Download or read book A Study of the Relationship Between Changes in the Corporate Governance Mechanism CEO Turnover and Performance in Declining Firms written by Ashay Bhalchandra Desai and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 174 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book written by _春燕、_田交_ and published by 西南財經大學出版社. This book was released on 2018-02-28 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: �公司治理__受到__界和__界人士的_泛_注。_有研究_注更多的是西方成熟__体的公司治理__。在新_市__家，_中小股__益的法律保_相比成熟__体有所欠缺，如何_解控股股__中小股__富的侵占__是公司治理的一_重要__。中_公司所有__构高度集中、存在非流通股，容易_生大股__中小股_利益的侵占__。由_春燕、_田交_著的《公司治理_构与治理机制研究--基于金融危机股_分置改革的_角》_用中__据研究公司治理机制如何保_中小股_利益的__。具体__，本_研究了以下三_方面的__：(1)在全球金融危机期_公司治理机制_公司市___的影_；(2)高管更替后公司市___的_期表_；(3)公司_金股利支付与公司所有__构之_的_系。已有文___了中_公司治理_公司__的影_，本_在受到更少治理_量內生性__影_的研究_置下再一次__中_公司治理_公司__的影_。 2007—2009年全球金融危机___公司__是不可__的，采用全球金融危机期_的_据__治理机制_公司__的影_可以避免治理_量的內生性__。研 究__在金融危机前表_差一些的_有企_在金融危机期_反而表_更好了，特_是那些公司所有__构集中和_行__多的_有企_。__果表明集中的_家所有__解了金融危机期__有企_的__困境。_研究___在控制了各种公司特征_量后，管理者持股与有企_金融危机期_的市___呈_著正相__系，表明管理者持股_解了_有企_的委托代理__。最后，___聘用有__的___事_所_任__的公司在全球金危机期___了更少的市___下降。 2005年，_了消除非流通股，中______了股_分置改革，__中_的公司治理_构__了巨大_化。本_分_探究了股_分置改革前后高管更替公司的市___表_，_果表明股_分置改革前高管更替_有改_公司市___，但在股_分置改革完成后，_那些投_者股票回___的公司的高管_行更替后，公司股票__取得了_著改善。_表明在股_分置改革后，公司控股股_有_力去_戒市___表_ 差的公司高管。 本_探究了中_上市公司_金股利支付相_的侵占__，具体研究了股_分置改革前后非流通比例的改_、控股股_持股比例的改_与公司_金股利支付_化的_系。本_研究表明，在中_，由于_中小股_保__不足，加上集中的所有__构，控股股_的_机非常重要。股_分置改革在一定程度上使控股股_与中小股_的利益__一致，但是只要控股股_有_机持有充足的股份以_到他_控制公司的目的，控股股_与中小股_之_的利益_突就不_完全消除。

Download or read book Corporate Governance in Less Developed and Emerging Economies written by Matthew Tsamenyi and published by Emerald Group Publishing. This book was released on 2008-12-01 with total page 565 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance reform has become an important global policy agenda driven by events such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, corporate scandals (such as Enron and WorldCom) and the globalisation of capital markets. This book advances debate on corporate governance, accountability and transparency in less developed and emerging economies.

Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.

Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 678 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book Essays on Executive Turnover written by Johan Maharjan and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 1 deviates from the conventional practice by highlighting an alternative to forced CEO turnover. An interesting puzzle in corporate finance is the week sensitivity of disciplinary action against CEO to poor firm performance. I show that this weak relation is in part driven by an overlooked alternative to firing, which in practice takes the form of splitting the CEO-Chairman role or demoting the incumbent CEO to the executive Chairman position. I first document that such demotions are a frequently used alternative disciplinary mechanism, accounting for nearly 40% of all involuntary CEO transitions. I further show that the use of this mechanism is concentrated among firms in which the CEO is most entrenched or the cost of firing its CEO is high, i.e. CEOs with firm or industry-specific managerial skills and those with strong long-term performance and weak governance. Market reactions to CEO demotions are positive, on average. Finally, I show that classifying CEO demotions as an alternative form of involuntary turnover magnifies the sensitivity of involuntary turnover to firm performance and eliminates the relation between performance and voluntary turnover. In chapter 2, we examine the role of deferred vesting of stock and option grants in reducing executive turnover. To the extent an executive forfeits all unvested stock and option grants if she leaves the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit. Using pay Duration proposed in Gopalan, et al., (forthcoming) as a measure of the length of managerial pay, we find that CEOs and non-CEO executives with longer pay Duration are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily. Employing the vesting of a large prior-year stock/option grant as an instrument for Duration, we find the effect to be causal. CEOs with longer pay Duration are also less likely to experience a forced turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower in firms that offer longer duration pay. Overall, our study highlights a strong link between compensation design and turnover for top executives. Finally, in chapter 3, we develop and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover. Investors may disagree with management on the optimal course of corporate actions due to heterogeneous prior beliefs. Such disagreement may be persistent and costly to firms, and thus create incentives for firms to replace CEOs who investors tend to disagree with. We use this logic to develop and provide evidence for three hypotheses. First, firms with higher investor-management disagreement are more likely to fire their CEOs, and this effect is more pronounced in more-financially-constrained firms as well as those with less-entrenched CEOs and stronger shareholder governance. Second, firms are more likely to hire an external CEO as a successor if investor-management disagreement with the departing CEO is higher. Third, investor-management disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. Thus, the evidence sheds new light on how disagreement between management and investors shapes one important aspect of corporate governance--the replacement of CEOs.

Download or read book Essays in Corporate Governance written by Lixiong Guo and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance written by Tih Koon Tan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 83 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in S & P firms. The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the S & P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace him/her. This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive compensation levels. I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize. In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market. The heterogeneity index seems to proxy for internal labor market competition.

Download or read book Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance written by Shveta Singh and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2022-05-12 with total page 204 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book begins by analysing the various corporate governance mechanisms explored in the extant literature and determining their effectiveness in enhancing the firm value using multivariate analysis. The findings are of global relevance as the corporate governance regulations of most countries focus on independent directors as the mainstay of good governance. The empirical evidence from the first objective of this study corroborates the claim that independent directors do not strengthen the firms’ governance quality. The book is one of the few works to have analysed the possible reasons behind the ineffectiveness of the independent directors. Also, in view of the famous concept of the bundle of governance mechanisms, it might be possible that the independent directors strengthen the firms’ governance quality indirectly by strengthening other governance mechanisms. This aspect too has little precedence. This study adopts a novel moderation and mediation approach to analyse the monitoring behaviour of independent directors in relation to other governance mechanisms. The work is a must read for corporate players as well as researchers and scholars studying this discipline.

Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.

Download or read book Corporate Governance Performance and CEO Turnover written by Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years, an increasing share of researches on Finance have placed attention to the study of corporate governance, highlighting its implications to the global performance of companies. One of the ways to assess the structures and practices of the corporate governance is to verify the sensibility of executives' turnover to the company performance. In this article we aim at checking if the determinants of executives' turnover in Brazilian companies may be different between family and non-family businesses from the governance viewpoint. The analysis is conducted having as reference a set of 176 industrial businesses listed at Bovespa, segmented by type (family or non-family), between 1997 and 2001. The contribution of this study is in the peculiarities involving the family businesses and which have not been considered in Brazilian researches, and by offering elements to reflect theoretically about the performance of family businesses and their governance structures. The results reveal the existence of significant differences in performance, value and structures of corporate governance between family and non-family businesses. It has also been observed that the companies which obtained better profitability tended to implement a smaller turnover.

Download or read book Corporate Governance and the Timeliness of Change written by Rajeswarar S. Chaganti and published by Bloomsbury Publishing USA. This book was released on 1998-08-27 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The ability to implement change quickly is crucial to an organizations's success—not only in traditionally sedate industries, but also in today's fast-moving hi-tech ones. Sherman and Chaganti, from their study of 100 American corporations, half in stable industries, half in volatile ones, find that a firm's structure of governance bears heavily on the speed with which the firm can reorient itself. What are the characteristics of firms that change quickly? What inhibits others? And what, precisely, is the impact of a firm's stockholders, board and top management on its ability to adapt? Sherman and Chaganti provide answers to these and other questions, in the first book yet to focus entirely on the determinants of time in corporate reorientations. In order for a firm to develop or sustain a competitive advantage, it must not only adapt correctly to environmental change, but also adapt quickly. This study examines the factors associated with the time a firm takes to initiate reorientation. The results of the research indicate that even in relatively large organizations, reorientations are not rare and occur routinely. Further, deterioration of a firm's financial condition tends to hasten its initiation of reorientation. However, the determinants of time taken to initiate reorientation differ in firms with relatively high prior performance and firms with relatively low prior performance.

Download or read book The Impact of Forced CEO Turnover Announcements on Shareholder Value written by Roman Stebler and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the impact of forced CEO turnover announcements on shareholder value as measured by stock-price-based and accounting-based performance measures. Using a unique sample of 311 CEO turnover events at firms listed on the SP500 Index between 2000 and 2010, the study investigates the actual empirical relation between firing decisions of the board of directors and how capital markets perceives the quality and effectiveness of these decisions. This paper investigates the prevailing assumption that forced CEO turnovers in every sense represent positive news to shareholders and provides new evidence that shareholder critically differentiate between the dismissal of out- and underperforming top managers yet do not explicitly disesteem the dismissal of outperforming CEOs. Despite, analysis of changes in operating return on assets urge that ousting outperforming executives tends to have an adverse impact on firm value. The findings are further confirmed in a multivariate cross-sectional regression. Informative results from the regressions also indicate that shareholders seem to be more concerned with forced turnovers in times of overall economic downturn. Moreover, analysis on the causes of dismissal suggests that in a considerable number of events the board's explanation for ousting the incumbent CEO lacks credibility and that shareholders seem to assess top executives partially but not exclusively on the basis of past performance. Overall, the results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on shareholders based on the example of forced CEO turnovers.

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance written by Ruud A.I. van Frederikslust and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2007-12-18 with total page 1313 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Ruud. A. I. van Frederikslust, Associate Professor of Finance, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam James S. Ang, Bank of America Eminent Scholar, Professor of Finance, College of Business, The Florida State University Sudi Sudarsanam, Professor of Finance & Corporate Control, School of Management, Cranfield University Ruud. A. I. van Frederikslust, Associate Professor of Finance, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam. He joined Rotterdam School of Management as Associate Professor of Finance 1984 from the Inter-University Graduate School of Management, The Netherlands, where he was Associate Professor of Finance. He is author of the work Predictability of Corporate Failure (Kluwer Academic Publishers). And editor in chief of the volume of collection: Mergers & Acquisitions (in Dutch) and of the volume Corporate Restructuring and Recovery (in Dutch) (Reed Elsevier LexisNexis). He has participated in the organizations of leading conferences in Europe and the USA and presented there also numerous research papers at the conferences. He has published in leading journals like the Multinational Finance Journal and the Journal of Financial Transformation. He was a member of the Board of the European Finance Association. James S. Ang, Bank of America Eminent Scholar, Professor of Finance, College of Business, Florida State University. He joined the College of Business, of Florida State University as a Professor of Finance in 1998 from Barnett Bank Chair Professor of Finance, Florida State University. His main areas of research interest are amongst others, in corporate restructuring, corporate governance and control. He has published extensively in leading academic journals like Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Finance, The Bell Journal of Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, and The Review of Economics and Statistics. And he is a member (current and past) of the Editorial Board of several of these Journals. He is amongst others a member of the Board of Trustees of the Financial Management Association and formerly he was a member of the Board of Directors of the European Financial Management Association. Sudi Sudarsanam, Professor of Finance & Corporate Control, School of Management, Cranfield University. He joined Cranfield as Professor of Finance and Corporate Control on the 1 January 2000 from City University Business School where he was Professor of Finance and Accounting. His original commercial background was in banking and international trade finance. Sudi’s main areas of research interest are in corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions and corporate strategy, adopting a multidisciplinary approach. He is one of the leading authorities on mergers and acquisitions in Europe and author of The Essence of Mergers and Acquisitions (Prentice Hall), translated into five European and Asian languages. His recent book, Creating value from mergers and acquisitions: the challenges, an international and integrated perspective (FT Prentice Hall, 2003, pp613) has been widely acclaimed by both academics and practitioners and is considered a standard work on M & A. He has been a visiting professor at US and European business schools. He has been an expert commentator on mergers and acquisitions on radio and television and in the print media. Sudi has also published articles in top US and European journals on corporate restructuring, corporate governance and valuation of intellectual assets.

Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward

Download or read book Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover written by Mark R. Huson and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.