Download or read book A Study of the Relationship Between Firm Performance and CEO Compensation in the U S Commercial Banking Industry written by Chris R. Crumley and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 512 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Study of the Relationship Between Firm Performance and CEO Compensation in the United States Commercial Banking Industry to 25 Pages 26 to 50 Pages 51 to 75 Pages 76 to 100 Pages 101 to 125 Pages 126 to 150 Pages 151 to 175 Pages 176 to 200 Pages 201 to 225 Pages 226 to 250 Pages 251 to 269 written by Chris R. Crumley and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 269 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U S Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. The authors find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of the author¿s sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking. Charts and tables.
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U S Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large, publicly traded commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, and were influenced by, the risk-profiles of these firms. We find evidence linking contractual risk-taking incentives, which we proxy with standard measures of vega and delta, to risk-increasing business policy choices. Moreover, these linkages became stronger after 1999, when financial industry deregulation created new growth opportunities for commercial banks. Our results suggest that compensation committees provided new incentives for bank CEOs to exploit these growth opportunities, and also to shift from traditional on-balance sheet portfolio lending to less traditional investments (e.g., private-issue mortgage-backed securities) and nontraditional fee-generating activities. Apart from these strategic reallocations, our results also suggest that bank boards designed CEO compensation contracts to limit excessive risk taking, especially after deregulation.
Download or read book Bank CEOs written by Claudia Curi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-05-22 with total page 61 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book thoroughly explores the characteristics and importance of bank CEOs against the backdrop of growing awareness of the social implications of CEO behavior for the performance and stability of the financial and economic system. After an introductory section on the relevance of CEOs in the banking industry, the connections between the bank CEO labor market, contractual incentives, and compensation structures are examined. The focus then turns to empirical findings concerning the impact that bank CEO compensation has on various firm-level outcomes, such as bank performance and strategies. In addition, the relation between CEO turnover and changes in compensation policies since the financial crisis is discussed. A concluding section presents some fresh empirical evidence deriving from an up-to-date database of traits of CEOs operating in the largest European banks. For PhD students and academics, the surveys offer detailed roadmaps on the empirical research landscape and provide suggestions for future work. The writing style ensures that the content will be readily accessible to all industry practitioners.
Download or read book Executive Pay and Performance written by R. Glenn Hubbard and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate banking regulation on the level and structure of bank CEO compensation. Using panel data on 147 banks over the decade of the 1980s, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that competitive corporate control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate banking is not permitted. Further, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation, as does the proportion in performance-related compensation. These results suggest strong evidence of a managerial talent market -- that is, one which matches the level and structure of compensation with the competitiveness of the banking environment.
Download or read book A study of the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in the U S airline industry written by Trudy Dawkins Morlino and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book CEO Pay and Firm Performance written by Paul L. Joskow and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current compensation responds to past performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within two years. This contrasts sharply with models of infinitely persistent performance effects implicitly assumed in much of the empirical compensation literature. We find that both accounting and market performance measures influence compensation and that the salary and bonus component of pay as well as total compensation have become more sensitive to firm financial performance over the past two decades. There is no evidence that boards fail to penalize CEOs for poor financial performance or reward them disproportionately well for good performance. Finally, the data suggest that boards may discount extreme performance outcomes -both high and low - relative to performance that lies within some `normal' band in setting compensation.
Download or read book A Study of the Relationship Between Firm Performance and CEO Compensation written by Morris C. Attaway and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 488 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Research Handbook on Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value written by Jennifer Carpenter and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 159 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Download or read book A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay written by Eli Talmor and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines executive compensation determinants in the U.S. financial services sector. Multiple theories of executive pay are discussed and tested using a relatively homogenous sample. We perform an in-depth look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the companies selected. The analysis is conducted for the financial sector as a whole and for each of three sub-groups: commercial banks, brokerage and other non-depository institutions, and insurance companies. Variables that proxy for managerial strategic discretion and task complexity are found to best explain CEO compensation. Corporate governance, including board characteristics and external ownership, is the second leading determinant of pay variation, while firm performance and CEO specific characteristics seem to play the least role. We explore the simultaneous relationship between compensation, firm performance, and board strength and find evidence that the board of directors provides a monitoring function and that a strong board appears to be a substitute with incentive compensation for aligning incentives. These findings, when viewed with subsequent firm performance, support an efficient contracting argument.
Download or read book The New Ideal Worker written by Mireia las Heras Maestro and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-06-29 with total page 271 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many managers and organizations still assume that employees who devote long hours to their jobs with no family interference are “ideal workers”. However, this assumption has negative consequences for employees, their families and, more interestingly, for their organizations. This book provides a wealth of empirical evidence from around the globe, as well as innovative conceptual frameworks, to help practitioners and researchers alike to go beyond the classic notion of the “ideal worker” and to rethink what companies actually need from their employees. As it demonstrates, doing so will be beneficial for countless men and women, and for society at large.
Download or read book CEO Compensation System of New York Stock Exchange Financial Services Companies written by Yusuf Nulla and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 9 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigated CEO compensation system of NYSE Financial Services companies. It tested the relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting firm performance, and corporate governance, from 2005 to 2010. The totaled of twenty five companies were selected through random sample method from NYSE index companies. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting firm performance, and corporate governance? To answer this question, nine statistical models were created and tested. It was found that, overall, there was a relationship between CEO salary, CEO bonus, CEO total compensation, firm size, accounting firm performance, and corporate governance. The correlations between CEO salary, CEO total compensation, and firm size were ranged from weak to good positive ratios. The correlation between CEO bonus and firm size was found to be weak positive. The correlations between CEO salary, CEO bonus, CEO total compensation, firm performance, and CEO power, were found to be ranged from weak to strong mixed ratios.
Download or read book The Relationship Between South African CEO Compensation and Company Performance in the Banking Industry written by Benno Deysel and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This exploratory study is based on a statistical data analysis to determine whether a long-term correlation is present between South African CEO compensation and company performance in the banking sector. The detailed analysis, using a seven-year time period, is performed at individual company level as well as at sector level and includes two measures of company performance, namely market performance (share price) and accounting performance (return on equity, EBITDA and HEPS). The study is based on the agency theory, which postulates that linking CEO compensation to company performance is a means of reducing agency monitoring costs. It takes into account the historical and current trends in CEO compensation, including King III and its “say-on-pay” provision. Six out of seven null hypotheses were accepted in the study, indicating a long-term correlation between CEO compensation and variables such as company performance, average employee salary, general market performance and inflation. No correlation was found with company size.
Download or read book The Importance of Firm Ownership on CEO Compensation written by Yusuf Nulla and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This important study in executive compensation topic investigated the importance of firm ownership on the CEO compensation system in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies. This research had compared the CEO compensation system of the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies from 2005 to 2010. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between the CEO cash compensation, the firm size, the accounting firm performance, and the corporate governance, among the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies? It was found that, there was a relationship between the CEO salary, the CEO bonus, the total compensation, the firm size, the accounting firm performance, and the corporate governance, among the owner-managed and the management-controlled companies.
Download or read book The Influence of the Board of Directors on the Executive Compensation in the Banking Industry written by Nesrine Ayadi and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this study is to examine the effect of the attributes of the board of directors on the compensation of the CEO of thirty European commercial banks. This research uses a technique of static panel data over the period 2004-2009. The study was conducted on a sample of thirty banks in four European countries. The results of our study suggest that the relationship between the size of the Board and the CEO's compensation is positive and statistically significant. Similarly, our results show that the presence of a proportion of independent directors in the Board improves the compensation of the CEO. They also indicate that improving the compensation of the CEO is also due to his power in the Board since he is its chairman. This study shows that the Board of directors acts as the primary mechanism of internal control designed to align the shareholders and managers' conflicting interests. However, the Board has an important role in defining the executives' compensation; therefore, its power depends on the members that compose it. This study also indicates that the independence quality of the board's members affects the compensation policy to improve the CEO's compensation depending on the banking performance. Moreover, this study suggests that the banking performance is related to the CEO's compensation through the attributes of the board. It therefore gives an overview of the impact of a complementary relationship between the board mechanism and that of the CEO's compensation. This study provides an overview on the complementary between the mechanism of the board and the CEO's compensation.
