social insurance. Appropriate both for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics, management, and finance, this text provides the background required to understand current research. Predictions derived from theoretical arguments are not merely stated, but also related to empirical evidence. Throughout the book, conclusions summarize key results, helping readers to check their knowledge and comprehension. Issues discussed include paradoxes in decision making under risk and attempts at their resolution, moral hazard and adverse selection including the possibility of a “death spiral”, and future challenges to both private and social insurance such as globalization and the availability of genetic information. This second edition has been extensively revised. Most importantly, substantial content has been added to represent the evolution of risk-related research. A new chapter, Insurance Demand II: Nontraditional Approaches, provides a timely addition in view of recent developments in risk theory and insurance. Previous discussions of Enterprise Risk Management, long-term care insurance, adverse selection, and moral hazard have all been updated. In an effort to expand the global reach of the text, evidence and research from the U.S. and China have also been added.

Download or read book Insurance Economics written by Peter Zweifel and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-02-24 with total page 461 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Winner of the 2014 Kulp-Wright Book Award Presented by the American Risk and Insurance Association". More information can be found here: http://www.aria.org/awards/bookawards.htm Insurance Economics brings together the economic analysis of decision making under risk, risk management and demand for insurance by individuals and corporations, objectives pursued and management tools used by insurance companies, the regulation of insurance, and the division of labor between private and social insurance. Appropriete both for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics, management, and finance, this text provides the background required to understand current research. Predictions derived from theoretical argument are not only stated but confronted with empirical evidence. Throughout the book, conclusions summarize results, helping readers to check their knowledge and understanding. Issues discussed include paradoxa in decision making under risk, selection of favorable risks by insurers, the possibility of a "death spiral" in insurance markets, and future challenges such as re-regulation in the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis and the increasing availability of generic information.

Download or read book Consumer Risk Perceptions and Information in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection written by James A. Ligon and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss probabilities. We show that additional private information is privately and socially valuable. When the equilibrium policies separate types, policyholders can deduce the underlying probabilities from the contracts, so it is information on risk type, rather than loss probability per se, that is valuable. We show that the equilibrium is quot;as ifquot; policyholders were endowed with complete knowledge if, and only if, information is noiseless and costless. If information is noisy, the equilibrium depends on policyholders' prior beliefs and the amount of noise in the information they acquire.

Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Gwen Peters Burchett and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: