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Book A Comparison of Standard Multi unit Auctions with Synergies

Download or read book A Comparison of Standard Multi unit Auctions with Synergies written by Gian Luigi Albano and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 6 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Artificial Economics

    Book Details:
  • Author : Ces Reo Hern Ndez
  • Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
  • Release : 2011-09-28
  • ISBN : 3642029574
  • Pages : 280 pages

Download or read book Artificial Economics written by Ces Reo Hern Ndez and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2011-09-28 with total page 280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Simulation is used in economics to solve large econometric models, for large-scale micro simulations, and to obtain numerical solutions for policy design in top-down established models. But these applications fail to take advantage of the methods offered by artificial economics (AE) through artificial intelligence and distributed computing. AE is a bottom-up and generative approach of agent-based modelling developed to get a deeper insight into the complexity of economics. AE can be viewed as a very elegant and general class of modelling techniques that generalize numerical economics, mathematical programming and micro simulation approaches. The papers presented in this book address methodological questions and applications of AE to macroeconomics, industrial organization, information and learning, market dynamics, finance and financial markets.

Book Multi Unit Auctions

    Book Details:
  • Author : Alejandro Manelli
  • Publisher :
  • Release : 2000
  • ISBN :
  • Pages : 0 pages

Download or read book Multi Unit Auctions written by Alejandro Manelli and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction recently introduced by Ausubel (1997). We evaluate the relative performance of both auctions in terms of efficiency and revenue in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We find that the Ausubel auction is less prone to overbidding and may yield higher revenue than the Vickrey auction. The gain in revenue seems to be coupled with a loss of efficiency.

Book SOFSEM 2009  Theory and Practice of Computer Science

Download or read book SOFSEM 2009 Theory and Practice of Computer Science written by Mogens Nielsen and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2009-01-12 with total page 685 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 35th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, SOFSEM 2009, held in Špindleruv Mlýn, Czech Republic, in January 2009. The 49 revised full papers, presented together with 9 invited contributions, were carefully reviewed and selected from 132 submissions. SOFSEM 2009 was organized around the following four tracks: Foundations of Computer Science; Theory and Practice of Software Services; Game Theoretic Aspects of E-commerce; and Techniques and Tools for Formal Verification.

Book Journal of Economics

Download or read book Journal of Economics written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 366 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions

Download or read book Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions written by Flavio F. Menezes and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book An Example of Multi unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria

Download or read book An Example of Multi unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Multi unit Auctions with Complementarities

Download or read book Multi unit Auctions with Complementarities written by Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Multi unit Auctions in which Almost Every Bid Wins

Download or read book Multi unit Auctions in which Almost Every Bid Wins written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Efficient Multi Unit Auctions for Normal Goods

Download or read book Efficient Multi Unit Auctions for Normal Goods written by Brian Baisa and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single-dimensional types. I also present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies Vickrey's desired properties and weak budget balance when bidders have multi-dimensional types.

Book Monotone Equilibrium in Multi unit Auctions

Download or read book Monotone Equilibrium in Multi unit Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) nondecreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private. Keywords: Autions, Multi-unit Auctions, Uniform-price Auction, Vickrey Auctions Bidders, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.

Book Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi unit Auctions

Download or read book Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi unit Auctions written by Lawrence Marc Ausubel and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Multi unit Auctions with Incomplete Information

Download or read book Multi unit Auctions with Incomplete Information written by Brett E. Katzman and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Large Multi Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder

Download or read book Large Multi Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder written by Brian Baisa and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We compare equilibrium bidding in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when a single large bidder (i.e., with multi-unit demand) competes against many small bidders, each with single-unit demands. We show that the large bidder prefers the discriminatory auction over the uniform-price auction, and we provide general conditions under which small bidders have the reverse preference. We also show that the discriminatory auction provides greater incentives for the large bidder to invest in increased capacity, while the uniform-price auction provides greater incentives for small bidders to enter the auction. We use examples to show that the efficiency and revenue rankings of the two auctions are ambiguous.

Book Multi unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single unit Demand

Download or read book Multi unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single unit Demand written by Edward J. Anderson and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.

Book Essays on Multi unit Auctions

Download or read book Essays on Multi unit Auctions written by Jinsoo Bae (Ph. D. in economics) and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 114 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 3 studies a pro-competitive effect of joint bidding in multi-unit uniform price auctions where bidders have private values and demand different quantities of units. I analyze a simple model with three identical items for sale, two small bidders each demanding a single unit, and a big bidder demanding two units. I show that joint bidding of the two small bidders, which recovers the symmetry of bidders, enhances competition among the bidders and increases efficiency and revenue of the auction.