Download or read book A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence written by Mr.Eric Le Borgne and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2003-07-01 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
Download or read book A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence written by Gauti B. Eggertsson and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic New-Keynesian stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
Download or read book A political agency theory of central bank independence written by Gauti ; Le Borgne Eggertsson (Eric) and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Central Bank Strategy Credibility and Independence written by Alex Cukierman and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1992 with total page 532 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.
Download or read book Bankers Bureaucrats and Central Bank Politics written by Christopher Adolph and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-04-15 with total page 389 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence Targets and Credibility written by Francesco Lippi and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1999-01-27 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.
Download or read book The Politics of Central Bank Independence written by and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician endogenously gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. Applied to monetary policy, this theory (i) formalizes the rationale for delegation highlighted by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, and by Alan S. Blinder, former Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and (ii) does not rely on the inflation bias that underlies most existing theories of central bank independence. Delegation trades off the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long-term job contract against the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) has less incentive to pander to public opinion than a politician. Our key theoretical predictions are broadly consistent with the data"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site.
Download or read book Gatekeepers of Growth written by Sylvia Maxfield and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1998-07-13 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.
Download or read book Public Governance of Central Banks written by Yoshiharu Oritani and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The governance of central banks has two dimensions: corporate governance and public governance. Public governance is an institutional framework whereby the general public governs a central bank by and through the legislative and executive bodies in a country. This paper argues that the literature of new institutional economics sheds new light on the public governance of central banks. First, Williamson's theory of 'governance as integrity' (probity) is applied to the internal management of central banks. Moe's theory of 'public bureaucracy' is applied to the concept of central bank independence. Second, we apply agency theory to the issues associated with central bank independence and accountability. Third, public choice theory is applied to central bank independence.
Download or read book Bankers Bureaucrats and Central Bank Politics written by Christopher Adolph and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-04-15 with total page 389 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by Jan Kleineman and published by BRILL. This book was released on 2021-10-18 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In December 1999, prior to the forming of a Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law, an international symposium entitled Central Bank Independence was held at the Department of Law at Stockholm University in co-operation with the Swedish Central Bank (The Riksbank) and Queen Mary and Westfield College, London University. The participants were principally political, economic and legal specialists in the field, all with considerable international experience. This led to the topic being examined in detail from many different perspectives. This publication includes contributions by the participants and contains many important facts for those readers who wish to study and understand the different consequences of the yielding of control over financial policymaking by the traditional political organisations to a body of experts. For readers in some countries, who realise that the subject will revolutionise traditional Constitutional and Administrative Law, the topic and therefore this publication, cannot be ignored.
Download or read book The Political Economy of Central bank Independence written by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger and published by International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers. This book was released on 1996 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Japanese Central Banking System Compared with Its European and American Counterparts written by Yoshiharu Oritani and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-07-09 with total page 327 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book uniquely explores the role and governance mechanism of central banks by applying new institutional economics (NIE). Simultaneously, the book tests the analytical viability of NIE when applied to an organization that has both public and private characteristics. Special attention is paid to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) based on the author’s 30 years of work experience and “participant observation” there, touching upon discussion of central bank independence. The book argues that central bank independence cannot be defended solely by law, and a mechanism to eliminate requests from politicians needs to be embedded within the governance structure. The book also provides a comparative analysis between the BOJ and central banks in Europe and the USA. In reviewing the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, it suggests possible measures based on behavioral economics and public choice theory. These theory-based analyses provide useful insights when considering matters such as whether a central bank should issue electronic money or the European system of central banks could be established in Asia.
Download or read book Central Banking as a Political Principal Agent Problem written by Michele U. Fratianni and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Due to their ties with elected leaders, central bankers may pursue policies that are not in society's best interests. Consequently, the relationship between the public and the central bank can be characterized as a principal-agent problem. An inflation and a stabilization bias arise as a result of this agency problem and the magnitudes of these biases depend on the political environment. Various institutional proposals for eliminating these biases are examined, and we find that central bank independence and performance contracts work best. However, we argue that central bank independence is preferable for resolving the agency problem.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by International Monetary Fund and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1991-06-01 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There has been growing interest recently in the scope for promoting monetary stability through the establishment of independent central banks. This paper reviews the issues involved in central bank independence against the background of arrangements in nine countries. The analysis suggests that detailed institutional arrangements would need to be carefully designed if the potential benefits of central bank independence are to be delivered. Particularly important are the nature of arrangements to resolve various types of conflicts involving monetary policy, and arrangements to promote accountability and public monitoring of monetary policy performance.
Download or read book Unelected Power written by Paul Tucker and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2019-09-10 with total page 662 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.
Download or read book Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions written by Philip Keefer and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2000 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions.
